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Abstract 
 
Sexual violence is morally abhorrent and occurs with appalling frequency. In this 
thesis, I argue that we are correct to recognise sexual violence as seriously 
wrongful. Specifically, I argue that sexual attacks perpetrate a wrong that is not 
present in non-sexual attacks. 
This thesis begins by raising a problem for widely held views in sexual ethics. In 
order to explain why sexual attacks perpetrate a distinct wrong in virtue of being 
sexual attacks, it seems that we are committed to the view that there is something 
morally special about sexual contact. The worry is that this might presuppose or 
entail conservative or restrictive approaches to sexual ethics and/or a traditional and 
misogynist view of women and women’s sexuality. I formulate this problem as the 
traditionalist’s challenge. 
My focus in this thesis is on responding to this challenge, explaining the distinct 
wrongness of sexual attacks without appeal to a traditional or overly moralised 
approach to sexual contact. I discuss a range of accounts of the wrongness of sexual 
attacks. These explain the wrongness of sexual attacks by appeal to the victim’s 
psychological suffering, the assailant’s objectification of the victim, the importance of 
sex to a person’s identity, and the victim’s rights over their own body. I argue that 
each of these accounts is not entirely successful, but that they provide resources 
that are useful for explaining the wrong of sexual attacks. 
Finally, I advance my own proposal. I develop an account of what it is for an attack 
to be sexual, arguing that an attack is sexual when the assailant sexualises the 
victim, which depends on the expressive significance of the contact imposed. I then 
argue that the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks can be explained by the 
expressive meanings attributed to this contact. 
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Introduction 
 
Rape and many forms of sexual assault are typically recognised as abhorrent moral 
wrongs. There is a range of other attacks and impositions, such as groping, 
voyeurism, indecent exposure (flashing), and unwelcome comments (cat-calling), 
which are generally recognised as having a sexual component. In this thesis, I argue 
that sexual attacks involve a distinct wrong that is not present in non-sexual attacks. 
The sexual nature of an attack makes the attack more seriously wrongful, and we 
have good reason to treat sexual assault differently to common assault. 
There are many reasons that I take this project to be important. First, sexual 
violence is both extremely harmful and tragically frequent. As I discuss in Chapter 2, 
the psychological impact of sexual assault is often devastating. Even when sexual 
attacks do not have this impact, they nevertheless constitute serious wrongs. At the 
same time, these attacks are alarmingly common. The Crime Survey for England and 
Wales (CSEW) in the year ending March 2017 estimates that 12.1% (approximately 
4 million) of adults between the ages of 16 and 59 have been subjected to sexual 
assault since they were 16 (Office for National Statistics 2018). It also estimates 
that, in the preceding 12-month period, 0.5% were subjected to rape or assault by 
penetration and 1.7% to indecent exposure or “unwanted sexual touching” (Office 
for National Statistics 2018). Women are far more likely to be subjected to sexual 
assault, with the survey estimating that 20.3% have been attacked since age 16 and 
3.1% in the last year alone (Office for National Statistics 2018; Travis 2018). In the 
British National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles conducted between 2010 
and 2012 (Natsal-3), researchers asked participants if anyone had ever made them 
have sex against their will. 19.4% of women and 4.7% of men reported that 
someone had attempted to make them have sex against their will, and 9.8% of 
women 1.4% of men reported that someone had “completed” sex against their will 
(Macdowall et al. 2013; Spiegelhalter 2015, 283–84).1 Sexual violence is horrific and 
occurs with shocking frequency; we have good reason to enhance our 
understanding. 
Second, the criminal law in many jurisdictions is such that non-consensual sexual 
contact constitutes separate offences to non-sexual contact, and these sexual 
offences carry higher criminal penalties as a result. Philosophical analysis of sexual 
offences is necessary to justify and appropriately apply these provisions of criminal 
justice. In Section 1.2, I show that there is an international trend of higher criminal 
penalties for sexual assault than for non-sexual assault and suggest that this relies 
                                                          
1 We should allow for the possibility that survey participants were unwilling to disclose that they have 
been sexually assaulted and that the survey therefore underestimates the prevalence of sexual 
assault. 
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on the moral claim that sexual attacks involve a distinct wrong. In Section 5.2, I 
argue that the very notion of what it is for an attack to be sexual is unclear, leading 
to inconsistencies in the application of criminal law. The application and justification 
of distinct sexual offences in law relies on an account of what it is for non-
consensual contact to be sexual and an argument that these are distinctly wrongful. 
I engage with these problems as central foci in the thesis and believe that my 
project therefore has important implications for our criminal legal practices. 
Third, while the existing philosophical literature on the wrong of sexual attacks is 
extensive, sophisticated, and insightful, there is scope for a novel perspective on 
these issues. The existing literature focuses quite narrowly on the wrongness of 
rape. As I detail in Section 1.8, I believe that this overlooks a more general 
phenomenon whereby a much broader class of sexual attacks involve distinct 
wrongs. Examining the full range of these cases can provide an important insight 
into the wrongness of rape that is obscured when one focuses on rape and not on 
other sexual attacks.  
Furthermore, accounts of the wrongness of rape typically stipulate a definition of 
‘rape’ or ‘sexual assault’ without examining what distinguishes these conceptually 
from non-sexual attacks. That is, there are no sustained attempts in the 
philosophical literature, to my knowledge, to explain what it is that makes an attack 
sexual. In Chapter 5, I engage with this question. Unlike many other accounts of the 
wrongness of sexual attacks, my account proceeds from an analysis of what sexual 
attacks are. 
Philosophical inquiry into these issues is pressing and important. All the same, we 
should not lose sight of the fact that sexual violence is appallingly frequent and often 
severely traumatic. Philosophical methodology lends itself to abstraction. It therefore 
carries a risk that inquiry into the wrongness of sexual violence can become 
insensitive to the experiences of those who are subjected to these attacks and 
overlook that these are actual atrocities perpetrated against real victims.2 
Accordingly, I endeavour to draw on real-life cases rather than on more abstract 
thought experiments where this is possible and appropriate, and to appeal to the 
experiences and testimony of survivors of sexual violence where writing on this is 
available. All the same, I worry that my discussion at times becomes abstracted from 
the horrifying real-world experiences and consequences of systemic sexual violence. 
I can only ask that the reader be patient and forgiving if this is the case. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 1, I explain and motivate the 
problem. I first explain in more detail the idea that sexual attacks are distinctly 
wrongful. I then explain a formulation of this problem offered by David Benatar. 
Benatar (2002) argues that one can only explain the distinct wrong of sexual attacks 
                                                          
2 I use the term ‘victim’ rather than ‘survivor’ to accommodate those cases in which the assailant kills 
the person targeted in a sexual attack. 
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by appealing to the view that sex is morally permissible only within a committed 
relationship of romantic love. Benatar’s categorisation of approaches to sexual ethics 
is reflected widely in the philosophical literature, but I argue that his formulation of 
the underlying problem is nevertheless flawed. I advance my own formulation of the 
underlying problem, which I call the traditionalist’s challenge. According to the 
traditionalist’s challenge, one can only explain the distinct wrong of sexual attacks by 
endorsing the claim that sex is morally special, and this view of sex entails a 
restrictive sexual ethic. In the remaining chapters, I consider a series of accounts 
that can be understood as attempts to answer the traditionalist’s challenge and 
explain the distinct wrong of sexual attacks in a way that does not commit one to a 
restrictive sexual ethic. 
In Chapter 2, I consider two accounts of the wrongness of rape, offered by Alan 
Wertheimer (2003) and John Gardner and Stephen Shute (2007). Wertheimer 
argues that rape is distinctly wrongful because it causes such severe suffering for 
the victim, while Gardner and Shute argue that it objectifies or uses the victim in a 
way that other assaults do not insofar as it subverts the social meaning of 
consensual sex. I reject these accounts but argue that objections against them offer 
an insight into the form that an account of the wrong of sexual attacks should take. 
Wertheimer’s account, and Gardner and Shute’s objections against it, offer a helpful 
model for the role that the experiences and suffering of victims of sexual violence 
should take in an explanation of the wrong of such attacks. Gardner and Shute’s 
account introduces social meaning and objectification, conceptual resources that I 
go on to utilise in developing my own account. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the view that sex is central to a person’s self or identity, and 
so rape is distinctly wrong because it attacks them in a way that targets something 
very important to them. This view is advanced in various forms by Jean Hampton 
(1999), Joan McGregor (1994), Jeffrie Murphy (1994), and Carolyn Shafer and 
Marilyn Frye (1977). I argue that these accounts cannot succeed because there is no 
interpretation of what it means for something to be central to a person’s self-hood, 
identity, humanity, and so on, according to which sex is central in this way for each 
person and attacking someone by targeting something central to who they are is 
distinctly wrongful. I then discuss David Archard’s (2007) development of this view. 
Archard (2007, 391–92) argues that persons are such that we have an important 
interest in sexual integrity, in much the same way as we have interests in happiness, 
knowledge, friendship, and so on. I dispute this argument on the grounds that 
sexual integrity is disanalogous with these other interests. While I disagree with 
these accounts, I find that they contribute important resources for understanding 
the wrong of sexual attacks. These accounts develop a notion of the expressive 
significance of attacks, according to which the assailant, by imposing non-consensual 
contact, conveys something about the victim’s status, value, or entitlements. They 
also provide insight into the claim that the assailant treats or uses the victim as an 
object. 
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In Chapter 4, I examine the view that sexual attacks are wrong insofar as they 
violate the victim’s self-ownership claims over their own body. I first consider a 
formulation of this advanced by Donald Dripps (1992, 1993) and Richard Posner 
(1993), according to which the wrong of sexual attacks is similar in kind to the 
wrong committed when a person’s property rights are violated. I examine objections 
against this kind of account from Gardner and Shute (2007) and draw on the work 
of Gerald Cohen (1995) and Jesse Wall (2015) to show how a self-ownership 
account might overcome these objections. Specifically, I argue that a self-ownership 
account must treat the wrong of sexual attacks as very different in kind to the wrong 
perpetrated when a person’s property rights over their possessions are violated, 
ruling out the kind of view advanced by Dripps and Posner. Following Judith Jarvis 
Thomson (1990, 225–26) and Archard (2008, 29–30), I propose that we view self-
ownership as claims or rights over one’s own body, where self-ownership has 
nothing else in common with ownership of property. I then argue that, while self-
ownership claims might take a necessary role in explaining the wrongness of sexual 
attacks, they should not be understood as grounding the distinct wrong of these 
attacks. 
In Chapter 5, I begin to develop my own account. I do not directly address the 
distinct wrongness of sexual attacks here. Instead, I argue that it is not clear how 
sexual and non-sexual attacks are to be distinguished conceptually and offer my own 
account of what it is for an attack to be sexual. After explaining the problem, I reject 
three accounts of sexual attacks; one that appeals only to popular intuitions, one 
that categorises an attack as sexual in virtue of the body parts involved, and one 
that categorises an attack as sexual in virtue of the assailant’s motivation. According 
to my own account, an attack is sexual insofar as the assailant treats the victim as a 
sex object, or as if they were a tool to be used for sexual gratification. This does not 
mean that the assailant necessarily perpetrates the attack for sexual gratification or 
anything like it. Instead, I argue that some forms of contact acquire what Anne 
Barnhill (2013) calls a “default expressive significance”, and convey that the victim is 
a sexual object regardless of the assailant’s intention or motive. When contact with 
the relevant expressive significance is imposed, the victim is sexualised, and the 
attack is sexual. 
In Chapter 6, I present my account of the wrongness of sexual attacks. Having 
identified what I take to be the distinguishing feature of sexual attacks in Chapter 5, 
I aim to show that this is morally significant and grounds the distinct wrong 
perpetrated in such attacks. I argue, following Hampton (1999), that sexual attacks 
impose a distinct wrong given the expressive harm inflicted onto the victim. These 
attacks convey an attitude towards or statement about the victim given social 
meanings or broad cultural views that are attributed to sexual contact. I propose 
that there is a widespread, and fairly minimal, view of sexual contact that it occurs 
for the gratification or pleasure of at least one party. Sexual contact conveys that 
both parties seek the sexual gratification of at least one of the participants. Sexual 
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attacks are therefore particularly cruel because the assailant not only violates the 
victim’s self-ownership claims, but also conveys that they are complicit in the attack 
on themselves. There is a kind of victim-blaming implicit in the contact imposed in 
sexual attacks. 
There are some limitations to my project, and particularly in my own explanation of 
the distinct wrong of sexual attacks. I offer a framework for grounding a moral 
distinction between sexual and non-sexual attacks, and I believe that my account 
goes a long way towards an explanation, even though some of the detail of my 
account is tentative or yet to be elucidated. Specifically, I leave open some questions 
about how my account would apply in cases in which the relevant expressive 
significance is not attributed to sexual contact and about how the expressive 
significance of acts is morally salient. A full defence of my account would therefore 
require further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Chapter 1 
Benatar's Dilemma and the Traditionalist's Challenge 
 
Section 1.1 – Introduction to Chapter 1 
 
In this chapter, I explain and develop the problem that motivates my project. There 
is a widely-held view that rape and sexual assault are more seriously wrongful than 
most acts of non-sexual assault. If we are to explain this, it seems that the sexual 
nature of these attacks must contribute to their wrongness. However, progressives, 
liberals, and feminists have rejected traditional beliefs about sexual activity more 
generally, according to which sex is especially significant, mysterious, and central to 
women’s lives. It is therefore difficult to make sense of the claim that the sexual 
nature of an assault exacerbates the wrongness of this assault. As we move towards 
seeing consensual sex as just another enjoyable thing people do together, it is hard 
to see how it could carry the kind of significance that would make sexual assault 
morally worse than non-sexual assault. 
I examine a challenge to the claim that sexual attacks, qua sexual attacks, involve a 
distinct wrong. Benatar (2002) argues that one can only make sense of this by 
adopting a view that sex is special, which itself entails a conservative or restrictive 
sexual ethic for consensual contact. I consider a range of conceptions of sex and 
their resulting sexual ethical frameworks to show that Benatar presents a compelling 
problem. However, I argue that his challenge does not fully capture the underlying 
problem at play, and formulate my own version of this, which I call the 
traditionalist’s challenge. 
In Section 1.2, I note the view that sexual attacks involve a distinct wrong and set 
out some conceptual resources that I will draw on throughout the thesis. In Section 
1.3, I explain Benatar’s dilemma. In Sections 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6, I explain a range of 
approaches to sexual ethics in order show the force of the challenge that Benatar 
advances. In Section 1.7, I argue that Benatar’s dilemma is not the best mechanism 
to capture the relevant underlying problem. I develop my own formulation of this, 
the traditionalist’s challenge, in Section 1.8. I close in Section 1.9 with some 
comments about the scope of the problem I set out and its links to the existing 
philosophical literature on rape. 
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Section 1.2 – 
The Problem and Some Methodological Preliminaries 
 
In this thesis, I aim to explain why sexual assault is seriously wrongful. Specifically, I 
hope to show that non-consensual sexual contact is more seriously wrongful insofar 
as it is sexual and that the sexual nature of an assault aggravates the wrongness of 
the assault. In this section, I note the widespread intuition that sexual violence 
constitutes a serious and distinct kind of wrongdoing and set out some conceptual 
resources that I find helpful in approaching this issue. 
There is a widespread belief that rape and many forms of sexual assault are 
seriously wrong. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear them described as some of the 
worst acts that one person can perpetrate against another. In many jurisdictions, a 
conviction for rape carries a very high penalty, and one that is higher than many 
other crimes. In the UK, for example, rape carries a maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment (Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 1). The legal penalties for non-consensual 
sexual touching more generally are often significantly higher than for non-sexual 
battery.3 This might reflect a broad recognition in these societies that sexual assault 
involves a distinct wrong that is not present in any or most cases of non-sexual 
assault. Jed Rubenfeld (2013, 1387) notes that every case of rape could be charged 
and punished as “assault or battery”, but that most jurisdictions recognise rape and 
sexual assault as distinct crimes with greater punishments than apply to (other) 
forms of assault. If this legal framework is to be justified, and assuming that the 
legal punishment for a crime should be proportionate to the wrongness of the crime 
(von Hirsch 1992), we require an explanation of what it is that makes sexual assault 
seriously wrong, and more serious than common assault, all other things being 
equal. 
Many philosophers propose that sexual attacks involve a special wrong. For instance, 
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1990, 210) suggests that “trespass that takes the form of 
sexual use of a person is [arguably] the profoundest insult.” Stephen Law (2009, 69) 
claims that the sexual aspect of rape “usually makes it a more serious form of 
                                                          
3 In the UK, non-sexual assault only carries a similar penalty to sexual assault when it causes severe 
injury to the victim (Sentencing Council 2011, 3, 11, 23; The Crown Prosecution Service n.d.; 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s 39; Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 1-3). In Australia, sexual 
assault that does not meet the conditions for some other crime (such as rape) carries a maximum 
penalty of between 5 years and 10 years imprisonment, while the maximum penalty for common 
assault is between 6 months and 5 years imprisonment, each depending on the state (Crimes Act 
1900 (ACT), s. 60, 335; Crimes Act 1900  (NSW), s. 61, 61KC; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT), s. 188; 
Criminal Code Act 1899 (QLD), s. 335, 352; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s. 20, 56; 
Crimes Act 1956 (VIC), s. 31, 39; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), s. 313, 323). In 
Canada, sexual assault carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment while common assault 
carries a maximum penalty of 6 months (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, s. 271, 787). 
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assault than mere physical, violent assault”; and Jonathan Herring (2005, 516) 
proposes that “not only should a person not touch you against your will but a 
particular wrong is done…when that touching is of a sexual nature.” Alan Soble 
(1996, 134) argues that such attacks are often particularly humiliating exactly 
because they are sexual and that assailants impose non-consensual sexual contact in 
order to inflict psychological harm. 
We might pose the problem as follows. All assaults (sexual and non-sexual) can 
minimally be described as unjustified non-consensual touching. Assaults vary hugely 
in severity based on a range of features, including the victim’s physical pain, the 
victim’s emotional suffering, physical injuries sustained by the victim, the 
invasiveness of the contact, the assailant’s motive, the assailant’s recklessness or 
negligence in causing further harm, and so on. One way to understand the relevant 
intuition here is that the sexual nature of an assault also aggravates its wrongness. 
That is, an attack is more seriously wrongful, all other things being equal, if it is a 
sexual attack. 
Considering hypothetical cases may motivate this intuition further. The following are 
cases of sexual assault and corresponding cases of non-sexual assault, which I 
intend to be similar except for the fact that one involves sexual contact and one 
does not. The only morally significant difference appears to be the sexual aspect of 
the sexual assault case. To deny that sexual assault is more seriously wrongful than 
non-sexual assault commits one to the view that these cases are morally equivalent. 
First, in a case of sexual assault, the victim is heavily unconscious. The assailant 
inserts his penis into her mouth and leaves. The victim never has any knowledge of 
the attack. She suffers no physical pain or discomfort, or lasting physical damage. In 
a non-sexual correlate case, the victim is similarly unconscious. The attacker 
repeatedly inserts his finger into the victim’s mouth. 
Second, in the sexual assault case, the assailant grabs and strokes the victim’s 
clothed penis and testicles. In the non-sexual assault correlate, the assailant 
punches the victim’s penis and testicles with a clenched fist. This is painful but 
causes no injury. 
I raise these cases to clarify what it means to say that an attack is more seriously 
wrongful insofar as it is sexual. Strikingly, the attacks in each pair are similar except 
that one is sexual and one is non-sexual. Therefore, one can only make sense of the 
claim that the first case is more seriously wrongful than the second by arguing that 
sexual assault is more seriously wrongful than otherwise similar cases of non-sexual 
assault. If there is a morally significant distinction between the cases, this must be 
because the sexual nature of an attack exacerbates its wrongness. 
Throughout this thesis, I will refer to cases like these as ‘otherwise similar’ sexual 
and non-sexual assault. I use this term to stipulate cases for which hthe only morally 
significant difference is that one is sexual and the other is non-sexual. Accordingly, if 
17 
 
there is a moral distinction to be made between then, it must be on the basis that 
one is sexual and this is a morally salient consideration. 
Finally, Archard (2007, 380) defines “core” harms of rape as those that are 
necessarily inflicted in such an attack, and “aggravating” harms as those that may 
exacerbate the wrongness of a particular attack but are not present in each instance 
of rape, such as physical injury, emotional suffering (which will not occur if the 
victim is unconscious and never discovers the attack), pregnancy, the transmission 
of disease, and so on. I focus on the core harms (or wrongs) of sexual attacks 
because I hope that my account will explain the serious wrongness of all sexual 
attacks, even those in which aggravating harm is not present. 
 
Section 1.3 – Benatar’s Dilemma 
 
Benatar offers a compelling formulation of the problem that I have in mind. He 
proposes that there are two dominant approaches to sexual ethics. Either sexual 
acts are subject to the same ethical considerations as non-sexual acts, or sexual acts 
are morally special, and persons should only engage in sexual contact within a loving 
and committed relationship. The first view allows for a more permissive sexual ethic, 
perhaps entailing that all or almost all consensual sex is unproblematic. However, 
Benatar argues that only the latter view accommodates the intuition that sexual 
assault is seriously wrong in virtue of being sexual assault.4 
Benatar (2002, 192) identifies the ‘casual view’ of sexual ethics, according to which 
sexual acts are morally indistinct from non-sexual acts. On this view, the sexual 
status of an act has no bearing on its moral permissibility or value, and sexual acts, 
in virtue of being sexual, are not subject to any further “moral constraints” (Benatar 
2002, 192). Sexual activity is permissible if it is consistent with the moral norms that 
apply to human interaction generally. 
On this view, sex is comparable to the consumption of food. While it is generally 
wrong to steal food and to force other people to eat, it is unproblematic to eat with 
a variety of people and with people one does not know (Benatar 2002, 192). The 
casual view of sex entails that sexual activity is the same, morally speaking. There is 
nothing wrong with promiscuity or with having sex with people one does not know, 
if one adheres to general norms about respecting the autonomy of others (by having 
sex only with consenting partners) and avoiding unnecessary suffering (by being 
                                                          
4 Benatar (2002) also applies this dilemma to sexual contact involving an adult and child, arguing that 
one can only consistently condemn adult-child sex by adopting a sexual ethic that entails conservative 
restrictions on consensual sexual contact between adults. This is outside of the scope of my project, 
in which I focus on non-consensual sexual contact imposed on adults, although I expect that my 
arguments have implications for Benatar’s dilemma as applied to adult-child sex. 
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responsible with contraception and in preventing the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases). When one adheres to these broad moral norms, there is nothing 
problematic in casual sex, paid sex, group sex, public sex, masturbation, and so on. 
Other theorists discuss this view, that a sexual act is morally permissible if it adheres 
to general moral norms that apply beyond the sexual sphere (Goldman 1977, 280–
81; Lee and George 1997, 136–37; Primoratz 1999, 173; Singer 2011, 2). An 
analogy with driving a car is prominent in the philosophical literature (Benn 1999, 
236; Goldman 1977, 280–81; Ruddick 1984, 280; Singer 2011, 2). According to this 
analogy, driving is not morally special in that there are no moral principles or ethical 
considerations that apply only to driving. There are certain moral prescriptions that 
appear to apply only to driving, such as adhering to highway regulations, remaining 
vigilant of pedestrians, and refraining from tailgating, undertaking, speeding, and so 
on. However, these are all straightforwardly derived from more general moral 
norms, usually those of avoiding unnecessary harm to other persons or perhaps 
considerations of fairness. According to the casual view, sexual ethics should be 
understood in a similar way. There are moral norms that apply only to sexual 
contact, but these derive quite straightforwardly from more general norms. Sexual 
assault is impermissible, for the same reasons that all unnecessary non-consensual 
physical contact is impermissible; cheating is impermissible given general norms 
against deception and promise-breaking; safe sex might be morally prescribed given 
general duties to safeguard the health of ourselves and those around us, as well as 
to avoid the negative consequences that often pertain to unintended pregnancies. 
These moral norms are all specific to sexual contact, but clearly emerge as 
applications of more general norms to the sphere of sexual acts. 
Complicating matters, Bernard Williams (2012, 26) suggests that 
it is both possible and reasonable to suppose that there is no distinctively sexual morality, in 
the sense of moral considerations that govern sexual relations and nothing else; while 
admitting the extremely obvious fact that sexual relationships are profoundly and specially 
liable to give rise to moral issues, of trust, exploitation, unconcern for the interests of third 
parties, and so on 
Similarly, Sara Ruddick (1984, 280) claims that “As lovers, we must guard against 
cruelty and betrayal, for we know that sexual experiences provide special 
opportunities for each.” Williams and Ruddick claim that sexual contact is more likely 
than many other spheres of human interaction to involve or lead to moral 
wrongdoing. This does not make sex special in the sense that I discuss here. 
Williams and Ruddick claim that sexual contact is especially likely to involve 
violations of some moral norm, but this is consistent with the view that the only 
moral norms that apply to sex are those that apply more generally. Even if we grant 
that sex is unusually likely to involve moral wrongdoing, the relevant claim for 
proponents of the casual view is that this wrongdoing consists in the violation of 
some general moral norm and not one that applies specifically to sexual contact. We 
might also say that driving a car is “specially liable to give rise to moral issues” (B. 
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Williams 2012, 26) insofar as negligence can lead to severe injury or death to 
oneself and others, so the general moral prescription to avoid harm to others is 
particularly stringent in this context. 
Opposed to this is the significance view. The significance view holds that sexual 
activity is morally permissible only if it is “an expression of (romantic) love” that 
reflects “reciprocal love and affection of the parties” (Benatar 2002, 192). On this 
view, sexual contact is permissible only if it meets two conditions. First, those 
involved must experience romantic love towards each other. Second, the sexual 
contact must reflect the romantic love and affection of those involved. This is more 
restrictive than the casual view and will probably render impermissible all instances 
of casual sex and paid sex, as well as most cases of group sex, given that it is 
difficult to conceive of instances of these acts in which all participants are in a 
relationship of mutual romantic love. We might also think that some sexual acts 
within loving relationships are impermissible on this view, if they fail to reflect the 
romantic love they feel for each other. If, for example, certain sadomasochistic acts 
fail to convey this attitude, then these acts will be impermissible on the significance 
view even where those involved are in love. 
According to Benatar (2002, 196), the casual view cannot accommodate the claim 
that “rape…is a special kind of wrong.” The casual view holds that the sexual status 
of an act has no ethical implications. Therefore, it cannot recognise anything 
especially wrong with these attacks as cases of non-consensual sex. On this view, 
rape is no worse than a non-sexual attack that involves the same degree of 
suffering, bodily injury, physical invasiveness, experienced suffering, and 
psychological trauma.5  The casual view is inconsistent with the claim that I raised in 
Section 1.2, that the sexual status of an attack exacerbates its wrongness. 
This is reflected on Michel Foucault’s (1988, 200–205) comments on rape. Foucault 
(1988, 200) begins by endorsing the casual view as it applies to legal regulation and 
criminal law; no act should be punished just because it is sexual. On this basis, he 
argues that the criminal law should punish rape only as an act of physical violence, 
without increasing the penalty on the grounds that the violence is sexual (Foucault 
1988, 204–5). He proposes that “it may be regarded as an act of violence, possibly 
more serious, but of the same type, as that of punching someone in the face” 
(Foucault 1988, 201). To recognise rape as a separate crime and to punish it more 
severely on this basis presupposes that sexual acts warrant regulation that non-
sexual acts do not, and that sexual organs have a significance and warrant 
                                                          
5 It might be unfair to include experienced suffering and psychological trauma here. On one view, 
sexual violence is more seriously wrong than otherwise similar non-sexual violence exactly because it 
typically involves greater suffering and psychological harm. The claim that sexual assault is not more 
serious than non-sexual assault if the two inflict comparable suffering obscures the fact that sexual 
assault (on this view) inflicts greater suffering. I examine the link between the wrongness of sexual 
attacks and the experienced suffering of victims in Chapter 2. 
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protection that non-sexual body parts do not (Foucault 1988, 201–2). In Foucault’s 
view, this reflects a moralist authoritarian view of sex as special, romanticised, or 
deviant, which ought to be rejected. Ann Cahill (2000, 44–45) succinctly explains his 
view: “why should an assault with a penis be treated any differently in the legal 
world than an assault with any other body part?” She adopts the legal analogue of 
the casual view, arguing that sexual contact should not be punished more severely 
in virtue of being sexual, so that that rape should not be punished except as physical 
violence or common assault. 
Murphy offers a similar observation of the casual view: 
I can imagine someone who has perhaps internalized the sixties view that our society has 
overmoralized sexuality and sexual activity, arguing in this way: Perhaps it is wrong to regard 
rape as anything more than an assault or an unlawful touching and perhaps the gravity of 
rape, as with other assaults, should be assessed roughly in terms of the physical injury 
inflicted. The mere fact that sex, or sexual penetration, is involved would, on this view, be 
irrelevant as an aggravating factor (Murphy 1994, 214). 
Murphy’s characterisation of the ‘sixties view’ is relevantly similar to the casual view; 
society has over-estimated the moral significance of sexual contact and we should 
instead view it, morally speaking, as no different to non-sexual contact. That rape is 
the non-consensual imposition of sex can therefore make no moral difference. On 
this basis, we should treat sexual assault in the same way as non-sexual assault, 
judging its severity only by appeal to the physical injury inflicted. 
The significance view is initially unappealing to many audiences on the basis that it 
renders casual sex and a host of other consensual sexual acts impermissible. 
However, Benatar claims that, unlike the casual view, it can accommodate the 
special and serious wrongness of rape. Benatar (2002, 193) argues that the 
significance view explains the distinct wrongness of rape on the grounds that such 
acts “compel a person to engage in an activity that should be an expression of deep 
affection”, treating an important aspect of sexual activity as being totally 
insignificant, and so “expresses extreme indifference to the deepest aspects of the 
person whose body is used for the rapist’s gratification”. On this view, rape is 
seriously wrong because it imposes contact that is only permissible as an expression 
of romantic love; as a result, rape wrongs the victim further by conveying that an 
important aspect of the victim counts for very little. 
It is not yet clear why the significance view entails that the indifference expressed 
by the rapist is extreme, nor why it targets the “deepest aspects of the person” 
(Benatar 2002, 193, emphasis mine). Benatar may intend something like the 
following argument, which I sketch very briefly. In romantic love, an individual feels 
great affection for one’s beloved as a unique individual. Troy Jollimore (2011, 89) 
argues that “Only the lover…looks closely, carefully, and generously enough to truly 
recognize the beloved in all her individuality”, and Natasha McKeever (2016, 203, 
209) adds that lovers “share their lives and identity.” Romantic love engages and 
makes salient central aspects of a person’s identity, as one values one’s beloved as a 
21 
 
unique individual and seeks intimacy to the extent of sharing a life with them. On 
the significance view, rape is the imposition of contact that is appropriate only within 
a relationship in which people are engaged with the most intimate parts of their 
partner. It therefore might be said to show indifference to the “deepest aspects of 
the person” (Benatar 2002, 193) because it is the imposition of contact that should 
be expressive of regard and care for these aspects of a person in a manner that 
itself disregards something very important of the victim, namely, their stated 
preferences and autonomy. The indifference is extreme insofar as it pertains to 
these intimate aspects of the victim. 
Benatar may or may not have something like this development of the significance 
view in mind. This proposal leaves much to be explained, including what it means for 
something to be a deep or central aspect of a person and how the link between sex 
and romantic love entails that rape conveys indifference to those aspects of a person 
that are valued in romantic love. Even with these steps explained, the significance 
view might lack the resources to explain the serious and distinctive wrongness of 
rape. I argue in Section 1.8 that this gives us a good reason to reject Benatar’s 
dilemma in favour of an alternative formulation of the underlying problem. At the 
very least, however, the significance view holds that the sexual nature of an act is 
morally significant, allowing for the possibility (if nothing else) that non-consensual 
contact is more seriously wrong in virtue of being sexual. Benatar shows that the 
significance view can draw on resources to explain the serious wrongness of rape 
that the casual view cannot. 
Benatar provides a compelling insight. Permissive theories of sexual ethics are likely 
to be motivated by the underlying claim that sexual contact is morally like other acts 
and that sexual contact is not subject to additional moral considerations just in virtue 
of being a sexual act. This entails that sex is morally much like eating, conversation, 
and embracing; that is, there is no ethical reason to oppose consensual and safe 
casual sex, promiscuity, non-monogamy, group sex, and so on. The problem is that 
these views rely on a claim that is inconsistent with the claim that sexual assault is 
more seriously wrongful than otherwise similar non-sexual assault. In a move that is 
likely concerning to many feminists and proponents of a permissive or progressive 
sexual ethic, Benatar claims that we cannot justify the serious and distinctive 
wrongness of rape without endorsing a restrictive approach to consensual sexual 
contact. This insight is indicative of a compelling underlying problem even if 
Benatar’s discussion of the significance view is unsatisfying, or so I shall argue. 
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Section 1.4 – Manifestations of the Casual View 
 
In the next two sections, I will outline competing accounts of sexual ethics to 
illustrate the scope of Benatar’s dilemma. In this section, I explain accounts that 
would be categorised as formulations of the casual view; in the next section, I focus 
on formulations of the significance view. 
Alan Goldman (1977, 267) argues that “our concept of sex will partially determine 
our moral view of it”, a suggestion that is echoed by Soble (2013, 3). It is therefore 
fitting to begin with accounts of what it is for an act to be sexual in order to 
understand how philosophers draw on these conceptions of sexual activity to 
advance a casual view of sexual ethics. 
Goldman proposes a plain sex view, that “sexual desire is desire for contact with 
another person’s body and for the pleasure which such conduct produces” and 
sexual activity is then just that activity that “tends to fulfil such desire for the agent” 
or is motivated by such desire (Goldman 1977, 268–69). 
Goldman (1977, 280) argues that it follows from his account that there is “no 
morality intrinsic to sex” and that sexual activity is subject to the same norms that 
apply generally to human behaviour. His account is opposed to the idea that there 
are any moral norms that apply specifically to sex that cannot be derived 
straightforwardly from more general norms that govern human behaviour. As a 
result, “the fact that an act is sexual in itself never renders it wrong or adds to its 
wrongness” (Goldman 1977, 280). That is, the sexual nature of an act cannot make 
the act wrong or exacerbate its wrongness. 
Goldman does not explain why his account of what a sexual act is entails a casual 
view of sexual ethics. I take the argument that he has in mind to be as follows. An 
act is sexual only insofar as it tends to fulfil the desire for contact with another 
person’s body and for the pleasure that results. That an act tends to fulfil this desire 
is not morally significant. While we often view the fulfilment of desire positively, in 
this case it is a good “without much positive moral significance” (Goldman 1977, 
282). Therefore, the sexual nature of an act cannot be morally significant because 
the feature in virtue of which an act is sexual itself has “no moral implications” 
(Goldman 1977, 280). It follows that there is no reason that the sexual status of an 
act would change the ethical norms that govern such conduct. 
Igor Primoratz (1999, 44–46) agrees with much of Goldman’s plain sex view, but 
objects to the suggestion that sexual desire is the desire for contact with another 
person’s body because this entails that masturbation is “deviant” or not sexual at all. 
Primoratz (1999, 46) instead proposes a plainer sex view, whereby “sexual desire” is 
a “desire for certain bodily pleasures” and sexual activity is just the activity that 
“tends to fulfil” this desire. The relevant bodily pleasures are those that are 
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“experienced in the sexual parts of the body”, which he identifies as those body 
parts that “differentiate the sexes” (Primoratz 1999, 46). 
On Primoratz’s view, sexual acts are distinguished from non-sexual acts only on the 
basis that they tend to provide pleasure in certain parts of the body. He therefore 
argues that there are no “moral rules and considerations that give expression to the 
distinctive moral significance of sex and apply only in the sphere of sex” and that 
“the sexual nature of our conduct makes it neither more nor less wrong” (Primoratz 
1999, 173). The presence of a particular kind of pleasure makes no difference to the 
moral implications of the act in question, and this is all it means for an act to be 
sexual. As a result, the sexual nature of an act can have no moral implications, and 
we should not judge sexual acts by appeal to moral norms that we would not 
consider in judging non-sexual acts. Elsewhere, Primoratz (2001, 202) argues that 
consent is sufficient for morally permissible sex, and proponents of the view that 
consensual sex might nevertheless be impermissible appeal to the view that sex has 
“significance beyond a mere source of a certain kind of pleasure”. Primoratz believes 
that attempts to ascribe moral norms specifically to sex rely on a conception of sex 
that imbues it with significance beyond the fact that it consists in a distinct kind of 
pleasure. This is straightforwardly inconsistent with the plainer sex view, and so 
Primoratz rejects the claim that sex could be subject to distinct moral considerations. 
According to Primoratz, his plainer sex conception of what sex is entails the casual 
view, which in turn entails a permissive sexual ethic. 
Jonathan Webber’s critical response to the plain sex and plainer sex views also offers 
a formulation of the casual view. While he offers an alternative conception of sexual 
activity, he agrees with Goldman and Primoratz that sex is subject only to those 
moral considerations that concern interactions generally. Webber (2009, 247) 
stipulates a distinctive phenomenal quality that our experiences of something might 
have and suggests that any act or desire is sexual if it is experienced in this way. 
While it is difficult to describe this phenomenal quality, he draws on the familiarity 
that many people have with desires or acts that are experienced in this distinct way, 
and the intuitive force of the claim that this is what determines that the act or desire 
is sexual. Giving an example, Webber (2009, 247) argues that “[k]leptophilia is 
easily distinguished from kleptomania because we understand that the enjoyment of 
theft can have or lack this quality.” An act of theft is sexual insofar as it is 
experienced in a way that involves this experiential quality. Webber (2009, 247) says 
that a desire is sexual just if “its occurrence can involve this quality”, and so sexual 
desire need not involve a desire for bodily contact with another person or for any 
kind of felt bodily pleasure. One’s experience of occurrences other than bodily 
contact can involve this phenomenal quality.  
Webber (2009, 248) argues that “[s]ex is not morally special, our sex lives are 
governed by all the moral principles and concerns that govern our lives generally”. 
This is because activity is sexual just in virtue of the fact that it involves a certain 
phenomenal quality. The presence of this quality itself has no moral significance, 
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and so the sexual status of an act itself makes no moral difference. Actions cannot 
be subject to distinct moral considerations in virtue of being sexual because the 
feature that makes an act sexual is not morally salient.  
Goldman, Primoratz, and Webber each defend the casual view on the basis of their 
own conception of what it is for an act to be sexual. Their argument, which is 
explicit in Webber’s writing and implicit in Goldman and Primoratz’s, begins by 
identifying some feature that makes an act sexual, and distinguishes sexual from 
non-sexual acts. The theorists note that this feature of an act has no moral 
significance and no moral implications. Therefore, the sexual nature of an act has no 
moral implications, and we must adopt the casual view. 
These accounts illustrate that the casual view has widespread appeal. I believe that 
they also lend support to Benatar’s claims about the implications of the casual view. 
Goldman, Primoratz, and Webber each argue that sex is not morally special on the 
grounds that the feature in virtue of which an act is sexual itself has no moral 
implications. This is likely to generate a permissive sexual ethic, at least in 
comparison to traditional views. As long as individuals conform to general moral 
norms against causing harm to others and imposing contact without their consent, 
and so on, there is nothing problematic in the sexual contact that occurs. They deny, 
for example, that sex must be procreative or occur within a loving relationship, 
because these claims rely on the view that sexual acts are subject to distinct moral 
norms just insofar as they are sexual. 
However, as Benatar argues, the casual view denies that sexual assault is more 
seriously wrong than otherwise similar non-sexual assault. Proponents of the casual 
view argue that sexual contact cannot be subject to further moral norms qua sexual 
contact because the feature of an act that makes it sexual has no moral salience. 
This applies as much to sexual assault as it does to consensual sex. Goldman, 
Primoratz, and Webber each claim that an act is not more or less seriously wrongful 
in virtue of being sexual because the sexual nature of an act is not morally salient. 
On this basis, they are committed to the claim that a sexual assault is not more 
seriously wrongful than an otherwise similar non-sexual assault. This is particularly 
striking in light of Goldman’s (1977, 280) claim that the sexual nature of an act 
“never…adds to its wrongness”. This supports Benatar’s argument that the casual 
view cannot accommodate the distinct wrongness of rape. 
Goldman (1977, 281) recognises that, given his commitment to the casual view, an 
explanation of the serious wrongness of sexual violence cannot rely on an appeal to 
its nature as sexual violence. He argues that 
A rule against rape can therefore be considered an obvious part of sexual morality which has 
no bearing on nonsexual contact. But the immorality of rape derives from its being an 
extreme violation of a person’s body, of the right not to be humiliated, and of the general 
moral prohibition against using other persons against their wills, not from the fact that it is a 
sexual act (Goldman 1977, 281). 
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Goldman argues that the serious and distinct wrongness of rape is not a function of 
it being a sexual attack, and his view is therefore consistent with the casual view. He 
claims that rape is seriously wrong only on the basis of general moral principles. 
Specifically, Goldman (1977, 281) argues that rape is seriously wrong because it 
violates the victim’s body to an “extreme” degree, humiliates the victim, and uses 
them without their consent. Initially, this looks promising. It is an explanation of the 
serious wrongness of rape that does not appeal to the claim that there is something 
morally special about the sexual nature of the attack. 
However, Goldman’s explanation of the wrongness of rape is lacking. I argue in 
Section 2.2 that we cannot make sense of the wrongness of sexual violence by 
appealing to the suffering of the victim. I will focus presently on Goldman’s claims 
about rape as using a person against their will and as an extreme violation of the 
victim’s body. Goldman (1977, 218) is correct to note that the assailant in rape uses 
the victim “against their wills”. Whatever the assailant’s motive, they do something 
to the victim without the victim’s consent in pursuit of their own ends. The problem 
for Goldman is that this does not offer a morally relevant distinction between sexual 
and non-sexual attacks. We could say of any non-consensual contact, sexual or 
otherwise, that the assailant uses the victim against the victim’s will. Goldman’s 
argument fails to explain why rape is seriously wrong, and why we should treat it 
differently to any other non-consensual physical contact. 
Goldman’s (1977, 281) claim that rape is seriously wrong because it is an “extreme 
violation of a person’s body” is similarly incomplete. I assume that any intentional 
and unjustified non-consensual bodily contact constitutes a violation of a person’s 
body in some sense, especially if it is violent or injurious. On Goldman’s view, it must 
be that rape is an extreme violation while most non-sexual attacks are not. Goldman 
does not explain what it is that makes rape an extreme violation, even though he is 
clearly correct to note that it is. The problem for Goldman is that he risks simply 
setting the problem back a step. He answers the question of why rape is seriously 
wrongful by claiming that it consists in the extreme violation of the victim’s body. If 
his account of the wrongness of rape is to succeed, one must explain why rape is an 
extreme violation of the victim’s body. 
Many of the accounts that I discuss throughout the thesis might be understood as 
attempts to explain why sexual attacks constitute more extreme violations than 
otherwise similar non-sexual attacks, so I will only consider one possible 
interpretation of Goldman’s claim here. Goldman might believe that rape is an 
extreme violation because it targets intimate areas of the victim’s body. The violation 
is extreme because the attack covers even those parts of a person’s body that are 
generally hidden, private, and deliberately made inaccessible. It is usually either 
penetrative, in which case the assailant invades the inner space of the victim’s body, 
or envelopmentive, in which case the assailant’s body surrounds and temporarily 
consumes a sensitive part of the victim’s body. Archard (2008, 28) notes that body 
“parts…have a different significance to and sensitivity for the person” such that the 
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“touching of skin and the penetration of an orifice” are significantly different. 
Goldman’s claim that rape is an extreme violation of the victim’s body suggests that 
he has something like this argument in mind. 
However, this interpretation of Goldman’s claim fails. First, we might worry about 
whether this argument really avoids imbuing sexual contact with moral significance. 
The argument I have raised relies on the idea that the genitals and anus are 
particularly intimate areas of a person’s body, and that this is why a violation that 
targets them is extreme. The problem is that it is hard to explain why the genitals 
and anus should be understood as intimate or private parts of a person’s body 
without recognising that they are often the focus of sexual acts. The idea that the 
genitals and anus/buttocks are intimate areas of the body seems to derive at least 
some of its appeal from the idea that sexual areas of a person’s body are especially 
private, which is an implication of the view that sex is morally special and subject to 
distinct moral norms. If there is nothing morally distinct about sexual activity and 
sexuality, it is not clear why the body parts typically targeted or employed in rape 
should be understood as especially intimate and why non-consensual interference 
with or using these parts constitutes an extreme violation. 
Second, there are sexual and non-sexual attacks that target the same part of the 
victim’s body. The suggestion that a sexual attack constitutes an extreme violation 
and is therefore more seriously wrongful in virtue of the body parts targeted in the 
attack will therefore not ground the serious wrongness of rape. This is evident in 
some of the cases I discussed in Section 1.2. Consider the cases of an assailant who 
inserts their penis into the victim’s mouth and of an assailant who inserts their finger 
into the victim’s mouth. While the mouth might be considered an intimate body part 
for non-sexual reasons, it is equally involved in the sexual and non-sexual variations 
on this case. If the sexual variant is more seriously wrong and the violation more 
extreme, this cannot be because it targets a more intimate body part of the victim. 
Primoratz seems to accept as an implication of his account that rape may not 
constitute a special wrong or a wrong that is significantly distinct from non-sexual 
assault. He suggests, in a manner not so far removed from Benatar’s discussion, that 
the view of rape as a special wrong may rely on “a conception of sex that endows 
sex with a special moral significance”, and that rejecting such a conception might 
commit one to viewing rape as “on a par with non-sexual battery” (Primoratz 1999, 
159). Primoratz is open to the suggestion that the casual view, which he supports, 
precludes one from consistently viewing rape as a special kind of wrong. When he 
elaborates on what it means to reject specifically sexual moral norms, he claims that 
“Rape is not wrong as sexual battery, but as sexual battery” (Primoratz 1999, 174, 
emphasis in original). Primoratz is quite explicit here, and his comments lend support 
to Benatar’s dilemma; the casual view entails that rape is not more seriously wrong 
than non-sexual assault. 
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I have surveyed some formulations of the casual view to show the widespread 
applicability of one horn of Benatar’s dilemma. Benatar identifies a popular trend in 
philosophical writing on sexual ethics. Considering these views lends credence to 
Benatar’s claim that their proponents cannot consistently hold that sexual assault 
involves a distinctive wrong. If the sexual nature of an act has no moral implications, 
it is not clear how one could ground the general claim that sexual attacks, qua 
sexual attacks, are more seriously wrongful. 
 
Section 1.5 – Manifestations of the Significance View 
 
Benatar’s discussion of the significance view likewise captures an approach to sexual 
ethics that receives widespread attention in the literature, and accurately represents 
the implications of these views. I focus on two such accounts, offered by Roger 
Scruton and Vincent Punzo. 
Roger Scruton defends a comparatively restrictive sexual ethic from a perspective of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics. He argues that erotic love is highly conducive to human 
flourishing, and that many sexual acts can quickly inculcate dispositions or habits 
that are inimical to developing an erotic love relationship. As a result, many 
consensual sexual acts are unethical. 
Scruton (2006, 92–93) claims that sexual desire leads “automatically, but not 
inevitably” to intimacy, which in turn leads to the deep commitment of erotic love, 
for a few reasons. First, desiring another makes one vulnerable. It involves sexual 
arousal towards another, which consists in one’s body responding to the other 
person in a manner that is out of one’s control (Scruton 2006, 92). Sexual desire 
makes one vulnerable because one loses control of the responses of one’s own body 
and this is prompted by the presence of the object of one’s desire. Scruton (2006, 
92) argues that persons can alleviate or guard against this vulnerability by 
developing a relationship of erotic love with the object of one’s sexual desire when 
this desire is mutual. To be vulnerable around someone with whom one shares a 
relationship of erotic love is not distressing or threatening in the way that other 
vulnerabilities are. 
Second, Scruton (2006, 31–32, 78) argues that sexual arousal and sexual desire 
involve “individualising intentionality”. That is, they are directed at a particular 
individual as that individual. He illustrates this with the following case. Suppose that 
a man is engaged in sexual contact with another person, who he believes to be his 
lover. He then realises that the person touching him is not his lover, but someone 
else. “His pleasure (in the normal case) instantly turns to disgust” (Scruton 2006, 
21), or so Scruton believes. Scruton (2006, 21) takes this to be evidence for the 
claim that the object of sexual arousal is a particular individual. Arousal involves 
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individualising intentionality because the associated pleasures are pleasures in 
contact with a particular individual, and sexual arousal and desire dissipate if one 
realises that one is not in fact engaged in an act with the particular individual that 
one believed. The individualising intentionality of sexual arousal and sexual desire 
might explain why sexual desire is a suitable precursor to erotic love, although 
Scruton is less clear on this point. What a person desires here is the unique 
individual at whom their desire is directed, and sexual desire therefore involves a 
kind of valuing of another person as a unique individual. We might think that this 
attitude towards another person is central to a relationship of erotic love (Jollimore 
2011, 89; McKeever 2016, 203). Certainly, it would be odd to suggest that one 
person is in love with another while acknowledging that they would enjoy sexual 
contact with many other people in just the same way or that they do not value them 
because they are the particular person that they are. 
Scruton’s view of sex is that sexual contact is an effective and perhaps necessary 
mechanism by which intimacy and erotic love develops between two persons. He 
claims that erotic love is “the fulfilment of [sexual] desire” (Scruton 2006, 93). This 
does not mean that sexual desire or sexual contact always leads to erotic love, but 
that sexual desire in some sense aims at erotic love. 
On these grounds, Scruton develops his view of sexual morality. He argues from a 
broadly Aristotelian virtue ethics approach that “human conduct” should aim at 
“happiness”, understood as the “fulfilment of the person” rather than “the 
satisfaction of impulses” (Scruton 2006, 326–27). A person is virtuous insofar as 
they are disposed towards or have the habit of acting in a manner that is reasonable 
when faced with strong and conflicting urges. If a person develops their virtues 
through habitually acting in line with what is reasonable, then this will alter that 
person’s desires, so that they “learn to want what is reasonable” (Scruton 2006, 
329). To flourish as human individuals, we must develop virtues that incline us to 
want and act in line with what is reasonable, and we achieve this through habitual 
action. 
Scruton (2006, 338) claims that “the capacity for love in general, and for erotic love 
in particular, is a virtue.” He takes it to be a deeply fulfilling commitment that 
protects one’s sense of self and provides a sense of importance in one’s projects and 
goals. It is an important contributor to human flourishing and we therefore have 
strong (moral) reasons to enhance our capacity to form a relationship of erotic love 
and to avoid that which could hinder this capacity. Scruton (2006, 344) claims that 
sexual acts can very quickly become habitual, and so we should stringently avoid 
those acts that, when repeated, are inimical to the development of erotic love. 
Scruton (2006, 339) claims that this justifies “a whole section of traditional sexual 
morality”. Specifically, one should only engage in sexual contact in the context of a 
relationship of erotic love or perhaps when one is open to a relationship of erotic 
love with one’s sexual partner. In casual sex and promiscuity, one engages in sexual 
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contact with no intention to develop a relationship of erotic love. One thereby 
develops a habit of engaging in sexual contact where this does not find its natural 
fulfilment in erotic love, and so hinders one’s capacity to develop erotic love through 
a sexual relationship with another person (Scruton 2006, 339). 
Moreover, casual sexual partners desire each other’s bodies insofar as they are 
capable of providing pleasure. Scruton (2006, 342–43) believes that having sex in 
which one desires the other person just for their body and resultant pleasures leads 
people to develop a habit whereby they are more likely to have sex solely to enjoy 
physical contact with another body and the pleasure that this produces. This is not 
desire for the individual embodied person, but is instead a desire for their body. It 
aims primarily at sexual pleasure and sexual relief rather than sexual union with the 
unique individual. If this becomes a habit, then the agent will no longer experience 
sexual desire as desire for a person through that person’s body, but instead 
experience simply attraction to the body of their sexual partner. They will no longer 
experience sexual desire directed at them as desire for them through their body, but 
simply as a positive evaluation of their body. This involves a separation of a person’s 
body and self in the experience of the agent, which, given the importance of valuing 
another as an embodied human person and being valued this way in turn to erotic 
love, hinders a person’s capacity for erotic love (Scruton 2006, 343). 
Scruton (2006, 344–45) also argues that masturbation is unethical. When persons 
fantasise and masturbate, they take sexual pleasure in fictional events that involve 
no hardships or obstacles to sexual contact. While love relationships involve 
disagreement, compromise, vulnerability, and embarrassment, fantasies that persons 
typically employ when masturbating exclude these difficulties (Scruton 2006, 344–
45). Persons who masturbate thereby develop a habit of experiencing sexual 
gratification without overcoming the challenges that occur in romantic relationships. 
Scruton (2006, 345) suggests that masturbation thereby makes a person less able to 
form fulfilling romantic relationships and to enjoy sexual contact in the context of 
erotic love. 
Punzo likewise develops a restrictive sexual ethic from his view of the nature of 
sexual contact. According to Punzo (1969, 193), sex involves two people “giving 
their bodies, the most intimate physical expression of themselves”, who have 
thereby “united themselves as intimately and totally as is physically possible”. He 
justifies this by appeal to the observable physical movements of sex. When a man 
and a woman have sex, he says, “the man…has literally entered her”, it is “a total 
merging and union on a physical level” (Punzo 1969, 193). Sex is distinct from other 
acts that people engage in together because it is a uniquely intimate physical union 
of two persons, and therefore involves the union of two selves. 
Punzo (1969, 195–96) argues that all premarital sex is morally wrong because it 
separates or alienates the bodies of the agents from their selves. According to Punzo 
(1969, 195), sex expresses or conveys a union of two persons and a commitment 
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between them. When married persons have sex, they engage in a physical union 
that reflects the union that they have already established between their selves and 
their lives. In premarital sex, persons do not convey or reflect any actual union or 
commitment they have made. In this way, premarital sex is “depersonalized” and 
those involved are reduced in their “most intimate physical being to the status of an 
object” (Punzo 1969, 196). In premarital sex, persons treat their own sexualities and 
bodies, and those of their partner, and separate from their respective selves. They 
treat each other as depersonalised bodies or objects for the purposes of sexual 
gratification rather than engaging with each other as unified and integrated selves. 
Punzo offers a strong formulation of the significance view; not only must sex express 
and take place in a relationship of erotic love, it is only permissible in a relationship 
in which the partners have made a lifelong commitment to each other. 
Scruton and Punzo both advance significance views of sexual ethics. These accounts 
provide resources to explain the serious wrongness of sexual assault that are not 
available to the casual view, reinforcing Benatar’s dilemma. Scruton and Punzo say 
little, if anything, on this issue, but I will attempt to explain how they might address 
the wrongness of sexual assault. 
Scruton argues that sexual desire finds its proper fulfilment in erotic love and that 
sexual contact should be avoided when those involved are not pursuing a committed 
romantic relationship. Adopting Scruton’s approach, one could argue that sexual 
assault is morally distinct from non-sexual assault because the assailant perverts the 
purpose of sexual contact. Scruton argues that casual sex works against the 
fulfilment of sexual desire because individuals act on this desire without intending 
that it will lead to erotic love. In the case of sexual assault, the assailant imposes 
sexual contact onto the victim in a manner that is utterly inconsistent with a loving 
relationship or attitude. All non-consensual violent physical contact not only falls 
short of the conduct that establishes and maintains erotic love but is totally opposed 
to it. Scruton (2006, 337) says, of the experience of being loved, that “Everything he 
is and values gains sustenance” from an erotic love relationship. Non-consensual 
contact has the opposite effect. In any assault, the assailant treats the victim as 
though they are of no value. Where erotic love enhances a person’s sense of their 
own value and of the value of their projects and goals, non-consensual physical 
contact treats them as though they and that which they care about are unworthy of 
being valued, and often leads the victim to view themselves in this way as well. As 
non-consensual physical contact, sexual assault violates and diminishes exactly those 
valuable phenomena that are enhanced in erotic love.6 Sexual assault involves a 
distinct wrong because it violates exactly the value in which sexual desire and sexual 
                                                          
6 This is consistent with recognising that sexual assault and other forms of abuse occur within 
committed romantic relationships at high rates. Assuming that my proposal for how Scruton’s account 
might explain the wrongness of sexual assault is correct, one can argue that committed romantic 
relationships that involve sexual abuse do not realise the value of erotic love. 
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contact find their fulfilment. By stipulating that sexual contact contributes to the 
fulfilment of sexual desire, Scruton’s account provides resources to explain the 
distinctive wrong of sexual violence. 
While Punzo does not provide an account of the wrongness of rape, his account may 
offer a justification for the view that rape is distinctly wrongful. Punzo’s argument 
against premarital sex proceeds from his view that sex engages an intimate part of a 
person and involves an intimate union between two persons. If one accepts this 
claim, then there is a morally significant feature that distinguishes sexual and non-
sexual contact, and sexual assault from non-sexual assault. First, Punzo claims that 
premarital sex treats the sexualities and bodies of those involved as objects separate 
from the self. On this basis, one might claim that sexual assault is especially wrong 
because it objectifies the victim in a way that non-sexual assault does not. Sex is 
distinct from other activities because it conveys and reflects a marital union or else 
treats a person’s body as separate from their self where no such union exists. If one 
accepts this, it is plausible that sexual assault objectifies a victim, by treating their 
body and sexuality as something that can be separated (and seized) from their self, 
in a manner that even a non-sexual violent beating does not. Second, Punzo has the 
resources to explain why sexual assault constitutes an especially invasive form of 
violence. I argued in Section 1.4 that Goldman fails to explain why sexual assault is 
more invasive that other forms of non-consensual physical contact, but perhaps 
Punzo’s account offers the resources to explain this. By violently imposing a form of 
contact that would ordinarily signify an intimate union of two selves, the assailant in 
a sexual assault imposes highly intimate contact onto the victim, where this is 
explained not by reference to the physical attributes of the contact, but the way in 
which, on Punzo’s view, sexual contact ordinarily unites two selves. If this is correct, 
sexual assault is the imposition of forced intimacy that does not occur in non-sexual 
assault. 
Benatar’s suggestion that the significance view can accommodate the severe and 
distinct wrongness of rape is supported by the accounts advanced by Scruton and 
Punzo. My explanation of these accounts is deliberately brief, but the strength of 
Benatar’s dilemma does not depend on the success of significance views here, only 
on the claim that significance views can draw on resources to explain the wrongness 
of rape that casual views cannot. 
 
Section 1.6 – Natural Law 
 
There is a further conception of sex and sexual ethics that warrants mention, (new) 
natural law theory. In this section, I argue that natural law theory lends weight to 
Benatar’s dilemma; it explains the serious wrongness of sexual violence, but only by 
grounding a sexual ethic that is more restrictive even than the significance view, 
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condemning casual sex, masturbation, same-sex sexual contact, oral sex, anal sex, 
and contracepted penile-vaginal intercourse (Corvino 2005, 516). John Finnis (1997, 
121–22) goes as far as to suggest that a person who engages in non-contracepted 
heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse with their marital partner nevertheless acts 
wrongly if they approve of sexual acts by others involving partners of the same-sex 
or contraception, etc., insofar as this indicates a “conditional willingness” to engage 
in acts that are opposed by natural law theory. I will focus on this view as it is 
advanced by Finnis, Patrick Lee, Robert George, and Gerald Bradley. They offer very 
similar accounts, which I discuss interchangeably. 
Natural law theorists stipulate a value or intelligible good that they call ‘marriage’, 
and argue that sexual acts are impermissible unless they actualise this value (Finnis 
1994, 1066, 1997, 393; George and Bradley 1995, 301–2, 314; Lee 2008, 425; Lee 
and George 1997, 135). Finnis (2008, 389) argues that the purpose of marriage “is 
twofold: procreation and friendship”. According to natural law theory, marriage is a 
relationship between two persons who commit to share a life in the “type of 
relationship” capable of conceiving offspring (Lee and George 1997, 143, emphasis 
in original). In other words, marriage is the good that is realised when two people 
who are committed to each other and to the ongoing project of creating life and 
raising a child have sex in a way that is open to the possibility of biological 
reproduction. An act is non-marital in this sense if it does not take place between 
partners who have made a lifelong commitment to each other or if it is not the kind 
of act that can be procreative (Finnis 1994, 1066, 1069; George and Bradley 1995, 
305; Lee 2008, 430). 
On this view, non-marital acts do not actualise the good of marriage and, by 
extension, do not actualise any human good (Finnis 1994, 1066, 2008, 393; George 
and Bradley 1995, 305; Lee 2008, 423–24; Lee and George 1997, 135). Natural law 
theorists advance two arguments for the claim that non-marital acts are immoral on 
this basis. 
First, they argue that non-marital sex disrespects one’s body and one’s partner and 
involves a disintegration of the self (Finnis 1994, 1069; George and Bradley 1995, 
302, 314, 316–18; Lee 2008, 425; Lee and George 1997, 139–41).7 Natural law 
theorists claim that persons engaged in non-marital acts “necessarily treat their 
bodies and those of their sexual partners (if any) as means or instruments” (George 
and Bradley 1995, 302, emphasis in original). When one acts in a way that realises a 
good or valuable goal, the whole of one’s body and consciously experiencing self are 
united in pursuing this goal (George and Bradley 1995, 316–17; Lee and George 
1997, 140); there is an intelligible good that both one’s body and consciously-
experiencing self are oriented towards. When one seeks pleasure in an act that does 
                                                          
7 This line of argument is not entirely dissimilar from Punzo’s suggestion that premarital sex involves 
a separation of a person from their body, although natural law theorists develop this idea differently 
and endorse a different conception of marital sex. 
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not realise an intelligible good, one separates these aspects of oneself, treating one’s 
body as a tool so that one’s conscious self can experience pleasure. According to 
natural law, non-marital sex does not realise an intelligible good, and therefore 
always treats the body as a tool in this manner. On this view, non-marital sex harms 
the integrity of the person by separating oneself as a bodily organism from oneself 
as a consciously choosing person (George and Bradley 1995, 314, 316; Lee and 
George 1997, 139–41). Non-marital sex also shows disrespect towards the body and 
one’s partner’s body, and by extension towards oneself and one’s partner, by 
treating human bodies as mere tools that may be utilised for pleasurable sensations 
(George and Bradley 1995, 314; Lee and George 1997, 139). 
Second, natural law theorists argue that non-marital acts deny the value of marriage 
and the capacity of marital acts to actualise the distinct human good of marriage 
(Finnis 1994, 1069–70, 1997, 119, 2008, 393). Engaging in non-marital sex conveys 
that sexual contact is appropriate for purposes that are unrelated to the good of 
marriage. It thereby constitutes a denial of the unique suitability of sexual contact to 
actualise a human good, namely marriage (Finnis 1994, 1070). For Finnis (2008, 
393), non-marital sex is unethical because it “sets the wills of the choosers…against 
the good of marriage.” By employing a kind of contact that is uniquely suited to 
actualise the good of marriage for some purpose unrelated to this good, persons 
who engage in non-marital sex deny the value of the good of marriage as something 
realised through sexual contact. In turn, Finnis (1994, 1069, 2008, 393, n.16) argues 
that non-marital sex wrongs those individuals who engage in marital sex with the 
intention of actualising the good of marriage. He argues that non-marital sex 
conveys that sexual contact is an appropriate mechanism to experience goods other 
than marriage, and therefore that sexual contact is not uniquely appropriate or 
effective as a vehicle to actualise marriage. It therefore constitutes a denial that 
persons who engage in marital sex engage in an act that can “really actualize, 
express and enable them to experience their marriage” (Finnis 2008, 393 n.16, 
emphasis in original). 
My explanation of the natural law approach to sexual ethics is deliberately brief, and 
there is much with which I disagree in these accounts. However, my purpose is not 
to evaluate the merits of the natural law theory approach, but instead to show that 
this influential philosophical tradition is further evidence of the problem advanced by 
Benatar, or something like it. 
The natural law approach is quite different to the significance view, although they 
share the implication that a strong romantic commitment is a necessary condition for 
sexual contact, and that sexual contact should be expressive of such a relationship. 
Lee and George (1997, 136) describe the significance view as the “liberal view”, 
according to which “sexual acts between people are morally right as long as they in 
some way express genuine love or affection”, where the relationship need not be 
marital. They reject this view, and distinguish it from natural law, on the grounds 
that sex that expresses romantic love is often ‘non-marital’ because it is not 
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procreative or occurs outside a lifelong commitment (Lee and George 1997, 143–
44). Strikingly, the significance view treats sexual contact within loving heterosexual 
relationships and loving homosexual relationships as equally valuable, whereas 
natural law holds that sexual contact between persons of the same sex is never 
morally permissible (Soble 2013, 15). 
Benatar himself disregards natural law when he constructs his dilemma. He might 
have natural law in mind when he makes the following claim: 
Consider, for instance, the view that a necessary condition of a sexual activity’s being morally 
acceptable is that it carry the possibility of procreation. While this view would be directly 
relevant to the practice of contraception, it would provide no way of morally judging 
promiscuity, paedophilia, or rape per se. Under some conditions, all of these practices would 
have procreative possibility (Benatar 2002, 192). 
This argument is too quick. Natural law takes procreation to be a necessary 
condition of morally permissible sexual contact, but it does not follow that rape or 
cases of adult-child sex in which the child is biologically capable of procreating are 
permissible. Natural law theorists take the procreative capacity of a kind of sexual 
act to be a necessary but not sufficient condition of morally permissible sexual 
contact. On this view, sexual contact must realise the value of marriage, which is 
also constituted by the good of friendship and lifelong commitment. These goods are 
are inconsistent with rape and adult-child sex. That any view takes procreation to be 
necessary for morally permissible sexual contact does not entail that it cannot 
provide an insight into the wrongness of sexual violence. 
Natural law theorists discuss sexual violence briefly, if at all. However, the following 
is instructive: 
Considered precisely as morally bad sex – rather than as, say, unjust (as rapes and some 
other morally bad sex acts obviously also are) – wrongful sex acts are more seriously immoral 
the “more distant” they are from marital sexual intercourse (Finnis 1997, 98, emphasis in 
original). 
Finnis (1997, 98) proposes that sexual violence is seriously wrong because it is 
“unjust”, perhaps in the way that all violent bodily assaults are unjust, but also 
because it is sexual contact that is not marital.8 On this view, an instance of sexual 
                                                          
8 I have used the definition of ‘marital’ endorsed by natural law theorists for the purposes of 
explaining their account. They use this term to describe a relationship of lifelong commitment of a 
kind that is open to procreation, rather than to label the legal and social relationships that are 
recognised as marriages in any given legal jurisdiction or community. On the more familiar 
understanding of ‘marital’, ‘marital rape’ refers to rape inflicted by one married partner against 
another; it is conceptually intelligible and it occurs. When natural law theorists claim that rape is 
necessarily non-marital, they do not deny that rape occurs in relationships that are legally and/or 
socially recognised as marriages. Instead, ‘marital’ in their parlance refers to relationships or acts that 
actualise the dual good of procreation and friendship. Rape is a very serious violation of, and 
diametrically opposed to, friendship, and is therefore necessarily non-marital in this sense. 
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assault is more seriously wrongful than an otherwise similar non-sexual assault 
because it involves the additional wrong of being sexual contact that does not 
actualise the good of marriage (because it is non-consensual, even if it is procreative 
and occurs within a relationship that is legally and socially recognised as a 
marriage). 
Finnis does not elaborate on this argument, but we can sketch how his argument 
might proceed. Natural law theorists argue that consensual non-marital sex is 
morally wrong because it aids the disintegration of those involved insofar as they 
treat their body as an instrument for the satisfaction of the consciously choosing 
self. A natural law theorist might argue that sexual assault therefore attacks the 
integrity or integration of the victim. The assailant treats the victim’s body as a tool 
to be used for their own purposes, entirely disregarding the victim’s will. This not 
only shows a great deal of contempt towards the victim, a denial that they are an 
integrated human person, it also treats the victim’s body as totally separate from 
their consciously experiencing self, insofar as the assailant hijacks the victim’s body 
for their own ends and disregards the victim’s conscious experiencing self entirely, 
often causing them a great deal of suffering. That is, they treat the victim’s body as 
a tool to be co-opted without any concern for the person that belongs in, or is 
identical to, their body. 
Natural law theorists also argue that non-marital sex is wrong because it disregards 
or disrespects the value of marriage. On a natural law account, this might also 
provide justification for the claim that sexual assault is distinctly wrong. Sexual 
assault is non-marital sexual contact, and therefore disrespects the good of marriage 
in the manner I have discussed. A proponent of natural law theory might argue that 
sexual assault goes further in this regard. The assailant imposes sexual contact, an 
act that should actualise the human good of marriage, and uses it to harm the 
victim. It is not only that the assailant initiates sexual contact that fails to actualise 
the good of marriage, but there is something especially perverse in their imposition 
of this form of contact to commit an injustice and often great suffering against the 
victim. Accordingly, sexual assault attacks the good of marriage in a way that non-
sexual assault and consensual non-marital sex do not. 
There are a multitude of compelling reasons raised by critics to reject natural law, 
and there might be good reasons to find these explanations of the distinct wrong of 
rape lacking even if one endorses natural law. However, my purpose here is not to 
evaluate natural law theory or the accounts of the wrongness of sexual violence that 
may or may not follow from its sexual ethic. Instead, I raise the example of natural 
law theory to show the widespread applicability of Benatar’s dilemma, beyond those 
cases that he himself discusses. 
If my suggestions are accurate, natural law provides a mechanism by which to 
ground a moral distinction between sexual and non-sexual assault. At the very least, 
it entails that sexual assault is seriously wrong because it is the imposition of an 
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injustice that is also non-marital sexual contact, whereas non-sexual assault is the 
imposition of an injustice without this further wrong. Natural law theory can explain 
the distinct wrongness of sexual violence, but only by appealing to the wrong of 
non-marital sexual contact, a resource that also entails a very restrictive ethical 
approach to consensual sexual contact. This illustrates the widespread applicability 
of Benatar’s dilemma and plays a role that is much like that of the significance view 
in this context. We can explain the distinct wrong of sexual violence, but only by 
adopting a very restrictive sexual ethic for consensual acts. 
 
Section 1.7 – Objections Against Benatar’s Formulation 
 
Benatar’s dilemma is a compelling challenge to those of us who believe that sexual 
violence involves a distinct wrong and endorse a permissive sexual ethic for 
consensual contact. In this section, however, I argue that Benatar’s dilemma 
represents an imperfect formulation of the underlying problem. 
Firstly, Benatar’s dilemma overlooks prominent approaches to sexual ethics. He 
advances a dilemma between the casual view and the significance view. As my 
discussion of natural law shows, there are sexual ethical approaches which deny that 
sexual contact is subject only to the general moral norms and deny that expressing 
romantic love is sufficient for morally permissible sex. 
Feminist approaches to consent reveal a similar problem. Lois Pineau (1989, 234–
35) argues that persons generally engage in sexual contact, or are presumed to 
engage in sexual contact, for sexual pleasure and that persons “in intimate 
situations” have an obligation to advance each other’s goals. On these grounds, she 
argues that we should adopt a model of “communicative sexuality”, whereby sexual 
partners respond to each other’s reactions and aim to enhance each other’s 
enjoyment (Pineau 1989, 236–37). While consent is sufficient for much morally 
permissible contact and trade, it is not sufficient for sexual contact (Pineau 1989, 
235). Pineau claims that morally permissible sexual contact requires that both 
parties communicate openly and aim to provide their partner with sexual pleasure. 
Martha Chamallas (1988, 836) stipulates an ideal of sexual contact based on 
“mutuality” rather than consent. On this view, consent is not sufficient for morally 
permissible sexual contact, it must also be the case that those involved “welcome” 
the contact, where this “response…is more positive than, for example, an ambiguous 
decision not to resist” (Chamallas 1988, 836). According to Chamallas (1988, 839), 
sexual contact is more egalitarian, and therefore less morally tainted, if those 
involved are motivated by the prospect of emotional intimacy and/or physical 
pleasure. This is because, unlike other incentives like monetary payment, men and 
women have an equal capacity for intimacy and pleasure. She rejects as 
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impermissible sexual contact “in which money, power, prestige, or financial or 
physical security is traded for sexual pleasure or intimacy”, and suggests that sex 
workers are likely wronged by clients when they engage in sexual contact for money 
(Chamallas 1988, 840–42). 
Pineau and Chamallas both set out a sexual ethic that does not treat sexual contact 
as subject only to the same moral norms as non-sexual contact. They argue that 
sexual contact specifically should be a communicative act in which persons aim to 
provide each other with sexual pleasure (for Pineau) or should be welcomed by 
those involved, aiming at intimacy or pleasure (for Chamallas). They do not suggest 
that non-sexual acts are subject to these norms, and it is not clear that they are 
straightforwardly derived from more general norms because Pineau and Chamallas 
appeal to the nature of sexual contact itself. The feminist accounts advanced by 
Pineau and Chamallas cannot helpfully be understood as manifestations of the 
casual view. At the same time, they clearly do not fall under Benatar’s description of 
significance views. They prescribe some restrictions on sexual contact but do not 
require that sexual contact takes place only within a romantic love relationship. 
Natural law and this feminist approach to consent are two conceptions of sexual 
ethics that do not fit Benatar’s description of the casual view or significance view. 
This is a problem for Benatar given the way that he frames his challenge. These 
accounts provide a way to avoid the dilemma that he establishes. Benatar’s framing 
of the problem leaves open many further possible approaches to sexual ethics, some 
of which may explain the distinct wrongness of sexual violence without being 
committed to a restrictive sexual ethic. 
Second, Benatar’s dilemma is vulnerable to the objection that significance views do 
not offer a compelling or suitable explanation of the special wrongness of sexual 
violence. His challenge is that one can either accept the casual view, adopting a 
permissive sexual ethic and the view that sexual assault involves no distinct wrong, 
or the significance view, explaining the distinct wrong of sexual violence and 
grounding a restrictive sexual ethic. If Benatar is incorrect in claiming that the 
significance view can explain the special wrongness of sexual violence, then his 
dilemma appears to be resolved; the appeal of the significance view is diminished, 
and one can endorse the casual view. In Sections 1.3 and 1.5, I stipulated how 
significance views might explain the distinct wrongness of sexual violence. It remains 
an open question whether these accounts succeed in explaining this. If one remains 
unconvinced by the accounts of the wrongness of sexual violence proposed by 
proponents of the significance view, then Benatar’s dilemma appears to be 
overcome. 
Thirdly, and more fundamentally, Benatar’s dilemma captures an underlying problem 
but formulates it imperfectly. We might reconstruct his argument in the following 
way: 
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1. Sexual assault is more seriously wrong than non-sexual assault. 
2. (1) is true only if there is a special sexual morality. 
3. If there is a special sexual morality, then sexual contact is morally permissible 
only within a committed romantic relationship (the significance view). 
Therefore, 
4. If one rejects the significance view, one must deny (1) sexual assault is more 
seriously wrongful than non-sexual assault. 
The reason that Benatar’s dilemma presents a disconcerting challenge to 
progressives and feminists lies in his proposal that one cannot consistently maintain 
a permissive sexual ethic for consensual contact and endorse the claim that sexual 
violence involves a distinct wrong. Benatar’s dilemma therefore relies on claim (3). If 
(2) is true, then sexual assault is distinctly wrong only if there is a special sexual 
morality, which is itself not a problem for proponents of a permissive sexual ethic. 
Benatar’s dilemma only presents a challenge if we accept that (3) a rejection of the 
casual view and endorsement of a special sexual ethic commits one to the 
significance view. However, Benatar does not defend this inference. Indeed, we 
have good reasons to question whether rejecting the casual view commits one to 
accepting the significance view. To explain why this inference is suspect, I will first 
explain the context of the significance and casual views that Benatar presents as 
mutually exclusive. 
On one hand, we can identify views about the permissibility or impermissibility of 
different sexual acts. Following numerous theorists, I will group these views as 
‘permissive’ and ‘restrictive’ insofar as they place fewer or greater constraints on 
permissible sexual contact (Benn 1999, 236; Malón 2015, 1073; McKay 1997, 286–
87).9 The significance view is one such position; it is a claim about when sexual 
contact is permissible. It is likely to seem restrictive to many contemporary 
audiences, but it is more permissive than natural law theory. 
Piers Benn (1999, 236–37) and Agustin Malόn (2015, 1072–74) distinguish these 
from views about whether there is a distinct sexual morality. Some theorists claim 
that sexual contact is subject only to moral norms and principles that apply more 
generally. Benatar calls this position the ‘casual view’. In opposition to this are what 
                                                          
9 Some theorists talk in terms of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ approaches to sexual ethics (Benn 1999, 
236; Lee and George 1997, 136; Malón 2015, 1073). I avoid these terms because they are 
ambiguous between (a) views about which acts are morally (im)permissible, and (b) views about 
which acts are properly criminalised or otherwise regulated by the State (Weeks 1985, 54). For 
example, consider a person who thinks that same-sex sexual contact, masturbation, and sex work are 
morally impermissible, but that none of these should be criminalised or regulated. It is not clear 
whether their views would be accurately described as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ because this could 
refer to both their views about particular acts (which are conservative) and their views about the 
appropriate role of the State in regulating sexual acts (which are liberal). 
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I will call ‘distinctiveness views’, according to which sexual contact is subject to 
moral norms that are not straightforwardly derived from much more general 
principles and the sexual status of an act is morally significant. 
Benn (1999, 236) cautions against conflating permissive views with the casual view, 
and restrictive views with the distinctiveness view. That is, we should not assume 
that a permissive sexual ethic requires that there is no special sexual morality or that 
the rejection of the casual view entails a restrictive sexual ethic. If Benn is correct, 
then this is a problem for Benatar because it undermines the claim that rejecting the 
casual view commits one to the significance view (claim (3) in my reconstruction of 
his argument). 
This becomes apparent in examining the relationships between these positions. 
Firstly, the casual view is necessarily more restrictive than some distinctiveness 
views, even though Benatar sets it up as the basis for a permissive sexual ethic. The 
casual view places many ethical restrictions on sexual contact insofar as all general 
moral principles apply as much to sex as they do to other interactions between 
persons. We can imagine a sexual ethic, characterised by the adage “All’s fair in love 
and war”, according to which some general moral principles do not apply to sexual 
contact as they would apply to non-sexual contact (Benn 1999, 237; Goldman 1977, 
280). On this view, for example, dishonesty, manipulation, and a disregard for 
another’s happiness are permitted when they occur during or as a means to sexual 
contact, where they would not be permitted in other contexts. This view justifies or 
excuses some acts just because they are sexual. This is a distinctiveness view of 
sexual ethics; it denies that sexual contact is subject to the same moral norms as 
other interactions. A rejection of the casual view does not always entail a more 
restrictive sexual ethic. This is a counter-example to Benatar’s claim (3) because it 
shows that adopting a special sexual morality does not commit one to a restrictive 
sexual ethic. In this case, rejecting the casual view accommodates a less restrictive 
approach. 
Secondly, under certain conditions, the casual view may entail a restrictive sexual 
ethic. Applying only general moral principles to sexual contact may prohibit many 
sexual acts. In a society in which resources are scarce, contraceptives are 
unavailable, and sexually transmitted diseases are prevalent, casual sex, 
promiscuity, non-monogamy, and even pre-marital sexual contact might be morally 
impermissible because these acts risk harm to oneself and others (Benn 1999, 236–
37; Singer 2011, 5). One could argue for a restrictive sexual ethic under these 
conditions without appealing to some moral consideration that applies just to sexual 
acts. In this case, a restrictive sexual ethic can be derived from a general moral 
principle of avoiding harm to others. Clearly, a restrictive sexual ethic such as the 
significance view is not synonymous with rejecting the casual view. 
Benatar’s dilemma is imperfectly formulated. He sets up a disagreement between 
two positions that are not diametrically opposed or mutually exhaustive. He assumes 
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that endorsing a special sexual morality (rejecting the casual view) to explain the 
serious wrong of sexual attacks commits one to a restrictive sexual ethic. It is not 
clear that this is the case. Indeed, a special sexual morality can entail a more 
permissive sexual ethic as well as a more restrictive one and the rejection of a 
special sexual morality can nevertheless ground a restrictive sexual ethic in at least 
some circumstances. 
However, this does not mean that we should dismiss the problem that Benatar 
raises. His claims are shocking, I think, because they are indicative of an underlying 
challenge; how can we explain the serious and distinct wrongness of sexual attacks 
without investing sex with so much moral significance that we are committed to a 
restrictive sexual ethic for consensual contact? My criticisms of Benatar’s dilemma do 
not answer the underlying challenge. All the same, I do find that Benatar’s dilemma 
obscures this important problem and that it introduces considerations that are not 
directly relevant. Therefore, I will offer my own formulation of this problem. 
 
Section 1.8 – The Traditionalist’s Challenge 
 
To explain the serious and distinct wrongness of sexual violence, it is tempting to 
argue that the sexual nature of an act is morally significant, and that moral 
considerations apply to sexual contact that do not apply elsewhere. However, 
Benatar’s dilemma shows that appealing to the moral salience of sex to explain the 
wrongness sexual assault can have unintended consequences. Traditionally, 
explanations of the wrongness of sexual assault have relied on conservative views of 
sex that entail a restrictive sexual ethic and sexist views of women’s sexuality and 
personhood. They take sexual assault to be morally worse than non-sexual assault, 
at least in some cases, but only on the basis of a deeply problematic conception of 
women’s sexuality. Now that we reject these views, it is not clear how sexual attacks 
could involve a distinct wrong (Rubenfeld 2013, 1386–92). 
Harriet Baber (1987, 136–37) criticises the assumption that “rape is the supreme 
evil” by arguing that this depends on the view that sexuality is particularly central to 
women’s lives and perceptions of themselves. She notes that “women are 
traditionally viewed primarily in connection with concerns which center around their 
sexuality – in terms of their roles as lovers, wives and mothers” (Baber 1987, 136). 
The aspects of women’s lives that revolve around sex and reproduction were 
considered the most important aspects of a woman’s life, and Baber argues that it 
was on this basis that sexual assault was viewed as very seriously wrongful. There 
was a widespread belief that sexual assault attacks the victim through something 
central to her life and her conception of herself. However, this is a view of women 
that we now reject. As a result, Baber (1987, 137) proposes that rape is a “serious 
harm”, but only to the same extent as “all other crimes of violence”. She rejects the 
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claim that sexual attacks involve a distinct wrong because this relies on a sexist view 
of women’s sexuality and identity. 
In a similar vein, Michael Davis (1984, 80) attributes the view that sexual assault is 
distinctly wrongful to the traditional, misplaced, and sexist assumption of the value 
of a woman’s “chastity”. Traditionally, a woman’s chastity or ‘sexual purity’ was 
considered extremely important (M. Davis 1984, 80). Rape and sexual assault were 
considered seriously wrongful because they attacked, and were thought to destroy, 
something very valuable to the victim. 
As Davis (1984, 81) notes, “[t]he traditional analysis is at best a dead justification.” 
Progressives and feminists generally hold that ‘chastity’ and ‘sexual purity’ are not as 
important as traditionally believed and that we should reject the view that this is 
more important for women than for men. A survivor of sexual assault is not 
damaged and does not lose an important part of themselves. Again, the views of the 
importance of women’s chastity, on which accounts of the wrongness of rape were 
traditionally based, are incorrect and sexist. From a progressive perspective, the 
traditional reasons for recognising sexual assault as morally worse than non-sexual 
assault are sexist, arbitrary, and no longer convincing. As Carolyn Shafer and Marilyn 
Frye (1977, 333–34) rightly note, 
Traditional mutterings about loss of purity, chastity, and honor, and about the diminution of 
the woman’s value as the property of her father, husband, or other male keeper will hardly 
account for the rage and horror feminists express about [sexual violence]. 
This view is most striking in comments by Camille Paglia. In response to a question 
about the seriousness of rape, she argued that “I dislike anything that treats women 
as if they are special, frail little creatures. We don’t need special protection” (Paglia 
1993, 64–65). Here, Paglia claims that the view of sexual attacks as distinctly 
wrongful relies on a patronising and paternalistic view of women as weaker than 
men. This view makes sense, she claims, against a background assumption that 
women are less emotionally robust than men and therefore require further 
protections against physical violence. When we reject these sexist beliefs, however, 
Paglia believes that the rationale for viewing sexual attacks as distinctly wrongful 
disappears. 
The progressive rejection of the view of sex as morally special and of traditional 
views about women’s chastity or ‘sexual purity’ therefore raises a compelling 
problem for accounts of the wrongness of sexual assault. Rejecting these outdated 
and problematic beliefs removes the traditional justification for the distinct 
wrongness of sexual attacks. It is not clear why sexual assault is morally worse than 
non-sexual assault, given the falsity of claims about the importance of chastity and 
the significance of sexual activity. As more and more people reject these claims 
(rightly, in my view), the traditional basis for recognising sexual assault as 
distinctively wrongful no longer applies. To maintain this view, we must explain the 
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distinctive wrongness of sexual attacks in a way that does not commit us to a 
restrictive sexual ethic or a sexist view of women’s sexuality. 
I will formulate this problem as the traditionalist’s challenge. The problem is how 
one can explain the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks without appealing to a 
traditional view of sex that itself generates a restrictive sexual ethic for consensual 
contact. It can be expressed as follows. 
The traditionalist to the progressive: 
 
You no longer consider sex to be significant, or sexual activity to be morally different to other 
kinds of interaction, and have rejected claims to that effect as outdated, arbitrary, and unduly 
restrictive. When it is consensual you see sex just as another activity that people enjoy 
together. How then can you argue that sexual assault is morally worse than non-sexual 
assault just because it is sexual? 
 
Alternatively: 
How can you consistently claim that there is nothing morally special about sex that would 
generate a restrictive sexual ethic (prohibiting casual sex, promiscuity, masturbation, and so 
on), while maintaining that there is something special about sex insofar as sexual assault is 
distinctly wrongful in virtue of being a sexual assault? 
I hope that this captures the underlying problem that motivates Benatar’s dilemma. I 
have aimed to characterise what is most concerning about the challenge that 
Benatar advances: one cannot consistently explain what is special about sexual 
contact such that sexual attacks are distinctively wrongful without recognising the 
moral significance of sex in a way that prohibits a great deal of consensual sexual 
contact. 
Importantly, the traditionalist’s challenge avoids the charges that I levelled against 
Benatar’s dilemma. I do not advance this challenge as a forced choice between two 
(or more) alternatives. Instead, it simply challenges its audience to explain the 
distinct and serious wrongness of sexual attacks in a way that does not commit them 
to a restrictive sexual ethic. Although this challenge becomes particularly salient 
given the rejection of traditional explanations of the wrongness of sexual violence, 
my comments here in no way rely on the view that these traditional explanations are 
themselves at all successful. Indeed, they are based on extremely suspect claims 
about women and sex and were often deployed inconsistently. For example, 
traditional approaches to sexual violence often failed to recognise as seriously wrong 
sexual attacks perpetrated against women of colour, economically marginalised 
women, women who have previously had sex, women without a male guardian, 
lesbian and bisexual women, sex workers, men, and so on (Card 1991, 309–10; 
Peterson 1977, 362–63). Given my formulation of the traditionalist’s challenge, the 
fundamental flaws of the traditional approach to the wrongness of sexual assault to 
not undermine the problem at hand. The question remains for proponents of a 
comparatively permissive sexual ethic; how will we justify the claim that sexual 
attacks involve a distinct wrong in a way that does not commit us to the claim that 
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sex is special and so subject to widespread moral prohibitions even when the contact 
is consensual and mutually desired? 
 
 
Section 1.9 – The Scope of My Project 
 
I will engage with attempts in the philosophical literature to explain the serious 
wrongness of rape and consider these as responses to the traditionalist’s challenge. 
The wrongness of rape is central to the problem that I have set out, but my project 
differs from the approach often adopted in the literature. In this section, I say 
something about why my approach diverges in these ways. 
First, I discuss the broad category of sexual attacks rather than rape, while theorists 
in the literature often focus only on rape (Archard 2007; Baber 1987; Gardner and 
Shute 2007; Murphy 1994; Shafer and Frye 1977). This is simply because it seems 
to me that the sexual nature of an attack makes a significant moral difference 
whether the violation under discussion is rape or some other sexual attack. Consider 
a case in which one person momentarily grabs another person’s buttocks, and a 
case in which one person momentarily grabs another person’s arm or shoulder. We 
might want to say that, intuitively, the first is more seriously wrongful than the 
second. Arguably, the only feature distinguishing these attacks that might be morally 
salient is that one is a sexual assault while the other is non-sexual. In these cases, it 
seems that the sexual nature of an attack is morally salient even when the attack in 
question does not constitute rape. 
The same phenomenon plausibly applies for sexual attacks that do not involve bodily 
contact. Consider the following two cases. 
Flashing. Person B is walking down a public street. Person A jumps in front 
of Person B and exposes his penis. 
Medical Exposure. Person D is walking down a public street. Person C 
jumps in front of Person D and exposes a growth on his torso, which Person 
D finds disgusting. 
I believe that these sexual and non-sexual cases are relevantly similar. That is, the 
only morally salient difference is that Flashing involves a sexual imposition while 
Medical Exposure does not. I assume that the person who exposes their genitals 
commits a more serious wrong than the person who exposes an unsightly growth.10 
If this is correct, then this must be more seriously wrongful in virtue of the sexual 
nature of the former. There are a range of non-consensual sexual impositions that 
do not involve bodily contact, including invasive or explicit comments, voyeurism, 
                                                          
10 It is worth noting that the law in the UK would treat these cases differently, punishing the assailant 
in Flashing with up to two years imprisonment (Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 66). 
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and so on. If we accept that many of these cases are more seriously wrongful than 
their relevantly similar non-sexual counterparts, then they must be wrongful in part 
because the imposition is sexual. 
I focus broadly on sexual attacks because there is a similar phenomenon in these 
cases as in the case of rape. Whether the focus is on rape, some other form of non-
consensual sexual contact, or sexual imposition without bodily contact, sexual 
violations are intuitively more seriously wrongful than relevantly similar non-sexual 
impositions. In each of these cases, the sexual nature of the act seems to aggravate 
its wrongness. The motivation behind accounts of the wrongness of rape is at least 
implicitly that there is something wrongful in rape that is not present in other violent 
attacks. These accounts take this as a start point and seek to justify making a moral 
distinction by arguing that there is something wrong in rape that does not occur in 
non-sexual attacks. The same motivation is relevant to sexual attacks more 
generally. These impositions also involve a feature that sets them apart, morally 
speaking, from otherwise similar non-sexual impositions, specifically that they are 
cases of sexual assault or sexual harassment, and so on. If I am correct that 
theorists investigate the wrongness of rape to discover the feature that distinguishes 
it morally from non-sexual attacks and that there is some feature that also sets other 
forms of sexual assault and non-contact sexual impositions apart from relevantly 
similar non-sexual impositions, then it is reasonable to prefer an account of the 
wrongness of rape that can also be applied (albeit with some changes) to sexual 
assault and sexual impositions without bodily contact. 
Second, the traditionalist’s challenge demands an explanation of the distinct wrong 
of sexual violence relative to non-sexual assault, whereas theorists discussing the 
wrongness of rape typically seek to explain why this is seriously wrong without 
reference to non-sexual contact. My divergence from their strategy here is not 
substantial. It is implied in the work of theorists seeking to justify the claim that rape 
is seriously wrong that they are seeking some reason that rape is morally distinct 
from otherwise similar cases of non-sexual assault. Otherwise, it would suffice for 
them to discuss the wrongness of non-consensual bodily contact more generally. 
That they aim to explain the wrongness of rape specifically indicates that they 
believe that the wrongness of rape is not explained entirely by the imposition of non-
consensual bodily contact, and that rape involves distinct wrongs that do not occur 
in all such non-consensual violations. 
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I consider accounts of the wrongness of rape and examine 
how successfully they explain the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks. I argue that 
they are unsuccessful but that they offer illuminating and instructive resources. I 
draw on these resources to develop my own account in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Suffering and Social Meaning 
 
Section 2.1 – Introduction to Chapter 2 
 
In this chapter, I examine two accounts of the wrongness of rape. Although I reject 
these accounts, I argue that they provide useful resources and that considering their 
flaws provides an insight into what we want from a response to the traditionalist’s 
challenge. 
In Section 2.2, I examine the argument that sexual attacks are seriously wrongful 
because they cause the victims a great deal of suffering, a proposal that I take to be 
highly intuitive and popular outside of academic writing. I will examine this view as it 
is advanced by Wertheimer. I argue that it inappropriately excludes some cases of 
sexual violence and that it incorrectly models the relationship between the suffering 
of victims and the wrongness of rape. I consider Gardner and Shute’s view that 
extreme suffering often experienced by victims is in part a response to and 
recognition of the very serious wrong perpetrated against them. In Section 2.3, I 
explain Gardner and Shute’s account of the wrongness of rape. In Sections 2.4 and 
2.5, I argue that Gardner and Shute’s reliance on the social meaning of sex reveals a 
flaw in their account. In Section 2.6, I draw out more explicitly those aspects of 
these accounts that I find instructive and will draw on moving forward. Although I 
argue that they rely on claims about the social meaning of consensual sex that are 
unsustainable, they advance some claims that I will draw on in developing my own 
account, in particular that the wrongness of rape is explicable in part by appeal to 
something like the social meaning of such attacks and the objectification of the 
victim. 
 
Section 2.2 – Wertheimer on Sexual Assault and Suffering 
 
I begin with Wertheimer’s account of the wrongness of rape. Wertheimer captures 
the most intuitive and initially tempting explanation of the wrongness of sexual 
violence. Wertheimer (2003, 103) argues that non-consensual sexual contact wrongs 
the victim insofar as it harms them. He proposes that “rape and non-consensual 
sexual relations are special harms and they are special harms largely because they 
are experienced as special harms” (Wertheimer 2003, 103, 109). Sexual attacks are 
distinctly wrong on this view because they tend to cause greater suffering for the 
victim. During a sexual attack and for some time afterwards, victims typically 
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experience a great deal of “distress”, which Wertheimer (2003, 106) takes to be 
emotional pain and other mental states that one experiences as negative and 
(deeply) uncomfortable. In the longer term, survivors of sexual assault typically 
report more extreme psychological problems than victims of most violent attacks 
(Wertheimer 2003, 104). Wertheimer’s view, then, is that sexual attacks are 
distinctly wrongful because they typically inflict greater suffering on victims than do 
non-sexual attacks. 
Although Wertheimer’s account captures an aspect of sexual attacks of which we 
must not lose sight, the suffering of those who are targeted in such attacks, his 
appeal to victims’ suffering does not furnish a sustainable explanation of the 
wrongness of sexual attacks. There are some sexual attacks in which the victim 
experiences no suffering. In these cases, Wertheimer’s account entails that sexual 
assault is not distinctly wrong. If the victim experiences no suffering as a result of 
the attack, then the feature of sexual violence that distinguishes it from non-sexual 
assault, the greater suffering inflicted onto the victim, is not present. Wertheimer’s 
account cannot explain the distinct wrong of sexual attacks in these cases. His 
account therefore entails that these sexual attacks are no more seriously wrongful 
than otherwise similar non-sexual attacks. This might mean that, if they cause no 
physical injury, they are not seriously wrong at all, as we often judge non-sexual 
assault that causes no injury or distress as quite minor wrongdoing. These are 
worrying implications of his account. 
Gardner and Shute (2007, 5) and Cecile Fabré (2004, 883) independently present a 
case of rape in which the victim has no experience of the attack and does not suffer. 
They suppose that the victim is unconscious at the time of the attack and the 
assailant inflicts penile-vagina intercourse while wearing a condom. The victim never 
discovers that they have been raped.11 Gardner and Shute (2007, 6, emphasis in 
original) call this the “pure case” of rape because it involves only core harms of rape, 
and so the wrong perpetrated in this case must also occur in all others. 
If we want to say that this attack is seriously wrongful, then this is a problem for 
Wertheimer’s account (Fabré 2004, 883; Husak 2006, 283). On his view, it is not 
distinctly wrong as a sexual attack because it involves no suffering, which is the 
feature of sexual attacks that distinguishes them from non-sexual attacks on his 
view, and must therefore be judged as equivalent to a non-sexual assault that 
involves no suffering or injury. 
To put this another way, consider two cases of assault perpetrated against an 
unconscious victim, which cause no pain or injury and which the victim never 
discovers. One is a sexual attack, in which the assailant inserts their penis into the 
                                                          
11 It is important that the victim never discovers that they have been assaulted at some later time. 
Cressida Heyes (2016) offers a compelling explanation of the trauma experienced by persons who are 
sexually assaulted while they are unconscious and later discover that they have been assaulted. 
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victim’s mouth; the other is a non-sexual attack, in which the assailant inserts their 
finger into the victim’s mouth. These cases are similar except that one is a sexual 
attack and the other is not. On Wertheimer’s view, we must conclude that both are 
equally wrong and, probably, that they both constitute quite minor wrongs because 
they cause no suffering or injury. Wertheimer (2003, 156) appears to concede this 
when he claims that 
the wrong of non-consensual sexual relations is a function of experience, and when some of 
the harms associated with more typical non-consensual sex seem not to apply, non-
consensual sex is much less wrong or not wrong at all. 
These cases are likely to seem contrived and artificial to the reader; they certainly 
do not reflect sexual assault as we think it actually occurs. Raising and relying on 
these cases to examine the wrongness of such attacks might therefore reasonably 
strike the reader as being in poor taste. Attempting to explain the wrongness of 
rape, something that is often traumatising and that important institutions all too 
frequently fail to take seriously, by focusing on such artificial cases poses the risk of 
insensitivity. It is worth bearing in mind, then, that cases like this are neither as 
artificial nor as infrequent or peripheral as we might think. Far from being contrived, 
these cases, like all kinds of sexual violence, are far too common. 
It is now widely reported and acknowledged that, until the early 2000s, medical 
students in the US were instructed to perform vaginal examinations on patients 
without specific consent to this contact (Barnes 2012; Bibby et al. 1988; Coldicott, 
Pope, and Roberts 2003; Friesen 2018; Rees and Monrouxe 2011; Schniederjan and 
Donovan 2005; Ubel, Jepson, and Silver-Isenstadt 2003). Medical students would 
insert their fingers into the patient’s vagina while the patient was under general 
anaesthetic for the purposes of their own education, to help them become 
accustomed to performing vaginal examinations. These patients were selected 
because they were anaesthetised, and usually were not present for any procedure 
that would require contact with their vagina. The patient would not be notified 
beforehand, and the practice was justified by a very general consent form signed by 
the patient prior to the administration of anaesthetic, which made no mention of the 
medical students performing a vaginal examination for training purposes. Many of 
the victims of this sexual assault now know that they were subjected to these 
attacks. However, we can suppose that some patients never discovered that this 
occurred. These victims suffered something like pure rape, a sexual attack of which 
they have no experience or knowledge. 
In a recent case in Phoenix, Arizona, a female patient who has been comatose for 
more than a decade at a Hacienda Healthcare clinic gave birth (Agencies in Phoenix 
2019). The woman must have become pregnant by vaginal penetration to which she 
could not consent. That is, she must have been sexually assaulted. The patient here 
did not experience suffering, and yet it would seem callous to suggest that she has 
not been (seriously) wronged. Certainly, the outcry in response to this case indicates 
a widespread view that the sexual assault was a serious wrong, and wrong in a 
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distinct way to non-sexual assault, where this cannot depend on the victim’s 
experienced suffering. These kinds of sexual assault occur, and it is important that 
accounts of the wrongness of sexual attacks can accommodate them. 
The claim that these patients were seriously wronged, and that the wrong 
perpetrated against them is distinct from that of common assault, is inconsistent 
with Wertheimer’s view that sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful only because they 
inflict greater suffering on the victim. The victims who did not later discover that 
they were attacked consciously experienced no suffering, and so Wertheimer’s 
account appears to offer no resources to explain the serious wrongness of these 
attacks. 
However, Wertheimer (2003, 111, emphasis in original) offers a response to this 
kind of case: “We can say that A’s [the assailant’s] behavior is wrong because it is 
likely to result in harm to B [the victim] without having to insist that B was harmed 
in this case”, where ‘harm’ refers narrowly to experienced suffering. Wertheimer 
argues that the sexual attacks in these cases are distinctly wrong because they 
involve behaviour that is likely to cause very serious experienced suffering in the 
victim, even if they in fact do not. 
It is unclear how far this helps Wertheimer to accommodate these cases. In some 
cases, it simply is not likely that the attack will cause the victim to suffer. If the 
victim is unconscious or comatose for a prolonged period of time, then they are 
unlikely to discover that the attack took place. Of these cases, we cannot say that it 
is even likely that the victim would experience suffering, and Wertheimer’s account 
is still unable to explain the distinct wrongness of these cases. 
Alternatively, we might interpret Wertheimer’s claims more broadly, as suggesting 
that the sexual attack involves the kind of non-consensual contact that, if the victim 
were conscious of the attack, would cause severe experienced suffering. Perhaps 
Wertheimer means to claim that sexual attacks are distinctly wrong for this reason. 
On this interpretation, Wertheimer’s account can accommodate the cases that I have 
raised. However, the account on this interpretation requires more by way of 
justification. Certainly, we can say that if the victim was conscious at the time of the 
attack, then the attack would likely cause them very severe suffering. However, it is 
not clear how this can explain the wrongness of such attacks when the victim is not 
conscious. It is unclear how the fact that this behaviour would cause severe 
suffering if the victim were conscious grounds the distinct wrongness of the attack, 
given that the victim is not conscious and never discovers the attack. In making this 
move, Wertheimer also downplays the most intuitively compelling features of his 
account. His account accommodates the highly intuitive claim that sexual attacks are 
distinctly wrongful because they inflict a great deal of suffering on victims. His 
caveat here, that sexual attacks are wrongful given the modal claim that they would 
cause extreme suffering under certain (different) conditions, dilutes his compelling 
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suggestion that these attacks are distinctly wrongful because they in fact cause the 
victim to suffer. 
There is a further problem with Wertheimer’s appeal to the suffering experienced by 
the victims of sexual attacks. Wertheimer argues that sexual attacks are distinctly 
wrong because they cause greater suffering to the victim. However, we have good 
reason to endorse the reverse, that victims of sexual violence experience such 
serious suffering in part because they are wronged. 
The problem with explaining the distinct wrong of rape solely by reference to the 
experienced psychological suffering of the victim is that it leaves open the question 
of whether this suffering is reasonable. Gardner and Shute (2007, 6–7) argue that 
“If nothing was wrong with being raped apart from the fact that one reacted badly 
afterwards, then one had no reason to react badly afterwards.” This formulation of 
the problem is not quite right. Minimally, the victim’s response to the attack would 
be reasonable; they would be reacting to the wrong perpetrated against them by the 
assailant’s imposition of non-consensual bodily contact. Gardner and Shute’s point 
here, however, is that we cannot explain the distinct wrong of sexual attacks by 
appeal to the victim’s suffering, because this would not provide a means by which to 
say that the victim of a sexual attack reasonably experiences the attack as more 
serious and traumatising than they would experience a common assault. According 
to Gardner and Shute, we want to say that the extensive suffering of victims of 
sexual attacks is a proportionate and reasonable response to a serious wrong 
perpetrated against them. If we argue that sexual attacks constitute distinct and 
serious wrongs just in virtue of the victim’s experience, then we cannot make this 
claim without circularity.  
Paglia also illustrates the problem at play here. Her comments are shockingly callous 
and dismissive, but I find that this gives us all the more reason to prefer an account 
that rules her view out, and one way to do this is to develop an account of the 
wrongness of sexual attacks that does not ground this solely in the victim’s suffering. 
Rape is an assault. If it is a totally devastating psychological experienced for a woman, then 
she doesn’t have a proper attitude toward sex. It’s this whole stupid feminist thing about how 
we are basically nurturing, benevolent people, and sex is a wonderful thing between two 
equals. With that kind of attitude, then of course rape is going to be a violation of your entire 
life (Paglia 1993, 64–65). 
Paglia suggests that severe experienced suffering in response to a sexual attack is 
unreasonable and based on a mistaken conception of sex. Accordingly, she thinks 
that the very serious traumatic suffering of victims does not provide a good reason 
to view sexual attacks as distinctly wrongful. Gardner and Shute (2007, 7–8) and Jed 
Rubenfeld (2013, 1429) raise a similar possibility without endorsing it. They suggest 
that the severe suffering experienced by victims of sexual attacks might be in part a 
function of the kind of traditional and sexist views of sex and of women that I 
discussed in Section 1.8. That is, some persons might be particularly affected by 
sexual attacks because they endorse or are influenced by the false claim that women 
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are damaged or rendered inferior by sex. The worry here is that the suffering is a 
consequence of an irrational attitude or false beliefs about sexual contact, and that 
this kind of suffering is an inadequate basis to explain the wrongness of the act that 
provokes it. 
If, however, we can explain the wrongness of these attacks by appeal to something 
other than the victim’s experiences, then we can show that this suffering is in fact a 
reasonable response to a wrong perpetrated against them. By rejecting 
Wertheimer’s account and appealing to something other than experienced suffering 
to explain the distinct wrongness of sexual violence, we can take the force out of 
Paglia’s claims. With an account of this structure, we can argue that Paglia is 
incorrect to claim the suffering inflicted by sexual violence results from an irrational 
or inaccurate conception of sex held by the victim; instead the victim’s suffering is 
explained by the wrong perpetrated against them and their accurate recognition of 
this. 
This raises a problem for Wertheimer’s account. It is not sufficient to observe that 
sexual attacks typically inflict great suffering onto the victim and to argue that they 
are more seriously wrongful on this basis. In order to show that sexual attacks are 
more wrongful on this basis, we must show that the suffering of victims is 
reasonable, a proportionate response to a serious wrong perpetrated against them 
(Gardner and Shute 2007, 6). This requires an explanation of the distinct wrong of 
sexual attacks that does not itself appeal to experienced suffering. 
An analogy might help to illustrate this argument. We can imagine a person who is 
extremely traumatised when another person touches the back of their hand. We 
would sympathise with this person, and likely believe that they deserve support. We 
would also strongly condemn anyone who touched their hand with the awareness 
that this would cause them extreme trauma. However, we would, I think, view this 
person’s reaction as in some sense irrational or unwarranted. Any help we offer 
them would likely include attempting to have them adopt a less drastic response to 
having their hand touched. The case of sexual assault is very different. We intuitively 
view the traumatic response of the survivor of sexual assault as reasonable in a way 
that the response to the hand-on-hand contact is not. The survivor of sexual assault 
suffers severe psychological trauma in response to a despicable wrong that is 
inflicted upon them. Their reaction makes sense as a response to the seriously 
wrongful attack. 
While we would be justified in trying to (gently) persuade the person in the first case 
that they have no reason to so fear having their hand touched and to change their 
reaction, a similar response would be insulting and counter-productive in the case of 
the survivor of sexual assault. In this case, the survivor of sexual assault has been 
seriously wronged and reacts in a manner that is both appropriate and 
proportionate. Paglia’s comments entail that we should view both persons in the 
same way. On her view, the person who suffers significantly upon having their hand 
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touched and the person who suffers significantly upon being sexually assaulted are 
wronged equally, and the wrong is fairly minor. She would suggest that both operate 
under a delusion (about the nature of having their hand touched and the nature of 
sex, respectively), and that their suffering is therefore does not ground the serious 
wrongness of the relevant assault. 
Appealing to the often extreme emotional and psychological trauma caused by 
sexual assault does not therefore enable Wertheimer’s account to ground a morally 
significant distinction between sexual and non-sexual assault. It seems that we have 
good reason to understand the particular wrongness of sexual assault as explicable 
independently of the trauma caused, although this trauma is a significant 
aggravating factor, and to understand the trauma as a reasonable and proportionate 
reaction to the seriously wrongful violation that befalls the victim. 
We therefore have two reasons to prefer an explanation that, unlike Wertheimer’s 
account, explains the distinct wrongness of sexual violence in terms of something 
other than (only) the victim’s suffering. First, it is not clear that Wertheimer’s 
account can succeed on its own terms. Second, we have strong independent reasons 
to argue that the trauma suffered by victims of sexual violence is not a function of 
weakness or a faulty conception of sex (Gardner and Shute 2007, 6–8; Rubenfeld 
2013, 1429), but instead a proportionate and reasonable response to being seriously 
wronged. Justifying this claim requires appealing to something other than the 
victim’s experienced suffering in an account of the wrongness of sexual violence. 
This leaves open the question of what role victim’s experiences play in explaining the 
wrongness of sexual attacks. Many victims of sexual violence suffer egregiously 
during sexual attacks and are often traumatised long after. We should be extremely 
suspicious, therefore, of the suggestion that these experiences play only a minor role 
in explaining the distinct wrongness of sexual violence. J.H. Bogart (1995, 168) and 
Rubenfeld (2013, 1428) note, correctly in my view, that we should avoid excessive 
abstraction and aim for a view that is sensitive to the experiences of victims of 
sexual attacks. 
I therefore endorse two claims that initially appear to be in tension. The first is that 
the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks cannot be explained entirely by appeal to 
the victims’ experiences. The second is that an account of the wrongness of sexual 
attacks should be sensitive to and reflect the experiences of survivors of such 
attacks. I believe that we can reconcile these claims. Gardner and Shute (2007, 7) 
argue that the experiences of victims “to be rational, must be epiphenomenal, in the 
sense that they cannot constitute, but must shadow, the basic, or essential, 
wrongness of rape”, and Archard (2007, 380) argues that the “hurtfulness [of a 
sexual attack] is evidence of, it is not constitutive of, its essential wrongness.” While 
Wertheimer claims that sexual attacks are distinctly wrong because they cause 
greater suffering, Gardner and Shute and Archard argue the reverse, that victims of 
sexual attacks experience greater suffering because sexual attacks perpetrate a 
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distinct wrong against them. On this model, the importance of these experiences is 
recognised, but these experiences do not themselves ground the distinct wrongness 
of sexual attacks. The testimony of survivors provides an insight into the wrong 
perpetrated against them, although it does not fully explain the distinct wrong of 
sexual attacks. 
 
Section 2.3 – Gardner and Shute on the Social Meaning of Rape 
 
In this section, I examine an account advanced by Gardner and Shute. On this view, 
the wrongness of rape is a function of the social meanings and cultural perceptions 
of consensual sex. I argue that this account is unsuccessful, but that Gardner and 
Shute provide useful resources for a more successful explanation of the wrongness 
of sexual violence. Their focus is on penetrative sex and penetrative sexual assault, 
so I shall adopt their narrower focus for the purposes of evaluating their account 
(Gardner 2018, 49; Gardner and Shute 2007, 21). I propose, however, that the more 
promising features of their account can be applied to all sexual attacks. 
Gardner and Shute (2007, 16, 19) argue that rape is seriously wrong because the 
rapist treats the victim as a tool by imposing contact for the rapist’s own ends with 
no regard for the victim’s autonomy, interests, or suffering. They describe this as 
“objectification” and, in Kantian terms, as the rapist treating the victim “merely as a 
means” (Gardner and Shute 2007, 16-17, emphasis in original). On this view, rape is 
wrong because it imposes contact without the victim’s consent.  Gardner and Shute 
(2007, 16) say that this “is a denial of their personhood. It is literally dehumanizing.” 
Rape denies the victim’s personhood in this sense because it is generally understood 
that persons interests and (withholding of) consent should be respected, whereas 
rape disregards and violates these. Specifically, rape wrongs the victim because it 
violates their right to sexual autonomy, which they characterise as the right to 
decide the sexual acts in which they engage (Gardner and Shute 2007, 20). 
This feature of their account does not establish that rape is distinctly wrong. It 
identifies that the wrong of rape consists in non-consensual contact and the 
objectification of the victim, but it does not yet establish that the objectification in 
rape is more severe than the treatment of the victim as an object that might occur in 
many forms of non-sexual assault. They explain the distinct wrongness of rape by 
arguing that there is a certain social meaning that attaches to consensual sex, and 
rape subverts this. In subverting the social meaning of consensual sex, rape 
constitutes an extreme objectification or use of the victim (Gardner and Shute 2007, 
21–22). 
Gardner and Shute do not explain the notion of ‘social meaning’ here, but they imply 
that it refers to the popular views of and attitudes towards (in this case) sex within a 
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particular culture. They suggest that the social meanings that surround consensual 
penetrative sex are that it is the paradigm case of “subject-subject” relations 
(Gardner and Shute 2007, 22). These social meanings are such that sex involves a 
“union” or “complete and literal intertwining of two selves”, in which the two 
partners engage as equal subjects in an act that is entirely unlike one in which one 
person treats the other as an object. In a later work, Gardner (2018, 49–51, 54–56) 
elaborates on the social meaning of sex, here referring to it as “a familiar picture of 
good sex.” He suggests that, according to this picture, sex is “a perfect and blissful 
union, a mutual integration of two embodied beings acting together as one”, a 
“collaboration” between partners in which two persons recognise and respond to 
each other’s intentions, desires, and pleasures (Gardner 2018, 49, 51, 54). The 
persistent themes here are that the social meaning of sex is that sex involves a 
union of two persons, rather than just contact between two bodies, and that it is a 
collaborative pursuit between equals, who recognise each other’s goals and interests 
and seek to realise these to provide fulfilment to each other. This social meaning is 
reminiscent of the conception of sex that underpins some significance views, and 
especially Punzo’s claims about sex as the union of two selves that I discussed in 
Section 1.5. However, Gardner and Shute claim that this is widely recognised as a 
feature of sex but not that sex must be confined to committed romantic love 
relationships as a result. 
They note that this may be “over-romanticised”, either in the sense that sex is 
largely not actually like this or that persons would not consciously accept that this is 
an accurate description of how sex is or even how sex should be (Gardner 2018, 49; 
Gardner and Shute 2007, 22). However, this is not a problem for their argument 
about the distinct wrongness of rape. Gardner and Shute (2007, 22, 24 n.28) argue 
that this conception has sufficient purchase or influence that this is the social 
meaning of sex, regardless of whether it is an accurate description of the sex that 
persons are actually having. 
Gardner and Shute argue that rape constitutes a “subversion” of the social meaning 
of sex (Gardner and Shute 2007, 22). That is, the negative social meaning attributed 
to rape in some way mirrors or corresponds to the positive social meaning attributed 
to consensual sex. Just as Gardner and Shute (2007, 22) say that our culture 
perceives consensual sex as “a perfection of subject-subject relations”, its subversion 
in rape then embodies “a paradigm of subject-object relations” or a case of “sheer 
use” of one person by another. Consensual sex is considered to be the epitome of a 
bodily and personal union of two people, and this meaning is subverted by the rapist 
and used against the victim (Gardner and Shute 2007, 23–24). As a result, rape 
constitutes a unique and aggravated case of using another person. While such use is 
always wrong, the social meaning ascribed to consensual sex, which is subverted in 
rape, establishes rape as an especially egregious and unadulterated form of “sheer 
use” (Gardner and Shute 2007, 22–23). It is this feature of rape that sets it apart 
from non-sexual violence. Rape is distinctly wrong because it constitutes an extreme 
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use of the victim as if they were an object. Rape constitutes an extreme use of the 
victim because the rapist subverts the social meaning of consensual sex as the 
paradigm of a collaborative union of two subjects, imposing the paradigm case of 
using another person as an object. Rape wrongs the victim in a manner that non-
sexual assault does not because it subverts the special and positive social meaning 
of consensual sex to treat the victim as an object in an especially degrading and 
dehumanising manner. 
Gardner and Shute’s account has its advantages. In light of my discussion in Section 
2.2, this account appropriately accommodates the suffering of victims of sexual 
violence. It recognises rape as seriously and distinctly wrongful even when the 
victim has no experience of the attack. In these cases, the assailant still subverts the 
social meaning of consensual sex to inflict an attack that objectifies the victim in a 
way that dehumanises them to the extreme. The victim is not aware that they are 
treated in this way in these cases, but the assailant nevertheless perpetrates an 
attack that constitutes a distinctly vicious affront to the victim’s dignity and 
personhood. Gardner and Shute’s account recognises as seriously and distinctly 
wrong those cases of rape in which the victim does not experience the attack, unlike 
Wertheimer’s account. 
At the same time, Gardner and Shute are sensitive to the importance of survivors’ 
experiences and testimony in the context of this work. They acknowledge that rape 
is typically “accompanied by violence, terror, humiliation, etc.” (Gardner and Shute 
2007, 16). Although it is important that an account can accommodate those cases in 
which the victim has no experience of the attack, they recognise that it is more 
common for victims of sexual violence to suffer, sometimes very severely. In line 
with their proposals that I outlined in Section 2.2, they argue that this suffering, 
feeling “terrified or humiliated” is a “justified” response to the wrong perpetrated 
against them (Gardner and Shute 2007, 16). On Gardner and Shute’s view, victims 
of rape have this experience because the assailant objectifies them, dehumanises 
them, and denies their personhood. They thereby avoid the problems that 
Wertheimer’s view encounters in explaining the wrong of rape by appeal to the 
suffering of victims, while recognising the role and importance of these experiences 
in such an account. 
Gardner and Shute note a further advantage of their account; given that they focus 
on the social meaning of consensual sex to ground the wrongness of rape, they do 
not rely on the contingent attitudes of particular individuals. Even if a person’s own 
conception of sex and its value differs significantly from the social meaning of sex, a 
sexual assault perpetrated against this person would nevertheless seriously wrong 
them, because it would draw on and subvert this social meaning (Gardner and Shute 
2007, 22–23). Someone might reject and even mock the idea of sex as an awe-
inspiring and collaborative union of two equals as being outdated, unrealistic, or 
undesirable. They might sincerely believe that sex is like other recreational activities 
that two or more persons might enjoy together, as per the casual view. Gardner and 
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Shute’s (2007, 22–23) account entails that this person would nevertheless be 
seriously wronged if they were subjected to a sexual attack, and that the victim is 
just as likely to find rape terrifying and humiliating, as they would if they considered 
sex to be something special and sacrosanct. 
Gardner and Shute’s account has a promising scope; rape is distinctly wrong even if 
the victim does not view sexual contact as at all special. It also means that their 
account goes some way towards resolving the traditionalist’s challenge. Rape is 
distinctly wrong even when the victim does not subscribe to a conception of sex that 
leads them to confine sexual contact to committed relationships. 
 
Section 2.4 – The Social Meaning of Consensual Sex 
 
However, Gardner and Shute’s conception of the social meaning of consensual sex 
presents a problem for their account. Even adopting Gardner and Shute’s quite 
narrow focus on penetrative sexual assault, they do not accurately represent the 
social meaning with which consensual sex is invested. I will argue that their 
description of the social meaning of penile-vaginal intercourse is incorrect, and that 
they do not accurately characterise the social meaning of other forms of penetrative 
sexual contact. I then argue that, more generally, their account depends too heavily 
on social meanings of consensual sexual acts that are prone to change over time. On 
this basis, I raise the problem that Gardner and Shute’s account may not entirely 
avoid the traditionalist’s challenge; the wrongness of rape on their account relies on 
a conception of sex that might generate a restrictive sexual ethic. 
First, we have reason to doubt Gardner and Shute’s conception of the social 
meaning of consensual penile-vaginal intercourse. In the modern West, the social 
meanings of consensual vaginal intercourse often differ significantly from those 
proposed by Gardner and Shute. Far from being an intimate and perfect union of 
two selves, even consensual sex is sometimes viewed as violent or harmful 
(particularly for any women involved), as an act in which one party takes an active 
role and performs some act on the other party, rather than a properly joint or 
collaborative union. I believe that these insights are confirmed in familiar cultural 
tropes about sex. The view of sex as a ‘conquest’, especially for young men, 
certainly reflects the idea of one party taking the active role, and of sex being 
violent, without involving much connection to the other person. 
Robert Baker identifies a social conception of sex by considering the language often 
used to describe penetrative sexual intercourse. If A and B have sex, Baker (2009, 
226–27) notes that this might be recounted as: ‘A fucked B’, ‘A screwed B’, ‘A 
banged B’ alongside more wholesome descriptions like ‘A slept with B’ or ‘A and B 
slept together’ and ‘A and B had sex’. Although these more wholesome descriptions 
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are available, Baker argues that the prominence of the first set of terms is indicative 
of a dominant conception of sexual contact. He argues that these terms suggest that 
one person harms the other, and that this reflects a conception of sex according to 
which one person harms the other when they engage in sexual contact (R. B. Baker 
2009, 228–30). In other contexts, to ‘screw’ someone or ‘fuck someone over’ can 
mean physically harming them or manipulating them in a way that leaves them 
worse off. This reflects, Baker argues, a conception of sex in which one person 
harms another. He believes that a view of sex persists according to which sexual 
contact enhances a man’s status while degrading a woman’s status (R. B. Baker 
2009, 230). More generally, Baker notes that we often talk about sex as something 
that one person does to another. Although some terms (‘sleeping together’, ‘having 
sex’) portray a joint action, many of the terms used to describe sex imply that one 
person does something (‘fucks’, ‘screws’, ‘bangs’) to the other. Again, Baker argues 
that this reflects a dominant conception of sex as something that one person does to 
another. 
If he is correct, then this raises an interesting problem for Gardner and Shute’s 
account. They suggest that the social meaning of sex is one of collaboration, in 
which two subjects engage with each other as subjects rather than as objects. Baker 
proposes that the social meaning of sex is instead that sex is something that one 
person (typically a man or person who penetrates their partner) does to another 
(typically a woman or a person who is penetrated). This is quite the reverse of the 
social meaning that Gardner and Shute observe, of sex as a collaborative effort 
between two subjects. 
It is an open question whether Baker’s inference from the language sometimes used 
to describe sex to his claims about the social meaning of sex is viable. Michelle 
Dempsey and Jonathan Herring explain this inference and offer further justification 
for the claim that Gardner and Shute inaccurately characterise the social meaning of 
sex. They endorse Simon Blackburn’s credibility principle as a means to determine 
the social meaning of an act within a cultural context. The credibility principle holds 
that a group is “committed to a belief” if there is no credible explanation of the 
group’s actions that does not appeal to their endorsement of this belief (Blackburn 
2001, 483-484, quoted in; Dempsey and Herring 2007, 484). That is, Blackburn 
(2001, 483–85) argues that a group has a belief if there is no sensible way to make 
sense of what the group does or says if it does not hold this belief. Blackburn (2001, 
485) argues that this could also be understood in terms of “public meaning”, and 
Dempsey and Herring (2007, 484) use the credibility principle to identify the social 
meaning of acts and practices. For them, an act or practice has a social meaning if 
the only way to credibly explain the act or practice is that persons within a cultural 
context endorse or are influenced by a certain proposition or attitude. 
Suppose that someone claims that the social meaning of sex is that it is the 
expression of a lifelong commitment between two persons. They would have to 
defend this claim by identifying certain practices that can only be credibly explained 
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if persons endorse or are influenced by this attitude towards or conception of sex. 
They might argue, for example, that stigma attaching to premarital sex, the 
marginalisation of unwed mothers, and the legal disenfranchisement of children born 
out of wedlock only make sense against a background set of beliefs and/or attitudes 
according to which sex is an expression of lifelong commitment that is only 
appropriate within marriage. Their argument would be compelling when applied to a 
traditional society in which these practices persist, if no credible explanation that 
appeals to a different set of beliefs or attitudes about sex is available. 
On this basis, Dempsey and Herring argue that sex has a negative social meaning in 
many societies, including all those of developed western countries, because there 
are certain practices that can only be credibly explained by appeal to a set of 
negative attitudes and beliefs about sex. Specifically, they argue that the social 
meaning of sex is that sex devalues and disrespects women because 
Our society could not use, depict, and describe penile sexual penetration of women’s vaginas 
and anuses the way it does if the social meaning of such conduct were not at least in part a 
way of devaluing women qua women and disrespecting women’s humanity (Dempsey and 
Herring 2007, 485). 
We know that consensual sex has this negative and sexist social meaning because 
the only credible way to explain popular descriptions and portrayals of sex is by 
appealing to beliefs and attitudes according to which penetrative sex is degrading, 
demeaning, and insulting to women who engage in it. Dempsey and Herring (2007, 
486) draw on Baker’s discussion of the language applied to sex to justify this claim. 
They note Baker’s view that the language of sex indicates that one person is harmed 
or manipulated in sex. They argue that the prominent use of this language cannot 
be credibly explained except by appeal to background beliefs or attitudes according 
to which sex harms one of the partners. We can only make sense of the 
phenomenon whereby persons talk about sex as one person ‘fucking’ or ‘screwing’ 
another if we recognise that many persons endorse or are influenced by the claim 
that consensual penetrative sex harms at least one of the partners. They propose 
that we can say something similar of “literature, film, advertising, television, 
pornography…internet depictions of sexual penetration [and] spam email” (Dempsey 
and Herring 2007, 485–86). Like Baker, Dempsey and Herring (2007, 485–86) argue 
that much of the language often used to describe sex only makes sense if we think 
of sex as something that one person does not another. It is untenable, they argue, 
to maintain that we would say that ‘A fucks B’ if we did not think of sex as 
something that one person does to another. The structure of these sentences 
implies that an agent acts upon an object. They claim that the portrayals of sex in 
these media can only be credibly explained if we appeal also the belief that sex 
disrespects the person being penetrated. Accordingly, they propose that the social 
meaning of sex is that one person does something to another, one person harms 
another, and women are degraded in sex in a way that men are not. 
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Baker and Dempsey and Herring hold that the social meaning of sex is negative; it is 
one of sex as harmful, objectifying, and sexist. However, one might think that the 
social meaning of sex is more positive than these proposals, without attributing to 
sex as much value as Gardner and Shute’s conception of its social meaning. An 
alternative possibility is that the social meaning of consensual sexual acts is that 
they are enjoyable recreational activities that people might do together because they 
desire to and expect that doing so will be very pleasurable. Accordingly, sex is 
recognised as enjoyable, but not so different to other recreational interactions. 
Something like this view is advanced by Hampton. She proposes that persons can 
attribute meaning to sex in many different ways on the basis of their upbringing, 
cultural influences, individual personality, and so on (Hampton 1999, 145). A person 
might come to view sex as “enjoyable, easy, natural, unremarkable, something one 
pursues for the pleasure of it” (Hampton 1999, 145). If enough people within a 
society or subculture came to internalise something like this view of sex, and 
especially if this affected their approach to sexual contact and the language that 
they use to describe it, then this would come to be the social meaning of sex with 
that cultural context. On this view, the main expectation of sex, and the main reason 
that people engage in it, is that it is fun. In some cultures, or among certain age 
groups or social groups within our society, this is plausibly already the extent of the 
social meanings attributed to sex. 
These social meanings are at odds with Gardner and Shute’s account of the social 
meanings of sex. Gardner and Shute (2007, 22) claim that the social meaning of 
consensual sex is that it is a collaborative union of two selves and two subjects. It is 
important for their account of the wrongness of rape that the social meaning of 
consensual sex is both profoundly positive and holds that sex is a collaboration 
between equal subjects. In the absence of these social meanings, the subversion of 
the social meanings of sex in rape cannot explain the distinct wrongness of non-
consensual sex, because their claim that rape involves an extreme use or 
objectification of the victim would no longer hold. If any of the alternative social 
meanings that I have proposed more accurately represent those that are attributed 
to sex, then Gardner and Shute’s account cannot succeed. 
It is plausible, however that sex in our society and in others carries a multiplicity of 
social meanings, some of which are in tension with each other. A proponent of 
Gardner and Shute’s account may reasonably respond that it is consistent to argue 
that Gardner and Shute’s conception of the social meaning of consensual sex is 
accurate, and the social meanings that Baker and Dempsey and Herring attribute to 
sex are also accurate. If this is the case, then Gardner and Shute are correct to 
recognise the social meaning of sex as the collaboration of two subjects and the 
subversion of this in rape as an extreme form of objectification, regardless of what 
other social meanings also attach to sex. 
There are two reasons to be cautious of this response, although I do not take them 
to be conclusive. First, while social meaning is complicated, not least when it comes 
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to sex, and it is possible that different social meanings might be in tension with each 
other, some of the social meanings that I have surveyed are directly inconsistent. It 
is difficult to see how these could be maintained simultaneously. Gardner and Shute 
claim that the social meaning of sex is that it is something that two persons do 
together, while Baker and Dempsey and Herring argue that this social meaning is 
that sex is something that one person does to another. These are inconsistent to the 
point that it is difficult to understand how both could hold. 
Secondly, even if multiple inconsistent social meanings are attributed to sex, it is not 
clear which social meaning is deployed and subverted in rape. Even if sex carries 
these social meanings, it is necessary that, if Gardner and Shute’s account is to 
succeed, a particular social meaning of sex is subverted and used against the victim 
of the attack. If sex does have these multiple, inconsistent social meanings, then it is 
unclear why the social meaning that is subverted and deployed against the victim is 
that of consensual sex as a collaborative act between subjects rather than 
something that one person does to another. If Gardner and Shute’s account is to 
succeed, and there are indeed multiple and contradictory social meanings that apply 
to consensual sex, then they must explain how the social meaning that they 
attribute to consensual sex, rather than any other, is the one that is subverted in 
rape. 
These comments are not conclusive against Gardner and Shute. It is possible that 
there are multiple social meanings attributed to sex and that the social meaning that 
Gardner and Shute endorse is the one that is subverted in rape, such that sexual 
violence is distinctly wrong as an extreme objectification of the victim. However, this 
does show that their account is more complex than it first appears and will require 
some further explanation. I will argue in Section 2.5 that this is indicative of a more 
fundamental problem in Gardner and Shute’s account. 
My focus so far has been on the social meanings of penile-vaginal intercourse and 
the implications of this for Gardner and Shute’s account. Although Gardner and 
Shute's description of the social meaning of consensual sex might apply in at least 
some contexts to penile-vaginal intercourse, it seems that Gardner and Shute would 
struggle to explain the distinct wrongness of rape that takes the form of non-
consensual anal penetration, simply because the same social meanings do not 
appear to be ascribed to consensual anal sex.12 
                                                          
12 I have followed Gardner and Shute in focusing only on the social meanings of consensual 
penetrative sex. I expect that Gardner and Shute’s account would also struggle to accommodate the 
particular wrongness of other kinds of rape and sexual assault, such as non-consensual non-
penetrative oral and manual sex, and other non-consensual sexual touching. A full response to the 
traditionalist’s challenge would require an explanation of the distinct wrongness of non-penetrative 
sexual attacks. I will not address this here, but I do draw on resources developed by Gardner and 
Shute in my own account in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Far from being universally highly valued as an intimate interaction between two 
people or ‘selves’, anal sex continues to be somewhat taboo, and is not romanticised 
in the way that vaginal sex is, although attitudes are changing (Lindberg, Jones, and 
Santelli 2008, 231). Plausibly, the social meanings of anal sex continue to be 
influenced by systemic homophobia. The social meanings often attributed to it may 
differ substantially from those that Gardner and Shute say are often attached to 
consensual vaginal intercourse. Anal sex is often characterised as deviant, and 
anything to do with the anus, especially sexual acts, is often thought of as 
unhygienic. The social meaning attributed by our culture to anal sex is currently 
ambiguous and contested. 
As a result, Gardner and Shute’s account of the wrongness of rape is unable to 
explain the distinct wrongness of non-consensual anal intercourse. On their account, 
rape is distinctly wrong because it subverts the strikingly positive social meanings 
that our culture attaches to consensual vaginal intercourse. Given the disagreement 
over the social meaning that our culture attributes to consensual anal intercourse, 
the subversion of this does not have the same implication for non-consensual anal 
intercourse. Gardner and Shute (2007, 22–23) may not therefore be able to offer a 
reason as to why non-consensual anal penetration is more wrongful than any 
otherwise similar non-sexual assault. 
 
Section 2.5 – The Instability of Social Meanings 
 
I have raised doubts about Gardner and Shute’s conception of the social meaning of 
sex by suggesting that other social meanings, sometimes in tension with those that 
they propose, are at least as likely to apply to sex. Of course, it is difficult if not 
impossible to identify exactly those social meanings that apply to sex in any culture. 
I should not rule out entirely the possibility that Gardner and Shute accurately 
describe the social meaning that attaches to sex in those societies that they have in 
mind. However, my objections against their view indicate a stronger rebuttal. Even if 
Gardner and Shute correctly identify the social meaning of consensual sex, their 
account is still flawed. 
 
Suppose, then, that Gardner and Shute accurately represent the social meaning of 
consensual sex, and rape is distinctly wrongful because it subverts this social 
meaning and constitutes an extreme objectification of the victim. The problem 
remains that the wrongness of rape is contingent on a very specific social meaning 
of sex, which is subject to change. Note that Gardner and Shute’s account relies on 
the social meaning of sex as something more than just a collaboration or just 
something that persons do to provide each other with enjoyment. It is important for 
their account that rape is seriously wrong because it objectifies the victim in a way 
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that other non-consensual contact does not. In order to justify their claim that the 
subversion of the social meaning of sex in rape has this effect, Gardner and Shute 
are committed to the claim that the social meaning of consensual sex is the reverse, 
that sex is an act that most purely treats one’s partner as a subject. 
 
Hence, Gardner and Shute’s account relies on their claim that the social meaning of 
sex is very profoundly positive and holds that sexual partners treat each other as 
subjects in a way that does not occur in other consensual contact. The social 
meaning that they attribute to sex is not only very positive, but also remarkably 
specific. This presents a problem for their account because it follows that, if the 
social meaning of consensual sex were to change over time and deviate from that 
which Gardner and Shute identify, their account would provide no basis for the 
distinct wrongness of rape. The scope of their account is therefore worryingly 
narrow. If our society changed so that the social meanings of sex are associated 
with harm and doing something to someone else, as Baker and Dempsey and 
Herring suggest, or as a fun but largely unremarkable recreational activity, as 
Hampton considers, it seems that we would still want to say that rape is seriously 
and distinctly wrong. Gardner and Shute do not allow for this. If the social meaning 
of consensual sex deviates too far from the specific vision described by Gardner and 
Shute, then their account provides no justification for the claim that there is 
anything especially wrong in rape. 
 
This account also faces an interesting problem when we consider it in relation to the 
traditionalist’s challenge. At first glance, Gardner and Shute’s account appears to 
overcome this problem. Gardner and Shute explain the distinct wrongness of rape 
without appealing to traditional beliefs about sex and women or a restrictive sexual 
ethic. On their account, the wrongness of rape relies on the social meaning of sex 
being a certain way (a collaborative union of equal subjects), and not on the claims 
that sex is actually like this or that sex should be like this, or on any individual’s view 
of sex. 
 
However, Gardner and Shute’s account may be vulnerable to an objection that is 
similar to the traditionalist’s challenge operating at the level of widespread cultural 
views. On their account, the wrongness of rape relies on it being the case that there 
is a particular social meaning attributed to consensual sex. In light of this, there are 
two ways in which Gardner and Shute’s account might link the wrongness of rape to 
a restrictive sexual ethic, upholding the central problem raised by the traditionalist’s 
challenge. 
 
First, we might expect that cultures in which this is the social meaning of sex to 
prohibit, stigmatise, or otherwise criticise a range of consensual sexual acts, 
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including casual sex and nonmonogamy. I have already noted that the social 
meaning Gardner and Shute attribute to consensual sex, the union of two subjects 
or selves, is quite reminiscent of Punzo’s argument against premarital sex that I 
raised in Section 1.4. More generally, persons who endorse the social meaning of 
consensual sex as explained by Gardner and Shute may be suspicious of casual sex 
insofar as this is not an interaction in which persons are particularly united as selves 
or subjects. Persons can have sex for pleasure knowing very little about each other 
and taking very little interest in the personal history or goals of their sexual partner 
beyond the limited scope of the sexual interaction itself. Indeed, casual sexual 
partners can do this while being entirely attentive to each other’s consent, desires, 
and responses. If this is correct, then Gardner and Shute’s account is vulnerable to 
something like the traditionalist’s challenge because they explain the wrongness of 
rape only by attributing to sex a social meaning that is likely to lead persons who 
subscribe to this to adopt a restrictive sexual ethic. According to this criticism of 
Gardner and Shute’s account, rape will only be distinctively wrong in a society in 
which many persons subscribe to a conception of sex that leads them to view casual 
sex as morally problematic. 
 
Second, and, I think, more plausibly, Gardner and Shute’s account might entail that 
the wrongness of rape would be undermined if persons were to internalise and act 
on a permissive sexual ethic with sufficient frequency. Suppose that a significant 
proportion of individuals come to view sexual contact simply as a recreational activity 
that brings joy and pleasure. Acting on this, they proceed to have sex with lovers, 
friends, and strangers, sensitive only to the consent of their partners and the 
enjoyment of those involved. According to a somewhat permissive sexual ethic, they 
do nothing wrong and there may be a great deal of value in their sexual conduct. If 
this approach to sex becomes sufficiently widespread, the social meaning that 
Gardner and Shute attribute to consensual sex would likely cease to pertain. If 
enough people act as though sex is just a source of pleasure and enjoyment, the 
social meaning of sex as a profound union of two subjects will be difficult to 
maintain. Perhaps, on Gardner and Shute’s view, the wrongness of rape relies on it 
being the case that a sufficient proportion of persons within a cultural context 
abstain from engaging in sexual contact that would be permitted on a non-restrictive 
sexual ethic. 
 
Plausibly, social meanings are not fragile and will not be changed by the actions of a 
few persons or a conscious decision to invest acts and practices with a different 
value. Indeed, Gardner and Shute (2007, 22–24) claim that this social meaning of 
consensual sex persists even if fairly few people consciously endorse the view of sex 
as a union of two selves as an accurate reflection of sexual contact or even an ideal 
that we should pursue. All the same, a widespread change in the ways in which 
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persons approach and engage in sexual contact is likely, over time, to change the 
social meaning attributed to sex. Something like the traditionalist’s challenge 
emerges here. Rape is only distinctly wrong in a cultural context if enough people 
within the cultural context adhere to a somewhat restrictive sexual ethic, so that the 
social meaning of consensual sex as a union of two subjects can be maintained. 
 
If successful, Gardner and Shute’s account does overcome the traditionalist’s 
challenge. However, I have suggested that it is vulnerable to a similar problem. They 
explain the wrongness of rape by appeal to a social meaning of sex as a profound 
and collaborative union of two subjects. If this social meaning is attributed to sex 
within a given cultural context, then persons within this cultural context are perhaps 
likely to morally condemn casual sex, endorsing a restrictive sexual ethic. If enough 
persons engage in casual sex with sufficient frequency, then the social meaning of 
sex will likely come to diverge from that which is presented by Gardner and Shute. If 
my observations here are plausible, then Gardner and Shute’s account is vulnerable 
to something like the traditionalist’s challenge; the wrongness of sexual attacks 
remains linked to a restrictive sexual ethic. 
  
By and large, my objections against Gardner and Shute have focused on the social 
meaning that they attribute to consensual sex. I have not addressed their strategy 
of arguing that consensual sex is special in virtue of its social meaning and that rape 
is distinctly wrong because it subverts this. I believe that this approach is quite 
promising. In Chapters 5 and 6, I draw on the notion of expressive significance, 
which I take to be related to social meaning, to determine what it is that makes an 
attack sexual and why sexual attacks are distinctly wrong. I also suggest that the 
wrongness of sexual attacks depends in part on the expressive significance of 
consensual sexual contact. I am therefore broadly sympathetic to Gardner and 
Shute’s strategy, and disagree with their account primarily because I find their 
characterisation of the social meaning of consensual sex to be an untenable basis for 
the wrongness of rape. Aside from this, their explanation of what social meaning is, 
how it attaches to sex, and how it can be subverted in non-consensual sex is quite 
unclear. A successful account that utilises a similar strategy must explain these social 
and moral phenomena. I am also interested in Gardner and Shute’s claim that rape 
is wrong because the assailant objectifies or uses the victim in a way that is more 
extreme or dehumanising than other forms of non-consensual contact. This idea 
arises in other accounts in the philosophical literature, some of which I explore in 
Chapter 3 (McGregor 1994, 235; Shafer and Frye 1977, 341, 345). I propose a 
similar claim in developing my own account of what a sexual attack is in Chapter 5 
and why sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful in Chapter 6. 
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Section 2.6 – The Significance of Suffering and Social Meaning 
 
In this chapter, I have rejected two account of the wrongness of rape. While 
considering these accounts, I have attempted to draw out insights about how an 
account of the wrongness of sexual attacks should be sensitive to and accommodate 
the experiences of victims and about the role that social meaning should play. I will 
briefly summarise these insights here. 
First, I rejected Wertheimer’s account, according to which sexual attacks are 
distinctly wrongful because they cause a great deal of suffering, and typically cause 
more suffering than otherwise similar non-sexual assaults. This account is highly 
intuitive and reflects an aspect of sexual violence, the suffering and trauma of those 
subjected to it, about which we should care very deeply. I argued that it does not 
succeed because it excludes those sexual attacks of which the victim has no 
experience and leaves open the question of whether the victim’s psychological 
response is reasonable and proportionate, when we have very good reason to prefer 
an account according to which their reaction is reasonable and proportionate. 
These objections show that the wrongness of sexual attacks cannot by explained 
entirely by appeal to the suffering endured by victims of these violations. Instead, I 
adopt a model proposed by Gardner and Shute, according to which the suffering of 
victims of sexual violence should be understood as a response to an independent 
wrong perpetrated against them. That is, the reason that many victims of sexual 
attacks experience such suffering and subsequent psychological trauma is in part as 
a reasonable and proportionate reaction to the serious wrong committed in the 
sexual attack against them. The victim’s suffering tracks the serious and distinct 
wrong of the sexual attack. 
The claim that the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks is not solely a function of the 
experienced suffering of those subjected to it does not minimise the role of these 
experiences in developing an account of the nature and wrongness of sexual 
attacks. If Gardner and Shute’s claim that the suffering of victims is a response to 
the wrong inflicted on them is correct, and I believe that it is, then we should expect 
that a viable account of the wrongness of rape reflects these experiences to some 
extent. At least, it counts against an account of the distinct wrongness of sexual 
attacks if its characterisation of this wrongness is in tension with the testimony of 
survivors of sexual violence about the attacks they have endured. I will therefore 
endeavour to draw on some of this testimony when I develop my account of what 
makes an attack sexual and lay out the basis for my account of the wrongness of 
these attacks in Chapter 5. 
In the next two chapters, I discuss two accounts of the wrongness of rape. 
Following my discussion here, we can understand these as attempts to show that 
the psychological suffering and subsequent trauma experienced by survivors of 
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sexual violence represent a reasonable and proportionate response to the serious 
wrong perpetrated against them. In Chapter 3, I consider the argument that rape is 
seriously wrong because it attacks something central to the victim’s identity. 
Drawing on Gardner and Shute’s model, proponents of these accounts could argue 
that the psychological suffering of victims of sexual violence is a response to this 
attack on something central to who they are. In Chapter 4, I discuss the view that 
sexual violence is seriously wrong because it violates the victim’s self-ownership 
claims. We might interpret these accounts as claiming that the psychological 
suffering of victims is in part a response to the assailant’s egregious violation of their 
rights and control over their own body. In appealing to aspects of sexual violence 
beyond the experienced suffering of victims, each of these accounts meets Gardner 
and Shute’s challenge that we should explain the wrong of rape in a way that shows 
the experiences of victims to be reasonable, rather than appealing to these 
experiences to explain the wrong of rape. 
Second, I rejected Gardner and Shute’s account, according to which sexual attacks 
are distinctly wrongful because they constitute an extreme use or objectification of 
the victim insofar as the assailant subverts the social meaning of consensual sex. I 
find this account lacking because it relies on there being an idealised social meaning 
of consensual sex that does not apply in our society and that, if it does apply, is 
insufficiently stable to ground the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks. 
However, my criticisms of their account are not focused on their strategy more 
broadly, which is to argue that sex is special because it carries a unique social 
meaning and that sexual violence is distinctly wrongful because the assailant 
subverts the social meaning of consensual sex in these attacks. I will draw on these 
ideas in developing my own view. I have also said very little about their claim that 
rape objectifies the victim to an extreme degree. I believe that this proposal is also 
promising; in later chapters I will note that other theorists endorse this view and 
draw on it when I develop my own account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Chapter 3 
Sex and the Self 
 
Section 3.1 – Introduction to Chapter 3 
 
In a report on sexual health, the World Health Organisation (WHO) offers the 
following (non-official) definition of ‘sexuality’: 
Sexuality is a central aspect of being human throughout life and encompasses sex, gender 
identities and roles, sexual orientation, eroticism, pleasure, intimacy and reproduction. 
Sexuality is experienced and expressed in thoughts, fantasies, desires, beliefs, attitudes, 
values, behaviours, practices, roles and relationships (World Health Organisation 2006, 5). 
 
There is some aspect of living a human life that encompasses a person’s sexual 
desires, the sexual behaviour in which they engage, and so on. According to the 
WHO (2006, 5), this is “a central aspect of being human”, although it is not yet clear 
what this means. Perhaps this offers an insight into the wrongness of sexual attacks; 
sexual contact (or abstaining from sexual contact) is an important part of each 
person’s life, and the non-consensual imposition of this is therefore very seriously 
wrong. 
 
This argument features prevalently in the philosophical and legal-theoretical 
literature. For instance, Ruth Seifert (1994, 56) claims that “Because personal 
identity is so tightly intertwined with sexual identity, the personal self is also touched 
to the quick when the sexual form of violence is applied.” Scott Anderson (2016, 63) 
considers the argument that non-consensual sex is particularly harmful because 
“sexuality is at the very core of our being”. Michael Davis raises (and rejects) the 
“Personal integrity analysis” of rape, according to which “Sex lies close to the centre 
of the self” such that sexual attacks “are particularly serious because they are 
particularly serious violations of the self” (M. Davis 1984, 77). The claim that rape is 
seriously wrongful because it attacks something central to the victim has garnered 
significant attention. 
I will examine this strategy as it is developed by Shafer and Frye (1977), McGregor 
(1994), and Hampton (1999). Archard (2007, 388–91) draws on each of these 
accounts to develop this idea further. These accounts adopt the same general 
strategy. They argue that some interests are more important to a person insofar as 
these are in some way more central to a person’s self or identity, such that a person 
suffers a greater harm if these interests are set back. McGregor (1994, 233–34) and 
Shafer and Frye (1977, 336–37) discuss this in terms of a person’s domain. A 
person’s domain includes everything over which they have rights, specifically the 
right to exclude others by withholding their consent, and something is more central 
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to a person’s domain insofar as it is more important to a person’s identity (McGregor 
1994, 233–34, 242; Shafer and Frye 1977, 377–78). This is explained in different 
ways by different accounts. Sexual assault is seriously wrong because it attacks the 
victim in a way that targets something central to their domain. 
If successful, these accounts offer an effective resolution to the traditionalist’s 
challenge. If proponents of these accounts can establish that sexual contact is 
particularly important to a person in the relevant sense, such that non-consensual 
sexual contact constitutes a particularly serious harm to the victim or a particularly 
condemnable denigration of the victim’s status, then they have offered good reason 
to believe that sexual assault is seriously wrongful and that it wrongs the victim in a 
way that non-sexual assault does not. Sexual attacks, like any assault, are wrong 
because they violate the victim’s claim to exclusive control of their own body (which 
is part of their domain). Such attacks are distinctly wrong because sex is a central 
component of the domain. Proponents of this account are not obviously committed 
to any claims about the moral value or impermissibility of various consensual sexual 
acts and, if successful, therefore offer a promising response to the traditionalist’s 
challenge. 
However, I argue that these accounts are unsuccessful. Any version of this account 
must explain what it means for something to be central to a person’s domain such 
that (1) sex is central to each person’s domain and (2) there is a distinct wrong in an 
attack that targets something central to a person’s domain. The first condition is 
necessary to explain the wrongness of sexual attacks in every case; the second 
condition is necessary to explain why sexual attacks perpetrate a wrong not present 
in non-sexual attacks. No interpretation of these accounts fulfils both conditions. We 
are left either with an account according to which sex is not central to every person’s 
domain or an account according to which something can be central to a person’s 
domain but an attack targeting this is not thereby seriously wrong. 
Nevertheless, these accounts offer promising insights into the wrongness of sexual 
violence. In particular, proponents of these accounts discuss the expressive 
significance of sexual attacks, a phenomenon that I will draw on in my own account. 
I am also interested in their proposals that individuals have domains over which they 
have prima facie claims to exclusive control and that the serious wrongness of 
sexual violence is explicable in part by the assailant’s use of the victim in service of 
the assailant’s goals. 
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, I set out the accounts developed by McGregor, Shafer and 
Frye, and Hampton. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, I argue that these accounts cannot 
provide an explanation of what it means for sex to be central to a person’s identity 
which makes it true that both (a) sex is central to each person’s identity, and (b) 
sexual violence is seriously wrongful because sex is central to the victim’s identity. In 
Section 3.6, I explain Archard ‘s account, which draws on resources from the other 
accounts but develops these to offer a novel approach. In Section 3.7, I object to 
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Archard’s account and argue that it must overcome some difficulties if it is to 
succeed. In Section 3.8, I identify the conceptual resources and argumentative 
strategies in these accounts that I believe warrant further consideration. 
 
Section 3.2 –  
Rape as an Attack on the Centre of a Person’s Domain 
 
McGregor (1994, 233, emphasis in original) claims that each person has a “domain” 
that their “consent ranges over.” For each person, there is a sphere of activity over 
which they have prima facie rights of control. One exerts control by the granting or 
withholding of consent to actions that encroach on this domain. If one person 
encroaches onto another’s person’s domain without their consent, then they 
perpetrate a (prima facie) wrong against this person. For McGregor, an individual 
has a domain in virtue of being a person. 
She argues that some aspects of a person are more central to their domain than 
others and that an attack on something central to a person’s domain constitutes a 
more serious wrong. On this view, some impositions target something close to the 
centre of a person’s domain, attacking “one’s personal integrity, identity, and 
dignity,…who one really is” (McGregor 1994, 234, emphasis in original). A minor 
theft does not seriously wrong the victim because “One’s personal space, one’s 
dignity, and one’s identity have not been affected at all with such trivial thefts”, so 
the theft attacks something on the outskirts of the victim’s domain (McGregor 1994, 
234-235, emphasis in original). Burglary from one’s home constitutes a more serious 
wrong because it violates “one’s personal space, one’s privacy, and one’s sense of 
security in one’s home” by intruding into a space that we usually only reveal and 
grant access to select others and in which “we would normally let down our guard” 
(McGregor 1994, 235). Most serious offences involve non-consensual bodily contact. 
A person’s body is the physical manifestation of the person themselves, so an attack 
on a person’s body is a direct attack on the person themselves. Here, McGregor 
offers a view of what it is that makes something central to a person’s domain. She 
posits that these more central aspects can be identified by their importance to the 
person (their identity) the status of a person (their dignity), or their body (their 
personal integrity). Hence, very serious attacks, those that interfere with something 
central to a person’s domain, are those that interfere with something very important 
to a person, denigrate their status as a human person, or impose onto their body. 
McGregor argues that we have good reason to view sex as central to a person’s 
domain. It is closely linked to “our gender and sexual expression”, which are in turn 
linked to our “personal identity”, sexual contact is generally considered “personal, 
private, [and] intimate”. It is overwhelmingly performed privately and assumed to 
occur between people who have a “close and caring relationship”), and “most 
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individuals believe that they are most vulnerable and exposed in sexual interactions” 
(McGregor 1994, 235). On this view, sexual contact is central to a person’s domain, 
which is to say that sex is an important part of a person’s identity. It is closely linked 
to other aspects of ourselves that we generally take to be important to who we are, 
it often makes individuals feel vulnerable and exposed as if they are revealing an 
intimate part of themselves, and people tend to engage in sexual contact with few 
persons relative to other forms of bodily contact. 
Given the centrality of sex to a person’s domain, McGregor (1994, 235) argues that 
it is particularly important that a person has control over the sexual contact in which 
they are involved. Rape is seriously wrong because it violates the victim’s “sexual 
autonomy”, to which we attach “special importance” (McGregor 1994, 236). 
McGregor also argues that sexual assault “makes the victim a mere object, an 
instrument of her attacker’s gratification” (McGregor 1994, 235). McGregor 
comments briefly on this aspect of the wrongness of rape, but I take her proposal to 
be that the assailant uses the victim for their own ends against the victim’s interests 
or without taking into account that the victim has a domain from which they are 
excluded. McGregor suggests that this is one aspect of sexual violence that makes it 
more seriously wrongful than non-sexual violence. Sexual assault not only intrudes 
on something central to the victim’s domain but also does so in a manner that 
compels the victim to serve the assailant’s ends. 
Shafer and Frye (1977, 336–39) also argue that each person has a “domain” over 
which they have a prima facie right to exclude others, adding that “A person’s 
domain is the physical, emotional, psychological, and intellectual space it lives in.” 
They also propose that a non-consensual imposition is more seriously wrongful 
insofar as it intrudes on something more central to a person’s domain. 
However, they recognise aspects of the domain as central on a different basis to 
McGregor. They argue that the centre of a person’s domain is occupied by those 
properties (“person-properties”) that are necessary for personhood, including 
“intelligence, self-awareness, linguistic ability, emotional sensibility, moral sense, and 
the ability to choose and make decisions” (Shafer and Frye 1977, 336–37). The body 
is also central to a person’s domain because a person’s body is the person, or at 
least their physical manifestation (Shafer and Frye 1977, 337). Anything that is 
necessary for the pursuit of their interests, such as “biological life and health” or 
affects their intelligence or “sense of identity” is “very near to the centre of the 
domain” (Shafer and Frye 1977, 337). Moreover, a person’s domain includes 
anything that affects them for an extended period or causes them “discomfort or 
distress”, and “the activities, the tools, and materials, and the physical spaces used” 
to fulfil their goals (Shafer and Frye 1977, 337). A person’s domain, then, includes 
anything that assists in living a flourishing life, and the centre of the domain is 
occupied by those entities or properties that constitute the individual as a person or 
are necessary for a human life. 
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Shafer and Frye argue that non-consensual intrusion into another person’s domain is 
wrong because it constitutes a failure or refusal to recognise the domain over which 
the victim is entitled to exercise control in virtue of their personhood (Shafer and 
Frye 1977, 338). An imposition is more seriously wrongful insofar as it attacks 
something more central to a person’s domain because this more directly attacks “the 
creature’s personhood itself” (Shafer and Frye 1977, 340). This is because such an 
imposition violates a person’s right to control even those aspects of themselves that 
are constitutive of personhood. Any sustained, injurious, or particularly painful 
physical assault is seriously wrong for this reason. 
Shafer and Frye (1977, 345) argue that rape is seriously wrong for two reasons. 
First, rape targets something that is “centrally…involved in [the victim’s] personal 
identity” and is therefore central to their domain. It is seriously wrongful because it 
constitutes an attack on the victim’s body and on something close to a person-
property, their health (Shafer and Frye 1977, 341, 345). Secondly, they argue that 
rape not only injures a person, but is also “the use of a person in pursuit of ends not 
its own and/or contrary to its own” (Shafer and Frye 1977, 341, 345). The rapist co-
opts the victim’s body to advance their own goals in a way that disregards and 
opposes the victim’s interests. This is similar to McGregor’s (1994, 235) claim that 
the assailant “makes the victim a mere object”. 
 
Section 3.3 – Hampton on Moral Injury 
 
Hampton does not draw on the notion of a domain but appeals to the claim that sex 
is central to a person’s identity to explain the serious wrongness of sexual violence. 
She argues that “our humanity is deeply engaged in the sexual experience. Sexuality 
and humanity are deeply entangled” and that “Our sexuality is deeply important to 
each of us and in certain ways central to our sense of self” (Hampton 1999, 147, 
151) Elaborating, she claims that: 
one’s humanity is perhaps never more engaged than in the sexual act. But it is not only 
present in the experience; more important, it is “at stake,” in the sense that each partner 
puts him/herself in a position where the behavior of the other can confirm it or threaten it, 
celebrate it or abuse it (Hampton 1999, 147). 
Hampton claims that sex is an important part of a person’s sense of self and closely 
connected to their humanity. Like McGregor, she claims that sex is closely linked to a 
person’s identity or conception of themselves. Hampton builds on this claim to 
explain the wrongness of rape. She argues that each individual has value in virtue of 
being “rational and autonomous”, although I take her view to be applicable on any 
conception of the value of persons (Hampton 1999, 123). If something has value, 
then certain ways of treating it are inappropriate. If a person said that an object has 
value and proceeded to destroy the object without justification, one would assume 
71 
 
that they were disingenuous in their claim that the object has value. Accordingly, 
Hampton (1999, 128, emphasis in original) claims that “value generates certain 
entitlements”; when a person or object has value, they are entitled to be treated and 
not treated in certain ways. 
According to Hampton (1999, 128–32, 135, 143) one person can therefore represent 
another person or object as lacking the value that it in fact has. When a person acts 
towards another person or an object in a manner that is inappropriate given the 
value of the person or object, they represent the person or object as lacking this 
value, a process that she calls “diminishment” (Hampton 1999, 128, 131). The 
“expressive content” of their action is that the person or object lacks this value 
(Hampton 1999, 135). This is because treating a person or object in a certain way 
conveys the message that it is appropriate to treat them in this way. Where the 
treatment would be inappropriate towards an entity with particular value, the 
treatment can only be appropriate if the target of the action lacks value. When a 
person treats another in a manner that would be inappropriate towards an entity 
that has value, they thereby deny their value (Hampton 1999, 128). 
For example, the perpetrator of a common assault diminishes their victim. The value 
that persons have entails that it is inappropriate to (unnecessarily) touch them 
without their consent; a person’s value generates the entitlement that they not be 
touched unnecessarily without their consent. Treating them in this way implies that 
doing so is appropriate, and therefore that they do not have the kind of value that 
would render this treatment inappropriate. Common assault thereby represents the 
victim as lacking value that they in fact have and conveys the message that they are 
less valuable that they in fact are. By denying the entitlement generated by the 
person’s value, the action denies the person’s value. Blackburn’s (2001, 483–85) 
credibility principle as developed by Dempsey and Herring (2007, 484), which I 
discussed in Section 2.4, is relevant here. If a person’s value entails that they should 
not be treated in a certain way, then the only credible explanation for a person 
treating them this way is that this person does not believe that they possess this 
value. Hence, their act conveys that the other person does not possess this value. 
Hampton thereby develops Shafer and Frye’s (1977, 338, 340) claim that the denial 
of a person’s right to control something central to their domain “is ipso facto to deny 
that there is a person there at all.” In both cases, the claim is that one can deny that 
another individual has value by acting in such a way that is inappropriate given their 
personhood. On Hampton’s view, certain acts diminish a person’s value by conveying 
the message that they do not have the value that they in fact possess. Hampton 
(1999, 123) calls an act that diminishes a person’s value a “moral injury”. A moral 
injury is damage to the realization or “acknowledgment” of the victim’s value by an 
action that represents the victim less valuable than they in fact are (Hampton 1999, 
132). 
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Hampton (1999, 128–29) argues that this diminishment is not a function of the 
victim’s perception of the act. A person is diminished when these entitlements are 
disregarded even when they are unaware of the wrong perpetrated against them or 
do not recognise that the imposition against them violates an entitlement (Hampton 
1999, 126–27).13 Hampton (1999, 129) claims that the denigration of a person’s 
value “is something that we “read off of” the effects of immoral behavior.” Her claim 
that the relevant feature is the effects of immoral behaviour is somewhat confusing 
here, as she is primarily focused on the expressive content conveyed by the act itself 
rather than its consequences. All the same, Hampton captures the idea that the 
diminishment or disregard of the victim’s status can be recognised as present in the 
assailant’s conduct, even if this is not perceived by the victim. 
The wrong that Hampton has in mind here bears some similarity to the notion of 
expressive harm developed by Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes. They propose 
that “A person suffers expressive harm when she is treated according to principles 
that express negative or inappropriate attitudes towards her” (E. S. Anderson and 
Pildes 2000, 1527). Applying this to Hampton’s account, we might say that 
unnecessary non-consensual contact constitutes an expressive harm for the victim. 
The victim is treated as though they do not have the entitlements that persons 
ordinarily possess. Therefore, they are treated as if they are not a full and equal 
person and the assailant’s attack conveys this about the victim. None of this relies 
on the victim recognising the assailant’s attitude towards them or the assailant 
intending to express any particular attitude (E. S. Anderson and Pildes 2000, 1508). 
A moral injury can be understood as an expressive harm, whose expressive content 
is that the victim is less valuable, or has less status as a person, than they in fact do. 
This provides a strategy by which to explain how the centrality of sex to a person’s 
identity, humanity, or domain explains the serious wrongness of rape. Consider 
again Hampton’s (1999, 147) claim that “one’s humanity is…“at stake”” in a sexual 
act and can thereby be threatened and abused. She also argues that: 
To express subordination of another through the sexual act will…likely be wounding to that 
person in a profound way – not only psychologically but objectively, given the way in which 
the act will be powerfully expressive of the idea of inferiority (Hampton 1999, 151). 
On Hampton’s view, persons have the capacity to denigrate the humanity of another 
individual by violating the entitlements that they have in virtue of their value as a 
person. Given the view that sex is closely linked to humanity, the violation of a 
person’s entitlements in non-consensual sexual contact constitutes a severe 
diminishment of the victim’s humanity (Hampton 1999, 150). It represents them as 
lacking value to the extent that they lack entitlements even over something that is 
central to who they are and closely connected to their humanity. 
                                                          
13 Diminishment is nevertheless affected by certain social conventions within a given society insofar 
as the value that persons have entitles them to a certain kind of respect, and different gestures and 
utterances convey disrespect in different cultures (Hampton 1999, 125, 130, 135). 
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Like McGregor and Shafer and Frye, Hampton also claims that a perpetrator of rape 
not only attacks the victim in a manner that targets an important aspect of their 
humanity, but also uses them for the assailant’s own ends (Hampton 1999, 135). 
She incorporates this into her account of moral injury, arguing that the assailant 
represents the victim as an object to be used by others against the victim’s own 
interests and preferences, conveying the message that the victim exists as a tool to 
serve the ends of others (Hampton 1999, 135; Archard 2007, 389). The expressive 
content of rape, then, is not only that the victim is inferior to the assailant, but that 
they may appropriately be used by the assailant for their own ends. 
 
Section 3.4 – Valuing Sex Subjectively 
 
The claim that sex is central to a person’s domain is a vital component of these 
accounts because it grounds the moral distinction between sexual and non-sexual 
attacks. Sexual attacks are distinctively wrong because they target something central 
to a person’s domain, sex, while non-sexual attacks do not. For these accounts to 
succeed, they must explain what it is for something to be central to a person’s 
domain or identity and this explanation must be consistent with the claim that sex is 
central in this way for every individual. This is difficult to make sense of, however. 
There are a few viable interpretations of the claim that sex is important to a person’s 
identity or self and central to a person’s domain, but I find that all of these either (a) 
fail to establish that sex is central to each person’s domain, or (b) fail to establish 
that something being central to a person’s domain is morally significant. 
One possibility is that something is central to a person’s domain if they consider it to 
be an important part of who they are. McGregor (1994, 234) takes this view, arguing 
that “These assignments depend on what people in fact care about and how they 
define their personhood.” While Hampton (1999, 151, emphasis mine) rejects the 
view that moral injury depends on the victim’s view of themselves, she defends the 
claim that rape attacks something central to the victim in part by arguing that “Our 
sexuality is deeply important to each of us and in certain ways central to our sense 
of self.” These phrases indicate that the importance of sex is explained in part by a 
person’s attitudes towards it and towards themselves. 
Murphy advances a similar view. He argues that the particular wrongness of sexual 
assault could be explained by the view “that a person’s sexuality is sacred, 
mysterious, precious, and even fearful because it is deeply tied…to love and to the 
essence of self and the meaningfulness of one’s life” (Murphy 1994, 214). A person 
will often consider who they are attracted to, the sexual acts that they enjoy, and 
the sexual acts that they engage in to constitute an important part of their life and 
an important aspect of who they are. Murphy (1994, 214–15) argues that sexual 
assault is distinctly wrongful because it attacks someone in virtue of something 
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especially significant to them and something that they take to be especially central 
to their life and sense of self. 
An analogy may help to clarify the harm that McGregor and Murphy have in mind. 
Consider a person who is manipulated, blackmailed, or tortured into betraying their 
friends or their political cause. A guerrilla fighter struggles to overthrow a regime, is 
captured by agents of the regime and is compelled by their captors to reveal 
information about their comrades’ location or plans. Certainly, this act is wrong 
because it is an act of manipulation, or blackmail, or torture, and insofar as it 
advances any unjust aims that the regime might have. However, this alone does not 
capture the entirety of the harm inflicted on the guerrilla fighter. There is something 
tragic about the fact that the person here is compelled to act against their 
relationships and political views. To explain the extent of the wrong perpetrated 
against the guerrilla fighter, we must attend to the way in which the attack on the 
fighter targets aspects of themselves that they consider to be very important. 
McGregor and Murphy advance a view according to which sex is an important part of 
each person’s identity in the sense that each person values sexual contact or 
considers the sexual contact in which they engage (and do not engage) to be an 
important part of themselves and their life. Sexual assault attacks a person by 
targeting an important part of their identity and denies them control of an aspect of 
their life that they take to be important. McGregor and Murphy make sense of an 
otherwise mysterious claim, that sex is central to a person’s identity, by explaining 
this in terms of the person’s values and the importance they invest in determining 
the sexual contact in which they engage. 
However, this view fails. First, there might be a person for whom sexual contact is 
genuinely a trifling matter. Baber (1987, 130) argues that “For the standard 
person…sexuality is a peripheral matter on which relatively little hangs”. Whether 
this is true of the ‘standard person’ is less important than the likelihood that at least 
some persons invest minimal importance in sexual contact. Suppose that an 
individual finds sex fairly enjoyable, although less entertaining than watching 
television or practicing a musical instrument. They accept sexual propositions when 
they are offered by someone who they find attractive but do not find sex sufficiently 
enjoyable or important to seek out sexual encounters pro-actively. Even given a very 
broad conception of what it is for sex to be central to a person’s identity of sense of 
self, sex would not be central for this person. In this case, the account in question 
would struggle to explain why sexual violence is seriously wrongful. The feature of 
sexual assault that makes it distinctively wrongful on this account, the importance of 
sex to a person’s identity, does not pertain in this case. 
This interpretation of the account, that sex is central to a person’s domain insofar as 
they view it as an important part of their identity, fails to accommodate all sexual 
attacks. Moreover, this person’s indifference towards consensual sexual contact 
should not be a mitigating factor regarding sexual violence perpetrated against them 
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and we would not expect them to be less traumatised by sexual violence than a 
person who views sexual contact as an important component of their life. 
Murphy (1994, 216) himself believes that this might be true of sex workers. He 
claims that “it initially seems implausible to believe that a prostitute conceives of her 
sexuality in just the way that…would justify regarding rape as more serious than any 
other assault.” Instead, he suggests that she is likely to view her sexuality and 
sexual capacities as a “commodity” that provides a useful means to an income when 
traded relatively indiscriminately with people that she may or may not know (Murphy 
1994, 216). Murphy believes that because sex workers, in his view, treat sex as 
something to be traded for money quite indiscriminately, they likely do not view their 
sexuality and the sexual contact in which they engage as important aspects of 
themselves. He recognises that, given his account, this would render sexual violence 
perpetrated against a sex worker less seriously wrong than a sexual attack against 
someone with a different conception of sex and equally as serious as an otherwise 
similar non-sexual assault. 
Clearly, this is a horrifying implication of his view. While he considers a range of 
reasons to nevertheless punish sexual attacks against a sex worker as severely as 
sexual attacks against other persons, he does not deal with the appalling implication 
of his account that a sexual attack against a sex worker is less seriously wrongful 
(Murphy 1994, 216–18). This is a striking and insurmountable problem for this 
formulation of the view that sexual violence is distinctly wrong because persons 
consider sex to be an important part of their identity. This account cannot 
accommodate sexual attacks against individuals who view sex not as a reflection of 
an intimate part of their self but as something to be traded (for material gain or 
pleasure) somewhat indiscriminately. If sex workers (as Murphy suggests) and 
promiscuous persons are more likely to adopt this conception of sex, then this 
account seems doubly irredeemable. It fails to accommodate all sexual attacks, and 
particularly those that are perpetrated against persons who, historically, have not 
found justice, support, or empathy when they are victimised by sexual assault. 
This account entails that certain cases of sexual assault are more wrongful than 
others on an irrelevant basis. It entails that some sexual assaults are no worse than 
otherwise similar non-sexual attacks if the victim lacks a conception of sex as an 
important part of their life or identity. While there are many factors that might 
exacerbate the wrongness of sexual violence in any particular case, it is simply not 
clear that a person’s attitude to (consensual) sex is one of them or even that a 
person’s view of consensual sex as central to their identity would necessarily make 
the attack more traumatic. 
The underlying problem is that this account explains the wrongness of sexual attacks 
by appeal to the victim’s view of consensual sexual contact, when it is not at all clear 
why these should be linked. Criticising Murphy’s view specifically, Archard (2007, 
382–87) argues that we should reject the view that the wrongness of rape is a 
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function of the value of consensual sexual contact. Murphy subscribes to this view 
insofar as he claims that rape is seriously wrongful only insofar as the victim values 
consensual sex as an important part of their identity and their life, such that rape 
attacks them by targeting something important to them (Archard 2007, 386). 
Archard (2007, 383, 386) responds that rape is fundamentally different to 
consensual sex, to the extent that referring to the former as ‘sex’ is often 
misleading. Therefore, it is not clear why the importance (or lack thereof) of 
consensual sex to a person should have any bearing on the wrong perpetrated 
against them, or the suffering that they may endure, should they be subjected to 
sexual violence. Sex is so unlike sexual assault, on Archard’s (2007, 386) view, that 
it is fruitless to attempt to explain the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks by 
appealing to the value of consensual sex. 
The view that rape is wrong because individuals subjectively view sex as an 
important part of who they are, which is explicitly endorsed by Murphy, is 
unsuccessful. Its scope is too narrow, failing to explain the serious wrong 
perpetrated in sexual attacks against persons who do not view sex as an important 
part of their life or identity. In doing so, it makes the wrongness of sexual violence 
depend on something irrelevant; consensual sex and sexual violence are so 
fundamentally different that it is difficult to understand how the value of the former 
could ground the wrongness of the latter. 
Second, many things will count as central to a person’s domain on this account, and 
so it cannot justify the claim that sexual violence constitutes a distinct wrong. Davis 
(1984, 78) argues that “Sex is not the only attribute close to the center of the self. 
The rest of our physical integrity lies there too, as may some of our property”. He 
notes that a person’s control over their own body is also central to the self. This is 
certainly true on this interpretation of the account, as a person’s body plays a vital 
and unique role in their life and their goals. On this basis, appeals to the centrality of 
sex to the self cannot justify the claim that the sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful. 
All non-consensual bodily contact targets something central to a person’s sense of 
self (their body). This account provides no reason to recognise sexual assault as 
seriously wrongful qua sexual assault, because it does not identify any morally 
significant difference between sexual and non-sexual assault. 
An account according to which sex is central to a person because they consider it to 
be an important part of themselves and their life is therefore unsuccessful. It does 
not justify the claim that sexual violence is always seriously wrong or that it involves 
a wrong that does not occur in non-sexual violence. 
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Section 3.5 – Sex and Personhood 
 
There is an alternative interpretation of the account available. Perhaps sex is central 
to a person’s domain because it is directly related to those capacities that are 
constitutive of personhood. It is central to a person’s identity insofar as it is one of 
those capacities that makes them a person or has a considerable impact on those 
capacities. This is advanced by Shafer and Frye (1977, 337), who argue that the 
centre of the domain houses “the…person-properties themselves and their physical 
locus, the body.” Archard (2007, 391–92 emphasis mine) perhaps expresses a 
similar view when he claims that “sex is central to our identity as human beings”. 
While Ann Cahill subscribes to a very different account of the wrongness of rape, the 
following comments reflect a similar idea: 
persons are fundamentally, not peripherally, embodied. Sexuality is therefore not to be 
understood as a possession of an essentially intellectual, disembodied being, but rather as an 
ineluctable element of being, a facet of personhood no less relevant than one’s capacity for 
rational thought (Cahill 2001, 182-183, emphasis mine). 
This interpretation is also unsuccessful. It cannot ground a moral distinction between 
sexual assault and other physical attacks and it is not clear why an attack on 
something central to a person’s identity in this sense would exacerbate the 
wrongness of the attack. 
Firstly, on this interpretation, the account fails to ground any morally significant 
difference between sexual and non-sexual physical assault. On this view, sexual 
assault attacks something central to a person insofar as it attacks their body, which 
is taken to be identical to them. Of course, any non-consensual physical contact will 
also constitute an attack on the person’s body. Shafer and Frye do not explain why a 
sexual attack on a person’s body constitutes a more severe attack on the person 
themselves than a non-sexual attack on their body. This interpretation of the 
account does not explain why sexual integrity is more important than, or even 
distinct from, bodily integrity more generally, and so cannot ground the claim that 
the wrong of sexual assault is distinct from that of non-sexual assault. 
Secondly, even if sexual assault attacks some property that is distinctively 
constitutive of an individual’s personhood, this alone does not explain why the attack 
is seriously wrongful. Shafer and Frye (1977, 337) argue that “Anything which exerts 
an influence on the person-properties themselves – which, for example, bends a 
person’s will or dulls its intelligence or affects its own sense of its identity – also 
comes very close to the center of the domain.” They make a compelling case here. 
An attack that reduces a person’s intelligence, a minimal degree of which is 
necessary for personhood, is profoundly serious. An attack that causes long-term or 
severe damage to a person’s body is also egregiously wrong. 
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However, it is not obvious that the reason that these attacks are seriously wrong is 
that they attack the victim by targeting some capacity that is necessary for 
personhood. Some attacks that target the victim’s person-properties or body do not 
constitute serious wrongs. For instance, both Shafer and Frye (1977, 336) and 
McGregor (1994, 234) argue that a necessary condition of personhood is the 
capacity to identify goals and pursue them, at least to a limited extent. Any non-
consensual interference that hinders a person’s goals, or a person’s ability to pursue 
them, thereby attacks something central to a person’s domain insofar as the 
capacity to pursue goals is constitutive of personhood. Many interferences in a 
person’s pursuit of their goals will be quite minor, especially if the interference is less 
invasive and the goal less important. Shafer and Frye (1977, 336) and McGregor 
(1994, 234) also recognise the capacity to communicate as a person-property. 
Suppose that one person temporarily follows another around a public space, playing 
a loud instrument whenever their target tries to speak, so that they cannot be 
heard.14 This is an imposition on the person that targets their capacity to 
communicate. An imposition can target a person’s capacity to set and pursue goals 
or communicate without being at all seriously wrong. 
This reveals a problem for this interpretation of the account. Taking this conception 
of what it is for an aspect of a person to be central, it is not clear that an attack is 
seriously wrongful just on the grounds that it targets something central to a person’s 
identity. Where an attack insults, disregards, or even temporarily disables some 
capacity of a person that is a necessary condition for their personhood but does not 
diminish this capacity for an extended time, this is not sufficient to render the attack 
seriously wrong. 
The account in question claims that rape is wrong because it attacks the victim by 
targeting something central to their self. I have considered two interpretations of 
what it is for something to be central to a person and argued that the account is 
unsuccessful however we interpret its central claim. 
 
Section 3.6 – Archard on the Wrongness of Rape 
 
Archard’s account draws on those that I have discussed thus far and develops some 
of the claims further. Archard (2007, 387–90) endorses what he calls the “spatial 
model” of interests, which he describes as follows: 
On the spatial model…interests should be thought of as occupying a defined but metaphorical 
space constitutive of the person or self. Interests are more or less important to the identity of 
                                                          
14 This was famously employed as a means of protest by suffragette Mary Maloney, who agitated for 
suffrage during the 1908 Dundee by-election by ringing a bell every time Winston Churchill tried to 
speak (IrishCentral Staff 2018; MacGabhann 2018). 
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the person, to our sense and understanding of ourselves. The more important our interests 
are, the closer they are to the centre or core of the space that, metaphorically, defines the 
self (Archard 2007, 388). 
According to this model, interests can be more or less significant to an individual’s 
identity, conception of themselves, or personhood. We can represent this with a 
spatial metaphor, according to which those interests that are particularly significant 
are at the centre of this space, and those that are less significant are on the 
periphery.15 
Archard (2007, 388–90) draws on arguments by McGregor and Shafer and Frye to 
advance the claim that some aspects of persons, including sex, are more central to 
their identity and selfhood, and so sex and sexuality are central to the metaphorical 
space that delineates the self in the spatial model of interests. Archard (2007, 389) 
also endorses Hampton’s account of moral injury, agreeing that a person is wronged 
when an assailant represents them through their action as being of less worth than 
they in fact are. He argues that a moral injury is greater insofar as the aspect of a 
person that is attacked is important to the victim’s identity, so that the attack 
violates an interest that is central in the spatial model of interests. In these cases, 
the assailant “can be taken to say to his victim ‘You do not count, or count for very 
little, even in respect of that which matters very much to you’” (Archard 2007, 389–
90). 
Given the importance of sex in the spatial model of interests, a perpetrator of rape 
inflicts an especially serious attack onto the victim. The assailant represents the 
victim as an object to be used, and disregards their interests and wellbeing, in 
relation to something central to who they are as an individual. The moral injury that 
they inflict is therefore particularly egregious. Archard (2007, 379, 390–93) claims 
that persons therefore have a particularly important (central) interest in “sexual 
bodily integrity”, which is set back or violated whenever a person is subjected to 
non-consensual sex. 
While he does not use such terminology, the notion of expressive harm is instructive 
here. When an assailant attacks something central to a person’s identity, as occurs 
in sexual assault, they convey through their action that the victim lacks value and 
worth even to the extent that the victim’s interest in controlling this aspect of their 
life and body does not give them reason to refrain from the attack. For Archard, the 
moral injury inflicted on the victim is exacerbated by the message that the assailant 
communicates about the victim’s worth. 
                                                          
15 Archard (2007, 388–90) does not commit himself to understanding a person’s rights and claims in 
terms of a personal domain, a sphere over which one has claims of exclusive control. He discusses his 
view of the claims that persons have over their own bodies elsewhere (Archard 2008). His spatial 
model instead illustrates the importance of interests relative to each other. 
80 
 
Archard (2007, 390) notes that the success of his view relies on the recognition of 
sex as central to each person’s identity. He claims that the status of sexual integrity 
as a central interest should not rely on a person conceiving of their sexual 
preferences and the sexual contact in which they engage as central parts of 
themselves. If it did, then this account would not accommodate the serious 
wrongness of sexual attacks against persons who do not view sex as deeply 
important to who they are. 
Archard (2007, 391) argues that sexual integrity is an important and distinct interest 
because each person “is a sexed being”, which means that “our sexuality, our sexual 
nature, is central to our identity, to who each of us is”, where this does not rely on a 
person viewing sex as related to their identity, nor on them enjoying, valuing, or 
engaging in sexual contact. Equally, Archard argues that an individual is a sexed 
being even if they do not think of themselves in this way. We can imagine a person 
who does not believe that they have any specifically sexual interests at all. This 
individual would claim that sexual assault would wrong them in the very same way 
as non-sexual assault that is similarly invasive, physically painful, and medically 
injurious. They would recognise such an attack as a violation of their autonomy and 
bodily integrity but would not view the sexual nature of the attack as an aggravating 
factor (Archard 2007, 392). That is, they would endorse the casual view (that sexual 
contact is not subject to distinct moral considerations) and the implications that 
Benatar attributes to it (that sexual assault is therefore no more seriously wrongful 
than non-sexual assault). Archard claims that this person would nevertheless have a 
central interest in sexual integrity, and that they would be mistaken to argue that 
they are not seriously wronged if they were sexually assaulted. Human persons are 
sexed beings, such that sexual integrity is a central interest to each of us, even if 
one denies that this is the case, and sexual violence is always seriously harmful. 
Archard (2007, 392) refers to this as an “objectivist view of human interests”. 
Archard does not offer a comprehensive defence of this objectivist view but does 
develop a compelling motivation for it. He argues that “there is a range of putatively 
fundamental human interests – sexual integrity, health, happiness, knowledge, 
friendship, self-fulfilment, and so on” (Archard 2007, 392). We can imagine a society 
in which the inhabitants do not consider each of these to be a particularly important 
aspect of their lives or their identity, and therefore dismiss the suggestion that they 
are (seriously) harmed when these interests are set back. However, Archard (2007, 
392) argues that, in such a society, there would have “been a serious loss of 
humanity and something [would have] caused the destruction or an erosion of the 
necessary conditions of human flourishing.” Archard argues that, although it is 
unclear why sexual integrity is objectively important, we can recognise it as 
analogous to these other interests. He proposes that sexual integrity is similar to 
these other interests, which are plausibly objectively fundamental. These other 
interests are fundamental regardless of an individual’s view of them, so we have 
good reason to think that the same is true of sexual integrity. 
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Section 3.7 – Sexual Integrity as an Objective Interest 
 
While Archard’s proposal here is compelling, there is a structural difference between 
sexual integrity and the other interests that Archard raises as objectively 
fundamental, raising a problem for his argument. His strategy therefore does not 
ground a distinct interest in sexual integrity. 
Archard does not explicitly define ‘sexual integrity’, although I take it to be just the 
interest in avoiding non-consensual sexual contact or in having control over the 
sexual contact in which one is involved. On this view, a person’s interest in sexual 
integrity is violated only when they are subjected to non-consensual sexual contact. 
This is reflected in Archard’s comments on sexual integrity. He claims that “a 
woman’s interest in her sexual integrity is set back when she undergoes sex to 
which she does not consent” (Archard 2007, 379) and that persons can “greatly 
value their integrity as sexual beings, even whilst they do not value the exercise of 
their sexuality” (Archard 2007, 391). 
The interests that Archard lists aside from sexual integrity are interests in realising 
certain values that are constitutive of a fulfilling life. For example, friendship is 
something that makes a life valuable. All things being equal, a life is more fulfilling 
insofar as it involves more friendship. In these cases, we can identify the harm that 
occurs when the relevant interest is set back; a setback to a person’s interest in 
health makes the person less healthy, a setback in a person’s interest in knowledge 
make them less knowledgeable, a setback in a person’s interest in friendship makes 
them less connected or less included. If sufficient, such loss leads to negative and 
unpleasant states of being, respectively, unhealthy, ignorant, and lonely/isolated. 
There is a value that is constitutive of a fulfilling life, we have an interest in realising 
this value, and so we are harmed by any action or event that hinders the realisation 
of this value and thereby sets back the relevant interest. 
In contrast, the harm inherent in a violation of sexual integrity does not consist in 
the denial, reduction, or removal of some good, but in the non-consensual sexual 
contact itself. Sexual integrity consists not the realisation of some value that can be 
increased or reduced, but in control over a certain aspect of one’s life and 
specifically in the ability to avoid certain forms of contact. The structural difference, 
then, is that sexual integrity concerns control over something, the contact in which 
one is engaged, and the other interests concern the realisation of some value that is 
taken to be constitutive of a fulfilling life. The value of sexual integrity consists 
entirely in the absence of some harmful and wrongful imposition, specifically non-
consensual sexual contact. While one aspect of friendship and happiness is that they 
signify the absence of loneliness/isolation and sadness respectively, their value does 
not consist in the absence of these negative states or experiences. Friendship, 
happiness, and the other goods that Archard lists are valuable independently of the 
absence of their corresponding negative states. 
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This yields practical differences in the circumstances under which the respective 
interests are set back and advanced. Sexual integrity cannot be directly16 advanced 
by some act that occurs without the consent of the person concerned. Non-
consensual sexual contact necessarily violates a person’s interest in sexual integrity.  
The other interests can be advanced by a non-consensual act. For example, a 
person’s health can be advanced by non-consensual interference, even when the act 
imposed is morally impermissible. Suppose that person B has a terminal illness and 
person A anaesthetises and operates on B without their consent. The operation is a 
success and person A is fully healed. Call this case ‘Surgery’. All things considered, A 
has wronged B by imposing very invasive contact on them without their consent. 
However, there is no doubt that the patient’s interest in health is advanced. The 
interest in health does not depend necessarily on the person having control over a 
certain aspect of their life but is instead advanced or infringed given the extent to 
which they access and realise the good of health. 
Similarly, consider a case in which two people are forced to socially interact with 
each other and become friends as a result. In a 2017 social experiment in Singapore, 
self-confessed “loner” 83-year-old Bill Teoh was paired up with 14-year-old Kieryon 
Maldini (Ng 2017). Prior to the study, Teoh avoided social contact wherever possible 
and was reluctant to connect with another person. Over time, their relationship 
developed and they became close (Ng 2017). Similar relationships are imagined in 
popular culture. In Jeff Baron’s play Visiting Mr. Green, Ross Gardiner almost runs 
over elderly widower Mr. Green and is sentenced to community service of assisting 
Green in his home (Simon 1998). They are initially frustrated by the arrangement 
but develop a close friendship. The 2016 film Hunt for the Wilderpeople sees Hec 
and his recently adopted son Ricky develop a close relationship after initially being at 
odds, following the death of Hec’s wife (Waititi, Crump, and Kahi 2016). In each 
case, an older man is paired with a boy or young man through not-fully-voluntary 
means, and the two develop a close friendship after initial mutual distrust, disdain, 
or disinterest. Those involved have little or no control over the circumstances in 
which their friendship develops, but this does not diminish the friendship that 
results. The interest in friendship does not necessarily require that one have control 
over the development of friendships. 
The recognition of sexual integrity as an objectively fundamental good therefore 
requires a different justificatory strategy to the recognition of the other goods that 
he raises. While Archard does not provide an argument for recognising these as 
objectively fundamental, the justificatory strategy is more obvious and 
straightforward in the case of the other interests than it would be in the case of 
                                                          
16 There are ways in which a person’s interest in sexual integrity could be advanced indirectly by 
some action to which they do not consent. For example, any government or institutional policy, 
community initiative, or criminal law reform that reduces the frequency of sexual assault might 
advance this interest. 
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sexual integrity. The claim that our interests in health, friendship, happiness, 
knowledge, and so on, are objectively fundamental relies only on the claim that 
these phenomena are objectively good,17 that is, they enhance a person’s life 
regardless of whether the person views them as such or finds their realisation 
fulfilling. This is not an insignificant feat; the claim that something can be good for a 
person in this sense is highly controversial. However, if one can establish that these 
phenomena are objectively good, then it follows quite straightforwardly that a 
person has objective interests in them; if health, knowledge, and so on are objective 
goods, then a person has interests in realising these regardless of what they think of 
the matter. 
The same justificatory strategy is not available in the case of sexual integrity 
because there is no good that could ground an objective interest in sexual integrity. 
This interest concerns control of some sphere of a person’s life rather than the 
maximisation or realisation of some value. Archard’s strategy is to show the appeal 
of an objective interest in sexual integrity by showing that it is analogous to other 
interests that we generally think of as objectively conducive to a fulfilling human life. 
However, the justification for these interests cannot apply to sexual integrity, raising 
a problem for this strategy. Therefore, Archard presents a somewhat diverse bundle 
of interests, and the intuitive appeal of objective interests in the goods he lists is 
insufficient to ground an objective interest in sexual integrity. 
This objection might be too quick, however. While the interests that Archard lists 
concern the value of the corresponding goods themselves, we might say that each 
person has objective interests in control over certain aspects of their lives, which are 
structurally similar to the interest in sexual integrity. 
For example, one might think that individuals have an objective interest in control 
over their occupation, the acts that they perform for a substantial portion of their life 
to secure the material prerequisites for survival and (at least) minimal comfort. That 
is, a person’s life goes better if they have greater control over the work that they do, 
who they work for, and their working conditions. This does not depend entirely on 
the impact that this control has on satisfaction in one’s occupation and one’s life in 
general; while we would expect someone with greater choice over (and within) what 
they do for a living to enjoy this more, we might think that a person’s life goes 
better insofar as they have a choice of their occupation and control over their 
working conditions independently of the impact that this has on their subjective 
enjoyment of their work. We might therefore posit an objective interest in 
‘occupational integrity’ or ‘occupational autonomy’ that is structurally similar to 
                                                          
17 This does not require that the interests or concomitant goods are objectively valuable in a meta-
ethical sense, but only that they are valuable (in some sense) regardless of whether the person who 
realises or experiences them recognises them as valuable. This claim is consistent with moral anti-
realism. 
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sexual integrity insofar as it concerns control over a certain sphere of one’s life and 
not the maximisation of some good per se. 
There are many ways in which one might argue in favour of such an interest. One 
might appeal to the importance of having ‘authorship’ of one’s life, directing one’s 
life by one’s own meaningful choices, or to the claim that there is something unjust 
or exploitative in having one’s labour directed by another person for their own 
benefit. The claim that persons have an objective interest in ‘occupational autonomy’ 
relies only on the claim that persons lives go better, all things being equal, if they 
have more control over their work, even if this would not increase their subjective 
fulfilment. 
If we can make sense of an objective interest in something like occupational 
autonomy, then an objective interest in sexual integrity is more plausible. That is, 
adopting Archard’s strategy of comparing sexual integrity to other putatively 
fundamental objective interests seems more promising. 
However, applying Archard’s strategy with reference to this kind of interest is not 
sufficient to ground an interest in sexual integrity. If it is appealing to recognise 
occupational integrity as an objective good, this is likely to be because work typically 
dominates a person’s life. Many individuals spend most of their waking hours for 
much of their life engaged in some productive labour to support themselves and 
their families, whether in the form of subsistence agriculture, gainful employment, or 
domestic labour. A person’s occupation is a central feature of their life because they 
are likely to spend a considerable proportion of their life engaged in it. Even if a 
person views their work as an unfortunate and tedious necessity and it does not 
seriously impact their sense of self, it is likely to be an important part of their 
identity simply because it occupies so much of their time and energy. 
Occupational integrity is important because a person’s work is central to their 
identity; if there are other interests that specifically concern a person’s control over a 
certain aspect of their life, these are likely to be grounded in the centrality of that 
aspect of the person’s life to their identity. Control of some aspect of a person’s life 
is important to a person (objectively) because this part of their life is central to who 
they are. If we are to argue that a person objectively has an important interest in 
control over some aspect of their life, we must first establish that this aspect of their 
life is important to who they are. A justification of sexual integrity by appeal to other 
interests in control of a particular sphere of one’s life does not escape the demand 
for an explanation of why sex is central to a person’s life or identity. While it is true 
that there are plausibly objective interests in control over particular spheres of one’s 
life, this is because these aspects of one’s life are important to who one is. If one 
has a distinct and important objective interest in control over the sexual part of 
one’s life, this relies on it being the case that sex is central to one’s identity. I have 
argued that this has yet to be justified. 
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If we are to make sense of the serious and distinct wrongness of sexual violence, it 
is insufficient to posit intuitively fundamental human interests and to argue that 
sexual integrity, an interest in avoiding non-consensual sexual contact, is similar. 
The interests that Archard himself raises are structurally dissimilar to sexual 
integrity, concerning the realisation of some good rather than control over some 
aspect of one’s life. While we can imagine certain other interests that concern 
control over some aspect of one’s life, such as an interest in control over one’s 
occupation, these rely on the claim that the aspect of one’s life in question is central 
to one’s identity or a very important part of one’s life. This strategy does not avoid 
the question of what it is for something to be a central interest nor how sexual 
integrity could be included here. 
Nevertheless, Archard’s claims about the expressive significance of non-consensual 
contact, offer a profound insight. Recall his proposal that the assailant “can be taken 
to say to his victim ‘You do not count, or count for very little, even in respect of that 
which matters very much to you’” (Archard 2007, 389–90). There are two claims 
here. First, that sexual assault communicates the attitude or view that the victim 
does not matter and that their interests and entitlements need not be recognised or 
respected. Second, sexual assault communicates that the victim does not matter 
even regarding a very significant aspect of who they are or something very 
important to them. 
The first claim can be justified by appeal to the notion of a personal domain over 
which each individual has claims to exclusive access and control. I examine the view 
that persons have claims over their own body in Chapter 4. This first claim also relies 
on the view that non-consensual contact can have expressive or communicative 
significance and can convey certain attitudes or views, which I examine further in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Following Hampton, one may argue that persons have claims over 
their body in virtue of being a person, and that unnecessary bodily contact 
constitutes an expressive harm insofar as it conveys that the victim is not worthy of 
these claims. 
However, if my objections succeed, then Archard’s account does not justify the 
second claim, that the assailant conveys the message through the attack that the 
victim does not matter even with regard to something very important to them. If we 
cannot make sense of sex being central to each person’s identity, then it is not clear 
that sexual assault could convey the message that the victim lacks worth even to the 
point that their interests and entitlements do not matter regarding something that 
matters greatly to them. Archard’s account distinguishes sexual assault from 
common assault on the grounds that sexual attacks target something very important 
to the victim. In order to explain the wrongness of rape and answer the 
traditionalist’s challenge, Archard (2007, 389–90) requires an account of what it 
means to say that sexual assault attacks that “which matters very much” to the 
victim that applies to every individual. 
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Section 3.8 –  
Promising Contributions and Remaining Challenges 
 
In what remains, I draw out those features of these accounts that warrant further 
consideration because I believe that they offer an insight into the wrongness of 
sexual violence, and identify the ways in which these conceptual tools must be 
further refined and developed. Initially, it is worth noting a general objection against 
the accounts that I have discussed, and which reveals a great deal about the route 
that we should take in explaining the wrongness of sexual violence. 
The core claim in these accounts is that the wrongness of sexual assault is grounded 
in the centrality of sex to each person’s identity or sense of self. The problem is that 
it is difficult to ascertain what it is for something to be central to a person in a way 
that is both morally significant and applies to every individual. While these accounts 
each specify the relevant relationship between individual persons and sex as being 
one in which sex is central to a person’s identity, sense of self, or domain, my 
discussion thus far suggests that it is difficult to identify any relationship to sex that 
everyone has and that could ground the claim that a sexual attack is seriously and 
distinctly wrongful. The attitudes that persons have to consensual sex are so varied 
that there will be no attitude to sex that each person shares or, if we can specify 
some claim about sex that is true for each person (for example, it involves their 
body), then this will be too trivial or general to distinguish sexual violence from 
(minor) non-sexual wrongs. 
This offers a compelling reason to abandon the attempt to explain the wrongness of 
sexual violence in terms of how individuals conceive of and engage in sex. Attitudes 
towards sexual contact generally are too diverse to ground an account of the 
wrongness of sexual violence that applies with sufficient generality. I submit that the 
problem with these accounts, then, is not only that they posit that sex is central to a 
person’s identity, but more generally that the argument depends on the victim of 
sexual violence having any particular relationship to or view of sex. 
While the general strategy of these accounts is unsuccessful, they introduce ideas 
that we should seriously consider as components of an explanation of the wrongness 
of sexual violence. 
First, Hampton’s notion of expressive significance, as developed by Archard, is 
promising. By appealing to this notion, one can argue that sexual violence disregards 
or attacks the victim’s moral status where this is not dependent on the assailant’s 
motive or the victim’s experience and interpretation of the attack. If sexual attacks 
can be shown to convey a distinctive expressive significance, then this notion can 
also assist in explaining the distinct wrong of sexual violence. Hampton’s comments 
introduce the idea that sexual violence is distinctively wrong (in part) on the basis of 
the expressive significance of the non-consensual contact. Non-consensual sexual 
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contact conveys that the victim is inferior, lacks the entitlements that proceed from 
their humanity, and that their interests do not matter. Perhaps part of what is so 
terrifying about rape, and the reason that many survivors report having experienced 
an imminent fear of being murdered during such attacks (Martin, Warfield, and 
Braen 1983, 502; Schnee 1986, 187), is that they are confronted by an assailant 
who refuses to recognise their rights as a person, denies that their interests are at 
all important, and manifests this in their action towards the victim. Hampton argues 
that sexual violence conveys that the victim is worthless, an object, or appropriately 
subordinated to the assailant. If we can make sense of how assault can convey 
these attitudes, it seems that Hampton has elucidated an aspect of sexual violence 
that explains why we find it so despicable and explains, at least in part, the serious 
wrong perpetrated against the victim. 
Nevertheless, this could be clarified and explained further. I have argued that 
Hampton does not fully explain the origin of the expressive significance of sexual 
attacks. The concept of expressive significance as introduced by Hampton would 
benefit from further development, in particular with a focus on the manner in which 
expressive significance attaches to particular acts, how an attack can convey a 
significance independently of the assailant’s motives or attitudes, and the distinctive 
expressive significance carried and conveyed by non-consensual sexual contact. I 
have argued that there is no compelling interpretation of the claim that sex is central 
to a person’s identity. If I am correct, Hampton’s view also requires an account of 
the distinct expressive significance of sexual violence. As Archard (2007, 190) 
explains, Hampton argues sexual violence constitutes a more serious wrong than 
other non-consensual bodily contact because sex plays an important role “in our 
understanding of ourselves.” If sex does not play such a role, then we need a 
different explanation of how the expressive harm perpetrated in sexual attacks is 
distinct from that which is inflicted in non-sexual attacks. 
Second, McGregor and Shafer and Frye develop the notion of a domain, a 
(metaphorical) space over which a person has the right to exclude others such that 
one perpetrates a wrong against them by intruding into their domain without their 
consent. I argued that these accounts go wrong in arguing that something can be 
more or less central to a person’s domain and that sexual violence is seriously 
wrongful because it targets something central to the victim’s domain. However, the 
notion of a domain itself helps to explain an aspect of the wrongness of sexual 
violence, the assailant’s imposition of non-consensual physical contact, because all 
non-consensual contact intrudes into a person’s domain without their consent. While 
I endeavour to offer an account that distinguishes sexual from non-sexual attacks, 
sexual assault is itself a form of non-consensual physical contact. Sexual assault is 
wrong in the way that non-sexual assault is wrong, even though it involves a further 
wrong in virtue of being a sexual attack. I consider the extent to which the idea of 
claims that persons have over themselves, in the form of self-ownership, can assist 
in developing an account of the wrongness of sexual violence in Chapter 4. 
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Third, proponents of these accounts argue that rape is seriously wrong in part 
because the assailant uses the victim for some endeavour that is contrary to the 
victim’s interests and preferences, rather than ‘merely’ harming or hurting them. 
Indeed, this feature of the account is often presented as independent of claims 
about the centrality of sex to the self and introduced without substantive argument. 
McGregor (1994, 235, emphasis mine) argues that “All unconsented-to border 
crossings show disrespect for the victim, but some more than others…Rape not only 
denies the ability to control a central part of one’s domain, but also in doing so 
makes the victim a mere object, an instrument of her attacker’s gratification.” 
Similarly, Shafer and Frye (1977, 345) conclude that rape “is bad in the way assault 
in general is, but its wickedness is compounded by the fact that it is a use of a 
person, not just the injury of a person, and a use of a person in pursuit of ends not 
its own and/or contrary to its own.” Although this is less explicit in Hampton’s 
account, she proposes that “rape…expresses the idea that women are even lower 
than chattel – mere “objects” who are there whenever the male feels the need to do 
so”, that the victim “is used as though she is an object”, and that it “confirms that 
women are “for” men: to be used, dominated, treated as objects” (Hampton 1999, 
135). The proposal here is that sexual violence is seriously wrong in part because 
the assailant uses the victim as a means to some goal against the victim’s will. The 
assailant hijacks or co-opts the victim’s body for their own purposes. This idea arises 
in the accounts of McGregor, Shafer and Frye, and Hampton, yet in each case their 
comments on this aspect of the account are very brief, and it seems independent of 
what they say about the centrality of sex to a person’s domain and the expressive 
content of sexual attacks. This argument is similar to Gardner and Shute’s claim, 
which I discussed in Section 2.3, that rape is seriously wrongful because constitutes 
an extreme objectification of the victim. 
A similar phenomenon might occur in non-sexual cases. Archard considers the case 
of a researcher who inserts a swab into an unconscious, non-consenting person’s 
mouth. He argues that “a wrong is done in inserting the swab in a person’s mouth 
without her consent. A further, and distinct, wrong would be done in using the swab 
to obtain and make use of the DNA information from the swab” (Archard 2008, 19-
20, emphasis mine). Perhaps this constitutes a distinct wrong because, by using the 
patient’s DNA, the researcher uses them in a project to which they have not 
consented, rather than ‘merely’ touching them without their consent. Archard echoes 
a popular intuition here. While we might feel wronged if a group gathers or retains 
personal information without our consent, there is perhaps a further wrong 
perpetrated if this group uses this data to target advertising at us, sells it on, or uses 
it in academic research. The group’s retention of personal information without one’s 
consent infringes on one’s privacy, but their use of this data involves us in a project 
to which we have not agreed. Of course, neither of these cases involves sexual 
violence. This suggests that sexual attacks cannot be distinctly wrong only in virtue 
of the use of the victim for some goal without their consent. However, it offers one 
feature that distinguishes sexual assault from many cases of non-sexual assault. 
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I have not examined this feature of these accounts, and it is raised very briefly in 
the literature that I have discussed. However, it offers a promising facet for a 
successful account of the wrongness of sexual violence, one that I will develop as 
part of my own account in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 4 
Sexual Violence as a Violation of Self-Ownership 
 
Section 4.1 – Introduction to Chapter 4 
 
At a 1975 meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 
Connie Borkenhagen offered a now-familiar analogy between sexual assault and 
theft to reveal systematic problems in the legal, institutional, and social responses to 
the former.18 
"Mr. Smith, you were held up at gunpoint on the corner of First and Main?'" 
"Yes." 
"Did you struggle with the robber?" 
"No." 
"Why not?" 
"He was armed." 
"Then you made a conscious decision to comply with his demands rather than resist?" 
"Yes." 
"Did you scream? Cry out?" 
  "No. I was afraid." 
"I see. Have you ever been held up before?" 
"No."  
"Have you ever given money away?"  
"Yes, of course."  
"And you did so willingly?" 
  "What are you getting at?" 
"Well let's put it like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in the past. In fact, you have 
quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can we be sure that you weren't contriving to have 
your money taken from you by force?"  
"Listen, if I wanted…" 
"Never mind. What time did this holdup take place, Mr. Smith?" 
"About 11:00 P.M."  
"You were out on the street at 11:00 P.M.? Doing what?"  
"Just walking."  
"Just walking? You know that it's dangerous being out on the street that late at night. 
Weren't you aware that you could have been held up?" 
"I hadn't thought about it." 
  "What were you wearing at the time, Mr. Smith?" 
"Let's see ... a suit. Yes, a suit." 
"An expensive suit?” 
"Well-yes. I'm a successful lawyer, you know." 
"In other words, Mr. Smith, you were walking around the streets late at night in a suit that 
practically advertised the fact that you might be a good target for some easy money, isn't 
                                                          
18 Borkenhagen’s analogy has been discussed on online blogs (Filipovic 2007) and similar analogies 
have been developed apparently independently of Borkenhagen’s work (Bahadur 2015; Hinde 2016; 
Jender 2011; Shaw 2014). 
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that so? I mean, if we didn't know better, Mr. Smith, we might even think that you were 
asking for this to, happen, mightn't we?” (American Bar Association 1975, 464–65). 
 
This interaction is absurd. According to Borkenhagen, it reflects the experiences of 
survivors of sexual assault who report what has happened to them; they are 
disbelieved or blamed for the assault on the basis of being alone, their attire, their 
prior sexual history, how much they struggled against the assailant, and so on. It 
reveals a difference in how the relevant institutions respond to reports of sexual 
attacks and reports of property crimes. There is often a presumption that the victim 
consented to or welcomed the attack in cases of sexual assault that is not present in 
theft (Wald 1997, 478–79). Moreover, allegations of sexual violence are often 
dismissed when there is no evidence of force or when the survivor and assailant 
have engaged in consensual sexual contact prior to the attack, while property crimes 
are not dismissed on this basis (Wald 1997, 481). Wald (1997, 467, 502) argues that 
we should treat sexual violence as the violation of something comparable to a 
property right. She believes that this will better protect victims of sexual attacks and 
offer a compelling account of the wrong perpetrated against them. 
Numerous theorists attempt to explain the wrongness of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence by appealing to self-ownership. They claim that sexual violence 
wrongs the victim because it violates the claims or rights that they have over their 
own body. The term ‘self-ownership’ captures the analogy with property that we 
own, where ownership consists in rights to prevent others from using the property 
and to choose how we use it ourselves. A person’s body belongs to that person, and 
sexual assault violates a person’s rights over their body. In this chapter, I examine 
these self-ownership accounts of the wrongness of sexual attacks and consider the 
role that a person’s claims over their own body will take in my own account. 
Initially, the suggestion that we should consider the wrongness of sexual attacks by 
considering the wrongness of property crimes might seem to trivialise the former. 
Sexual violence is often horrific and downplayed, so comparisons to property crimes 
such as theft, robbery, and perhaps even mugging might be inappropriate (West 
1993, 1448). I hope to show throughout the chapter that there are versions of the 
self-ownership account that do not have this implication. Indeed, some theorists 
argue that ownership claims over oneself are very different to ownership of one’s 
property. 
It is worth noting from the outset that comparisons between sexual attacks and 
property crimes in this form were developed by feminist theorists who recognised 
that treating sexual assault like a violation of property rights in law would grant 
greater protection to victims of sexual assault than they have currently, as 
Borkenhagen’s analogy reveals. In many jurisdictions, deception (or fraud) and 
coercion (in the form of threats or blackmail) are criminal offences when a person 
utilises them to obtain another person’s money or other property, but not when a 
person engages in these behaviours to secure sexual contact with another person 
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(Estrich 1986, 1088, 1093, 1107, 1119–20, 1127; Falk 1998, 76, 88, 148; Herring 
2005, 511; Rubenfeld 2013, 1372–78, 1395, 1398, 1413; Wald 1997, 478–79, 481; 
West 1996, 240, 242). 
Patricia Falk (1998, 71) discusses the case of United States v. Condolon 1979, in 
which the defendant fraudulently posed as offering opportunities to women to find 
them “acting and modelling jobs”, propositioned many of the women who contacted 
him, and had sex with those that agreed. If he had used this fraudulent venture to 
convince the women to pay him a fee, he would have been straightforwardly guilty 
of fraud or theft. The law did not recognise deception as undermining consent to sex 
in the way that it undermines consent to other interactions, however, and the 
defendant was only convicted for using a telephone to misrepresent his business 
venture (Falk 1998, 71). 
Coercion is often recognised as undermining consent in law, but not in cases of 
consent to sexual contact. That is, the very same coercive conduct can undermine 
consent to transfer money but not consent to sexual contact in law. Falk (1998, 80) 
raises the case of State v. Thompson 1990, in which a high-school principal told a 
student that he would prevent her from graduating unless she agreed to sexual 
contact with him. The principal was not found guilty of any criminal offence. If the 
principal had demanded money instead of sexual contact, he could likely have been 
convicted of extortion or blackmail (Estrich 1986, 1120). 
Some feminists therefore argue that treating sexual violence more like property 
crimes will offer greater protection and justice to victims of sexual violence, because 
a person’s claims over their property often receive greater recognition than their 
claims against non-consensual sexual contact (Wald 1997, 466–67, 481–82, 487, 
502). At least, it accommodates cases in which a person is deceived or coerced to 
engage in sexual contact as serious moral wrongs and crimes worthy of legal 
punishment (Estrich 1986, 1093, 1120, 1127; Falk 1998, 44–45, 76, 88, 147–48). 
That is, victims of sexual violence would be more justly served if they were 
recognised as the owners of their body and sexuality. My focus is not on the 
conditions under which consent to sexual contact is undermined, but on the 
wrongness of such contact when it occurs without consent. All the same, it is worth 
noting that the view of sexual violence as an attack on a person’s ownership of their 
body and their sexuality has had a fair amount of support from feminist theorists 
and activists, who endorsed this approach at least in part because they believe that 
it better provides protection and justice to victims. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed a range of accounts according to which rape is 
distinctly wrongful because it attacks the victim by targeting something central to 
their identity. McGregor and Shafer and Frye discuss this in terms of a domain, over 
which each person has the right to exclude others by withholding consent. While I 
rejected these accounts and took issue with the claim that something can be more 
or less central to a person’s domain, the proposal that sexual violence is seriously 
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wrong because it violates the claims that a person has over their domain, which 
includes their body, demands further consideration. In this chapter, I examine this 
proposal under a different guise, that of self-ownership claims. 
In Section 4.2, I outline the general strategy shared by self-ownership accounts of 
the wrongness of sexual assault. In Section 4.3, I consider accounts proposed by 
Donald Dripps and Richard Posner, according to which sexual violence is analogous 
to theft of an object or service. In Section 4.4, I examine John Gardner and Stephen 
Shute’s objections against self-ownership accounts of the wrongness of rape more 
generally. I draw on responses from Jesse Wall and other theorists to suggest that 
these objections raise problems for some, but not all, self-ownership accounts. In 
Section 4.5, I build on the responses to Gardner and Shute’s objections in Section 
4.4 and detail the kind of view that proponents of self-ownership commit themselves 
to in offering these responses. I argue that the kind of account offered by Dripps 
and Posner fall short here. In Sections 4.6 and 4.7, I consider two ways in which we 
might make sense of the role of self-ownership should take in an account of the 
wrongness of sexual attacks. I argue that we should not view sexual attacks as 
violating the victim’s self-ownership claims in a distinct way to non-sexual attacks, 
and propose instead that sexual attacks violate the victim’s self-ownership claims but 
that this does not itself ground the moral distinction between sexual and non-sexual 
attacks. In Section 4.8, I summarise my findings on the nature of self-ownership and 
the role that it should take in understanding the wrongness of sexual attacks. 
 
Section 4.2 – Self-Ownership Accounts of Sexual Violence 
 
Self-ownership accounts are diverse and varied, and my aim in this section is to 
elucidate those claims that are shared by all of these accounts. Ownership is 
constituted by the claims (a) to use that which one owns as one wishes so long as 
this does not illegitimately interfere with like claims on the part of other persons, 
and (b) that others do not use, damage, or otherwise interact with that which one 
owns (G. A. Cohen 1995, 68; Thomson 1990, 225; Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka 
2005, 203–4).19 
Self-ownership holds that each individual owns themselves (Dripps 1992, 1786, 1805 
n.75; Gardner and Shute 2007, 9; Penner 1997, 121; Thomson 1990, 225; 
Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka 2005, 202). Each person’s body belongs to them, 
and acting upon, using, or touching an adult without their agreement or justification 
wrongs them. Consequently, self-ownership entails that “one ought to be left free to 
do whatever one chooses so long as non-consenting other persons are not thereby 
                                                          
19 Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (2005, 203–4) add that it also includes rights to protect these 
claims and to exact compensation should they be violated. 
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harmed” (Arneson 1991, 36). Just as ownership generally means that one has a 
right not be coerced to use what one owns to help others, self-ownership entails 
that a person themselves should not be coerced to assist others (Arneson 1991, 36; 
G. A. Cohen 1995, 227–28; Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka 2005, 206). Just as 
ownership generally bestows the right to prevent others from accessing that which 
one owns, self-ownership grants a right against non-consensual physical contact by 
others (Wall 2015, 788). 
Proponents of self-ownership all propose that persons have claims to use their body 
as they wish without infringing the rights of others and to exclude others from 
access to one’s body, although they disagree on how stringent these claims are. 
Some theorists take a strong view of self-ownership claims. Gerald Cohen (1995, 
117, 215–16) argues that it is inconsistent to hold that a person owns some entity 
and that they may permissibly be compelled to use it in a certain way or allow others 
to use it. For example, he suggests that taxing a person for any purpose is 
inconsistent with the view that that person owns the money that they earn (G. A. 
Cohen 1995, 120). Analogously, he argues that self-ownership entails very strong 
claims, specifically that a person should never be compelled to use their body in 
service of someone else (G. A. Cohen 1995, 68, 117, 120).20 Richard Arneson 
agrees, arguing that “Owning himself, each person is free to do with his body 
whatever he chooses so long as he does not cause or threaten any harm to non-
consenting others. No-one is obligated to place herself at the service of others in the 
slightest degree.” Robert Nozick (2013, 172) claims that compelling a person to 
provide a service to another is to give the beneficiary of the service a property right 
in the compelled agent. On this view, such compulsion is inconsistent with the claim 
that a person owns themselves. 
In contrast, some theorists argue that self-ownership is consistent with weaker 
claims over oneself. Archard (2008, 29–30) argues that a person has ownership over 
some entity if that person “possesses some but not necessarily all” of the relevant 
claims and that “there may be reasonable restrictions on the ownership of some 
classes of things”. As such, Archard argues that self-ownership is consistent with 
there being certain limits on what a person may do with themselves. For example, 
self-ownership is consistent with denying a person the right to sell themselves 
(Archard 2008, 30). 
A weaker view of ownership generally does not necessarily entail a weaker view of 
self-ownership, however. Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka (2005, 
204) argue that ownership is consistent with restrictions on what a person can do 
with their property. However, they argue for the normative claim that persons have 
full ownership over themselves, where full ownership is “the logically strongest set of 
                                                          
20 Cohen (1995, 209–10) himself believes that the “thesis of self-ownership” is false; that is, 
individuals do not have (full) ownership rights over themselves. 
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ownership rights over a thing that a person can have compatibly with others having 
such rights over everything else” (Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka 2005, 204, 
emphasis in original). While Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka make the conceptual 
point that ownership is compatible with fairly weak claims over one’s property, they 
endorse the normative point that self-ownership involves very strong claims over 
one’s body.  
I will not state a preference for any conception of self-ownership here. It is sufficient 
for my purposes to note that, according to self-ownership, a person has claims that 
others do not prevent them from using their body as they wish or act upon their 
body without their consent. 
Self-ownership accounts differ in how they explain the wrongness of sexual violence, 
but there is a general strategy common to all accounts. Sexual assault is wrong 
because it is a form of trespass, an intrusion that violates the victim’s self-ownership 
right that others do not touch their body without their consent (Archard 2007, 28–
30; Thomson 1990, 205, 210). Self-ownership grants the right to “exclusive control 
over the body” and non-consensual sexual contact violates this right by touching or 
using the victim’s body without their permission (Wall 2015, 791). 
All accounts of this form share an advantage insofar as they recognise that persons 
have claims over their own body. Stephen Schulhofer (1998, x), followed by Alan 
Wertheimer (2003, 31), and Donald Dripps (1992, 1785–86) distinguish between 
positive and negative sexual autonomy.21 ‘Positive sexual autonomy’ refers to “the 
freedom to have sex with whomever one wishes” (Dripps 1992, 1785) or, more 
narrowly, to “engage in sexual relations with other willing partners” (Wertheimer 
2003, 31). A person’s negative sexual autonomy is realised insofar as they can avoid 
non-consensual (and perhaps also unwanted consensual) sexual contact. As Dripps 
understands positive sexual autonomy, it is set back whenever someone wants to 
engage in sexual contact but is unable to. We have good reason to recognise the 
distinction between negative and positive sexual autonomy and to privilege the 
former over the latter. Schulhofer (1998, 15) argues that “freedom from unwanted 
sex [negative sexual autonomy] and freedom to seek mutually desired sex [positive 
sexual autonomy] sometimes seem to be in tension.” When persons exercise their 
right to negative sexual autonomy by effectively refusing to have sex with another 
person, they might thereby set back this person’s positive sexual autonomy. 
Schulhofer (1998, x–xi, 11–16) argues that the law in the USA (although this is also 
true of elsewhere) has protected positive sexual autonomy at the expense of 
negative sexual autonomy insofar as it has generally failed to properly criminalise 
non-consensual sexual contact, allowing many perpetrators to impose sexual contact 
without fear of legal retribution. Clearly, we should privilege negative over positive 
sexual autonomy; it would be highly condemnable to insist that a person must 
                                                          
21 Schulhofer does not use this terminology, but the distinction is implicit in his writing. 
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engage in sexual contact against their will to satisfy another person’s desires (and 
positive sexual autonomy). 
To capture the importance of this distinction, we must say that each person has 
stringent claims over their own body and over access to their own sexual capacities. 
A person’s body and sexual capacities are not akin to publicly-owned resources that 
might be distributed with a view to balancing the fulfilment of one person’s positive 
sexual autonomy with the protection of another person’s negative sexual autonomy 
(Srinivasan 2018). Instead, negative sexual autonomy must be privileged. The 
notion that each person has a domain over which they have claims to exclusive 
control grounds this distinction and its moral significance. Negative sexual autonomy 
is important because set-backs to this violate rights that a person has over their 
body; positive sexual autonomy is an interest that does not generate rights because 
its fulfilment necessarily requires access to another person’s body, over which the 
other person has self-ownership claims. 
This distinction has present-day significance. Amia Srinivasan (2018) discusses the 
case of Elliot Rodger, who in 2014 murdered 4 people and wounded 14, claiming 
beforehand to be motivated by the refusal of the girls and women around him to 
have sex with him. Self-described involuntary celibate men (“incels”) blamed women 
for Rodger’s actions in online forums, arguing that he would not have perpetrated 
the rampage if a woman had agreed to have sex with him (Srinivasan 2018). 
Srinivasan (2018) argues that Rodger and his supporters believed that they “have a 
right to sex, a right that is being violated by those who refuse to have sex with 
them.” They believe that their interest in sexual fulfilment, in positive sexual 
autonomy, overrides women’s interest in their own negative sexual autonomy. At the 
very least, they view these interests as conflicting concerns that might be balanced 
against each other, such that one person’s positive autonomy can justify the 
violation of another person’s negative sexual autonomy. The proper response is to 
deny their equivocation of negative and positive sexual autonomy, to affirm that a 
person’s rights over their own body, and particularly over sexual contact with their 
own body, can never permissibly be infringed to satisfy another person’s desire. 
It is important that an account of the wrongness of sexual violence accommodates 
these concerns, that it explains the stringent claims that a person has over their own 
body and recognises that the desires of others do not establish any obligation (even 
prima facie) for one to engage in sexual contact. Self-ownership grounds claims that 
persons have over their own body, and so explains the important distinction 
between negative and positive sexual autonomy and the ways in which these 
operate. 
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Section 4.3 – Sexual Violence as a Property Rights Violation 
 
Dripps (1992, 1797) argues that each person has an “interest in exclusive control of 
one’s body for sexual purposes” and that sexual assault violates the victim’s rights in 
this regard. He calls this view the “commodity theory” of rape (Dripps 1992, 1786, 
1789, 1993, 1461). A central and distinctive claim in Dripps’s (1992, 1786) 
commodity theory is that “sexual cooperation is a service much like any other”. He 
stipulates a service, commodity, or “asset” that persons possess and may provide to 
others (Dripps 1992, 1801, 1993, 1469). This service consists in access to one’s 
body for the purposes of sexual gratification (Dripps 1992, 1786, 1789, 1797, 1805–
7).22 
Dripps (1992, 1786, 1993, 1469) then argues that each person has a right to 
exclude others from making use of this service, such that they are wronged if 
someone imposes sexual contact onto them without their agreement. Individuals 
have rights over their own body and the right against having physical contact 
imposed onto them (Dripps 1992, 1786, 1789, 1993, 1469). 
Dripps (1992, 1789, 1797–1800, 1807–8) argues that non-consensual23 sexual 
contact is wrongful, and should be criminally punished, because the assailant 
expropriates the service of sexual access from the victim. The victim’s ownership of 
her own body entails that she has a right to “exclusive control over [her] body for 
sexual purposes”, so this non-consensual expropriation violates her right over her 
own body (Dripps 1992, 1797). Similarly, Richard Posner (1993, 108–9) argues that 
“Rape parallels theft in being coerced taking” and wrongs the victim because the 
assailant takes something without their consent that they “should be required to 
“bargain” for”.24 
To illustrate the wrong perpetrated in all cases of non-consensual sexual contact, 
Dripps posits a case similar to Gardner and Shute’s (2007) example of ‘pure rape’. 
                                                          
22 Dripps does not clearly state what makes contact sexual. He identifies sexual violence with “using 
another person’s body for sexual gratification” (Dripps 1992, 1797, emphasis mine), and also claims 
that ““sexual act” means any act of coitus, fellatio, cunnilingus, buggery, or any insertion of an object 
into the vagina or anus” (Dripps 1992, 1807) It is not clear whether Dripps thinks that violence is 
sexual in virtue of the assailant’s motivation or in virtue of its physical form. This is not a problem for 
this account in particular; it reflects the problem I raise in Chapter 5, that accounts of the wrongness 
of sexual violence do not make explicit what it is for violence to be sexual. 
23 Dripps (1992, 1786–87 nn.27, 1800, 1805–1806) avoids characterising sexual violence as non-
consensual sexual contact, preferring instead to define it as the use of illegitimate means to impose 
sexual contact onto another person. However, as Bogart (1996, 258–64) points out, it is difficult to 
explain what makes such means illegitimate without appealing to non-consent. 
24 Dripps (1992, 1786 n.26) notes that Posner’s view is similar to his own. 
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He imagines that Clyde finds Dawn unconscious in a bedroom. Clyde applies a 
condom to his penis and penetrates her vagina. Dawn suffers no physical injuries 
and is unaware that the attack occurred (Dripps 1992, 1789). Noting that the 
wrongness of the attack cannot be a function of any experienced suffering or 
physical injury on Dawn’s part, he argues that his commodity theory is well placed to 
explain the wrongness of this sexual attack (Dripps 1992, 1789, 1801, 1805). 
Dripps (1992, 1789) argues that “Clyde acts wrongly because he expropriates 
Dawn’s body, a benefit that he may obtain only by persuading Dawn that sexual 
cooperation is to her advantage.” His view is that Dawn possesses some commodity 
or “valuable asset” that Clyde wishes to access (Dripps 1992, 1801). For Dripps, 
Clyde wrongs Dawn because he illegitimately takes this sexual commodity from her. 
Her property rights over her own body entail that she has a right to deny others 
access to this commodity, which Clyde violates. Dripps (1992, 1797–99, 1807) 
argues that all non-consensual sexual contact wrongs the victim because it involves 
this expropriation of some service, although we should recognise the separate crime 
of “Sexually Motivated Assault” where this involves (further) violence. 
The commodity theory of rape, advanced by Dripps and Posner, holds that sexual 
access (or “sexual cooperation”) is a service and commodity. The ‘service’ of sexual 
access involves bodily contact, and people have property rights over their own body, 
so this commodity is owned by each person. Accordingly, everyone has a property 
right to prevent other people from engaging in sexual contact with them. Sexual 
attacks violate this right. 
 
Section 4.4 –  
Gardner and Shute Against Self-Ownership Accounts 
 
In this section, I will examine Gardner and Shute’s rejection of self-ownership 
accounts. While they offer compelling reasons against treating sexual violence in a 
similar way to theft, I will argue that their objections do not apply to every version 
of the self-ownership account. In my view, they present three main objections 
against self-ownership accounts: that it is conceptually confused to claim that a 
person owns themselves; that ownership is contingent; and that self-ownership 
accounts risk treating persons as objects. Each of these relates to an overarching 
objection that Gardner and Shute level against the self-ownership account. They 
claim that “the first and major flaw in all self-ownership doctrines” is that “one 
cannot analogize what happens to oneself to what happens to what one owns” 
(Gardner and Shute 2007, 13). That is, self-ownership accounts are flawed because 
they mistakenly explain the wrong of attacks on a person by analogy with the 
wrongs done to a person by attacks on their property. 
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First, Gardner and Shute (2007, 12–14) argue that there is an important conceptual 
distinction between oneself and that which one owns. The problem, they claim, is 
that the notion of self-ownership treats the self as something that one owns 
alongside one’s possessions or “an addition to what one owns” and is therefore 
somehow separate from the person (Gardner and Shute 2007, 13–14). However, the 
self cannot be a person’s property or possession; the self is the person that owns. 
This objection against self-ownership charges that the notion is conceptually 
awkward; the body cannot be separated from the self, but this is implied by treating 
it as a possession of the self. 
However, Gerald Cohen argues that self-ownership does not treat the person qua 
owner as separate from themselves. He claims that ownership just consists in the 
rights to use this entity as one wishes and to exclude others from accessing it (G. A. 
Cohen 1995, 210–11). Given that a person can have these rights in relation to 
themselves, and this does not rely on any distinction between the person qua owner 
and the entity that is owned, self-ownership does not require that a person is 
separate from themselves. Self-ownership operates as a “reflexive relation” (G. A. 
Cohen 1995, 210–11). Wall (2015, 788–89) argues, similarly, that ownership here 
refers just to “‘full and exclusive rights of control’”, so the claim that a person owns 
themselves does not entail that there is some “additional item of property” that we 
must identify as the owned entity in this relation, but only that a person has certain 
rights over themselves. Cohen and Wall respond to the objection advanced by 
Gardner and Shute by endorsing what might be called a deflationary conception of 
ownership and, consequently, self-ownership. They show that self-ownership is 
conceptually coherent by reducing ownership to the rights to use that which one 
owns and to exclude others from access to that which one owns. 
The second problem Gardner and Shute (2007, 13–14) raise is that self-ownership 
accounts “render one’s relationship to oneself contingent”. On their view, property 
rights are recognised in particular social and political contexts because granting a 
person rights of exclusive use over certain objects is the best way to ensure that 
these objects are used efficiently (Gardner and Shute 2007, 9–14). Property rights 
are contingent both in the sense that a person might have their property rights over 
an object limited if their use of it is inefficient (as in the cases of rent control and 
“restrictions on inheritance”) and the continuation of a system of property rights per 
se depends on this being more efficient than the alternatives (Gardner and Shute 
2007, 10). 
Gardner and Shute’s justification of property rights is strikingly consequentialist and 
relies on an observation of how different societies tend to recognise an individual’s 
ownership of possessions without asking whether this arrangement is just. Their 
view is therefore vulnerable to a non-consequentialist justification of property rights. 
For example, a person might be thought to acquire property rights over an object by 
labouring on it, as on the Lockean view of original acquisition of property (Locke 
1980, 19–21; Wenar 1998, 807–8). 
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Nevertheless, on any justification of property, property rights over particular objects 
are contingent. Any individual might easily have not owned the object in question. 
Suppose that an adult acquires most of their possessions by buying them or 
receiving them as a gift. For each of these possessions, they might never have come 
to own them, either because they could have acquired a different object of the same 
type or abstained from acquiring an object of that type at all. Equally, one can give 
one’s possessions away and so cease to have ownership rights over them. As Wall 
(2015, 790) notes, “A dimension of the contingency of the ownership relationship is 
that a subsequent owner is able to stand in the same position with regards to the 
owned thing as the original owner.” It is a characteristic of individuals’ ownership of 
possessions that they can give the possession to a different person, and that the 
later owner will have the same ownership relation to the possession in question 
(Penner 1997, 111–14; Wenar 1998, 800–801). 
It is therefore unclear that persons can properly be said to have ownership claims 
over themselves. Unlike one’s property, one cannot transfer one’s self or one’s body 
such that the subsequent owner has the same relationship to these as one’s self. A 
person’s body will always be their body, and it would be dangerous to take the view 
that a person can transfer their self-ownership claims to grant another person this 
kind of legitimate power over their body. It is therefore unclear that the claims that 
a person has over their body are best understood as a kind of ownership. 
For this reason, discussing a person’s claims over their body as ownership may 
misrepresent the harm inflicted when these claims are violated. Property is fungible 
in the sense that it can usually be traded without negatively impacting the owner if 
they are compensated with something of comparable value. This is clearly not the 
case for the claims that we have over our bodies, our “bodily integrity” (Radin 1987, 
1880). A person’s relationship to their body is not transferrable in the way that a 
person’s relationship to other property is transferable, and if a person did transfer 
their claims over their own body to another person, this would be incomparable to 
transferring property to the other person. 
Wall (2015, 789–90) responds to this objection by arguing that self-ownership and 
property rights over external objects are “ultimately different”. He follows James 
Penner (1997, 111–12) in distinguishing property from other entities over which we 
have exclusive control. Penner (1997, 111) suggests that the term ‘property’ 
properly refers to those things that only contingently belong to an owner and are 
“separable” from the individual who currently owns them. A person’s body, on this 
view, is not property because it is not “separable from [them] in any straightforward 
way” (Penner 1997, 111–12). On Penner’s view, only those entities that can be 
straightforwardly separated from the owner constitute property. Wall (2015, 789) 
argues that “we ought to resist conflating notions of ownership with notions of 
property” without denying that these are closely related. While it is certainly true 
that an owner’s property rights over their possessions are contingent, there is no 
reason that this must apply in cases of self-ownership. The similarity that these 
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share, both involving exclusive control over the owned entity, does not entail that 
both must involve contingent relationships. 
Thirdly, Gardner and Shute (2007, 14–15) suggest that conceptualising the wrong of 
rape in terms of self-ownership dehumanises the victim. On Gardner and Shute’s 
(2007, 15) view, an essential aspect of the wrong of rape is that “a rapist objectifies 
his victim by treating her as a mere repository of use-value”. ‘Use-value’ here refers 
to the value that something has given how useful it is in pursuit of goals. Rape is 
severely wrong in part because the rapist treats the victim as if the victim’s value 
consists just in the use that they can serve the rapist’s purposes. Gardner and Shute 
(2007, 15) claim that self-ownership accounts also objectify the victim by treating 
the wrong of sexual violence as an attack on a person’s property, insofar as these 
accounts treat their body as their property. They argue that property and our 
ownership of property is valuable insofar as we can make use of our property, and 
so self-ownership accounts treat the victim of sexual violence and their body as 
objects that are valuable only insofar as they can be used. Instead, they urge that 
we should conceptualise sexual violence as an attack that disrespects and violates a 
person’s “non-use value”, that is, the value that a person has independently of how 
useful they are to themselves or others (Gardner and Shute 2007, 14–15; Wall 2015, 
790). This not only avoids what they view as a pernicious objectification of victims of 
sexual violence, but better explains the wrongness of sexual attacks and 
accommodates the claim that these are very different to attacks on a person’s 
property. Gardner and Shute believe this is inconsistent with a self-ownership 
account, which, by treating a person’s body as property, overlooks the value that a 
person has independently of their capacity to pursue their own projects or assist in 
those of others. 
Wall (2015, 790) responds that self-ownership is not justified by the “the use-value 
of the body”, but instead serves “as a means of protecting the non-use-value of 
each person.” The self-ownership account offers a means by which to condemn the 
very objectification of the victim with which Gardner and Shute are concerned, and 
to recognise the non-use-value of persons that they worry is obscured. A person’s 
non-use-value generates claims against non-consensual contact even when a person 
uses these claims in a way that is detrimental to themselves, (that is, these claims 
prohibit non-consensual paternalistic interference) (Arneson 1991, 36–37). This is 
because these claims are not grounded in use-value, the effectiveness with which a 
person uses their body or their claims over it. Self-ownership claims therefore reflect 
the non-use-value of persons; they are entitlements that are grounded in the worth 
of the person who holds them and cannot be explained by the use that the person 
makes of their body or of their claims over their own body. According to Wall (2015, 
791–92), the self-ownership view ensures that each person’s non-use value is 
recognised and respected by maintaining that we have a right of exclusive control 
over our own bodies, which renders non-consensual contact impermissible. By 
establishing and justifying rights against non-consensual contact, these accounts 
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protect the claims that are generated by their non-use value, specifically in the form 
of exclusive control over their own body. Wall (2015, 791) notes that Gardner and 
Shute (2007, 16) themselves argue that rape denies the “ultimate value of people” 
by removing control from the victim over the sexual contact in which she is involved. 
Protecting the self-ownership claims of each person recognises, and does not 
obscure, their non-use-value. 
I find this response to be unsatisfying, because it does not resolve the problem that 
Gardner and Shute have raised and because Wall has the resources to offer a 
broader critique of their objection against the self-ownership account. 
Wall is correct to note that the self-ownership account goes some way to protecting 
people from the dehumanisation of sexual violence, but this does not deal with 
Gardner and Shute’s main concern. Their objection is that self-ownership can only 
ground a right to exclusive control of one’s body by first recognising that a person’s 
body is a kind of property, and property is only valuable insofar as it is useful for 
pursuing goals. Therefore, Gardner and Shute object that any appeal to ownership 
relies on an inappropriate view of persons, according to which a person’s body is an 
item of property, and will thereby derive its value from the use that the person 
makes of it. Gardner and Shute can consistently hold, given Wall’s response, that 
self-ownership protects the entitlements that are generated by a person’s non-use-
value by condemning non-consensual contact and that this strategy nevertheless 
relies on the problematic view of persons are property, whose worth lies in what 
they can achieve. 
In my view, Wall’s response to the other objections raised by Gardner and Shute 
offers a more promising way to deal with this objection. In response to the 
preceding two objections, Wall notes that self-ownership does not entail that a 
person’s relationship to their self or body is at all like a person’s relationship to their 
property. Ownership only requires that one has the rights to control these entities 
and to exclude others. Gardner and Shute’s third objection rests on the claim that 
self-ownership treats the body, and therefore the self, as a kind of property, and 
subsequently that it must treat these as being valuable primarily in virtue of their 
use-value. However, it is simply not the case that self-ownership accounts are 
committed to the view that a person’s relationship to their body is at all similar to 
their relation to their property, beyond the very general feature that both involve 
some of the same claims. As such, the self-ownership account can avoid treating 
persons or their bodies as objects by taking a minimal view of the similarities 
between self-ownership and ownership of property. 
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Section 4.5 – Delimiting an Adequate Self-Ownership Account 
 
In this section, I examine what we can learn from the responses to Gardner and 
Shute’s objections against the self-ownership view. I believe that the responses I 
have considered succeed against Gardner and Shute’s objections, but thereby place 
restrictions on a viable self-ownership account of the wrongness of sexual attacks. 
Wall (2015, 788, emphasis in original) argues that “The problem with Shute and 
Gardner’s critique is that no one…relies on a full-blown analogy with property rights 
to explain the rights or interests that we have in our body.” This is not quite right; 
Dripps and Posner propose that self-ownership is very similar to property ownership 
(Dripps 1992, 1786, 1789; Posner 1993, 108–9; Wald 1997, 462–63), while 
Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (2005, 202, emphasis in original) claim that “Agents 
are full self-owners just in case they own themselves in the same way that they can 
fully own inanimate objects.” However, Wall does provide an insight into the form 
that an account of self-ownership must take if it is to avoid the objections put 
forward by Gardner and Shute. A viable self-ownership account must avoid drawing 
significant analogies between self-ownership and property ownership, or between 
sexual violence and violations of property rights. I propose two more specific 
conditions for a self-ownership account of the wrongness of sexual violence, which 
follow from this. 
Firstly, the meaning of ‘ownership’ in the context of ‘self-ownership’ is just that the 
owner has claims that others not touch their body without their consent or compel 
them to act in any particular way. If A owns themselves, this just means that A has 
a claim against each other person that they do not prevent her from using her body 
as she wishes (except when her actions wrongfully harm others) and that they do 
not touch her body without her consent. The use of the term ‘ownership’ does not 
entail any similarity between self-ownership and property ownership beyond these 
claims. Many theorists adopt this view (Archard 2008, 29–30; Arneson 1991, 36–37; 
G. A. Cohen 1995, 210–11; Thomson 1990, 225–26) and Thomson’s phrasing is 
particularly apt: 
ownership really is no more than a cluster of claims, privileges, and powers; and if the cluster 
of rights that a person X has in respect of his or her body is sufficiently like the clusters of 
rights people have in respect of their houses, type-writers, and shoes, then there is no 
objection in theory to saying that X does own his or her body (Thomson 1990, 225). 
Defining ‘ownership’ in this way neutralises the concerns that self-ownership is 
conceptually suspect and that the rights over one’s body are contingent. If self-
ownership is reducible to claims against other people that they refrain from 
interfering with one’s body, there is no implication that the body is separate to the 
self, nor any reason to believe that these claims are contingent. 
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Secondly, we should also be wary of drawing too strong an analogy between the 
justifications of self-ownership and of property ownership. A self-ownership account 
should not attempt to make sense of the wrongness of sexual violence by appeal to 
the wrong committed in attacks on a person via their property, such as theft and 
vandalism. This is particularly pertinent given Gardner and Shute’s criticism that the 
self-ownership account risks objectifying or otherwise dehumanising victims of 
sexual violence. I suggested that self-ownership accounts should therefore avoid 
explaining the wrongness of sexual violence by drawing on insights about the 
wrongness of violations of property rights. Although the self-ownership account can 
survive their objection, this places a non-trivial restriction on self-ownership 
accounts; they should not seek to explain the wrong of sexual violence by reference 
to the wrongs done when a person’s property rights are violated. 
The claim that a person owns themselves or their body means only that they have 
certain claims over their body. The similarities between self-ownership and property 
ownership must end here. This makes explicit a commitment that many proponents 
of self-ownership presuppose. 
While many theorists endorse something like these conditions, they rule out Dripps 
and Posner’s accounts. Dripps and Posner hold that sexual assault is wrong because 
the assailant literally steals or expropriates an asset of service that properly belongs 
to the victim. On their view, a person owns their body in much the same was as they 
own property, and sexual assault is wrong for similar reasons to property crimes. 
This is exemplified when Dripps (1992, 1789), discussing the case of sexual assault 
that causes no trauma or injury, claims (shockingly) that “If Clyde had stolen Dawn’s 
purse while she slept, instead of her body, the violation of her rights would be 
similar but less severe.” Dripps and Posner fall afoul of the two conditions that I 
have stipulated. They treat self-ownership not only as a person’s claims over their 
own body, but as something very similar, if not identical, to the ownership persons 
have of property. They explain the wrongness of violations of self-ownership, 
particularly in the form of non-consensual sexual contact, as similar to the wrong 
perpetrated when a person’s claims over their property are violated. 
 
 Section 4.6 –  
Sexual Violence as Unique Violation of Self-Ownership 
 
Having responded to Gardner and Shute’s objections, Wall claims that: 
Therefore, the principle of reflexive self-ownership is able to explain the wrongfulness of non-
consensual sexual penetration. Sexual offences infringe rights to exclusive control over the 
body (Wall 2015, 791). 
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Wall overstates his case here. His responses to Gardner and Shute show only that 
the notion of self-ownership is not obviously flawed. The discussion so far does not 
explain the wrongness of non-consensual sexual contact. A full account requires an 
explanation of how self-ownership shows that sexual attacks involve a wrong that 
non-sexual attacks do not. 
In the next two sections, I examine how self-ownership claims might aid an 
explanation of the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks. There are two ways in which 
a proponent of the self-ownership account can justify a moral distinction between 
sexual and non-sexual violations of self-ownership claims: 
1. Sexual attacks violate the victim’s self-ownership claims in a different way to 
non-sexual attacks. Sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful because they violate 
the victim’s self-ownership claims in a way that non-sexual attacks generally 
do not. 
2. The moral distinction between sexual and non-sexual attacks is independent 
of, although reliant on, the violation of self-ownership claims. The wrong of 
sexual attacks can only be explained by recognising that these violate claims 
that persons have over their own body, although it is grounded in something 
other than self-ownerships claims. 
I argue that (1) fails, but that (2) offers a promising model of the role that self-
ownership will play in a viable account of the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks. 
Proponents of (1) require an account of why sexual attacks violate the victim’s self-
ownership claims in a distinctive way. In my view, any such explanation will appeal 
to something about the sexual nature of the attack that is not directly concerned 
with the violation of the victim’s self-ownership claims. Therefore, (1) collapses into 
(2). According to (1), there must be some morally salient feature of sexual attacks 
such that they violate self-ownership claims in a different way to non-sexual attacks. 
However, accounts that do not appeal to self-ownership could also draw on this 
morally salient feature of sexual attacks. If something about the sexual status of an 
attack grounds the claim that sexual violence violates the victim’s self-ownership 
claims in a distinct way, then it is this feature that grounds a moral distinction 
between sexual and non-sexual assault rather than the way in which the victim’s 
self-ownership claims are violated. Appeals to self-ownership would not then explain 
the wrongness of sexual violence. 
The claim (1) that sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful because they violate the 
victim’s self-ownership claims in a different manner to many non-sexual attacks finds 
support in the philosophical literature. One view is that sexual violence violates a 
person’s self-ownership claims insofar as the assailant takes control of the victim. I 
call this the ‘appropriation account’. In some instances, Dripps (1992, 1786, 1789, 
1797–98) argues that sexual violence violates the self-ownership claims of the 
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victim, not by taking property from them or compelling them to act, but by 
illegitimately appropriating their body. A similar idea is briefly considered by Laurie 
Calhoun, who argues that: 
Rape is a crime of invasion in which an aggressor appropriates another human being as his 
personal possession and acts completely without regard to the fact that she is an intelligent, 
sentient human being with rights to self-determination and to live in peace and security 
(Calhoun 1997, 109). 
Calhoun’s description of rape draws parallels with enslavement, where this is 
understood as the ownership of one person by another. Calhoun (1997, 109) argues 
that the assailant “appropriates” the victim, bringing them into their “possession” 
(Berkich 2009, 390–91). On this view, sexual violence violates the victim’s self-
ownership rights by seizing or co-opting their body. It occurs when one person 
asserts a claim over another’s person’s body without their consent. 
Expanding on Calhoun’s brief explanation of this idea, Don Berkich (2009, 390) 
argues that the notion of appropriating a person serves to make the distinction 
between “constraining a person’s action in some way or other and capturing the 
person entirely”, where the appropriation of the person involves the latter. When 
one person appropriates another, they take control of them and act as though they 
have a general right to use the victim as they wish. Importantly, the appropriation of 
a person does not necessarily require physical contact, and one person can 
appropriate another from a distance. If one person coerced another through threats 
in a way that controlled the victim’s life for a sustained period of time, they would 
thereby appropriate the victim without touching them. 
On Calhoun (1997, 109) and Berkich’s account, sexual attacks violate the victim’s 
self-ownership claims not only by denying the victim’s right to determine what 
happens to their body, but insofar as the assailant treats the victim as a “personal 
possession”, as if the assailant has extensive claims over the victim’s body to decide 
what happens to them. Berkich (2009, 391) argues that sexual attacks therefore 
have more in common with historical institutions of enslavement (and present-day 
trafficking) than with common assault. These forms of enslavement are typically 
characterised by the master’s total domination and control (Bradley 1994, 16–19, 
24–30, 100–101, 132; Klein 1998, 2, 6, 13–15; Turley 2000, 104–9, 113, 133). 
Rubenfeld’s account of rape as a violation of self-possession reflects a similar idea. 
Rubenfeld (2013, 1425) discusses ‘self-possession’ as “possession of one’s own 
body.” While he does not use the terminology of self-ownership, this is closely 
related to the claims that a person has over their own body. He argues that a 
person’s self-possession is not necessarily compromised in cases of assault, even 
those that cause injury, but requires that the assailant “actually takes over your 
body – exercising such complete and invasive physical control over it that your body 
is in an elemental sense no longer your own” (Rubenfeld 2013, 1426). Self-
possession is most obviously violated in enslavement, in which the master fully 
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controls the enslaved person’s body and compels them to act at the master’s 
discretion, and in torture, in which pain and fear destroys the victim’s control over 
their own body (Rubenfeld 2013, 1426–27). In these cases, Rubenfeld (2013, 1427) 
believes that the victim’s self-possession is violated because they are literally made 
the “possession” of the assailant. 
Rubenfeld argues that rape is wrong in a way that common assault is not because in 
most cases25 it violates the victim’s self-possession. On this view, rape is therefore 
morally akin to enslavement and torture. He argues that rape violates the victim’s 
self-possession because the assailant makes the victim’s body their own possession, 
that is, the assailant appropriates the victim’s body. Rubenfeld (2013, 1426) argues 
that rape appropriates the victim’s body because the assailant “uses the victim’s 
body for sex” and, especially when this is “violent” or “penetrative”, takes over and 
possesses the victim’s body. The victim is compelled to act in service of the 
assailant’s goals, their body is trapped or manipulated, and they often suffer 
extreme pain and fear (Rubenfeld 2013, 1427, 1430). According to Rubenfeld (2013, 
1430), rape is “a special kind of harm” that is more akin to enslavement and torture 
than other forms of assault because the victim’s self-possession is violated; the 
assailant appropriates and takes control of the victim’s body. 
Calhoun, Berkich, and Rubenfeld offer similar accounts of the distinct wrong of rape. 
They argue that rape is unlike most other forms of assault because the assailant 
takes control of, appropriates, or possesses the victim’s body. Although none of 
them invoke the language of self-ownership, they describe the ways in which sexual 
attacks violate a person’s claims over their own body and specifically those claims 
against non-consensual contact by others. These theorists argue that sexual attacks 
are distinctly wrong because the violate the victim’s self-ownership claims in a 
different manner to otherwise similar non-sexual attacks. As in (1) above, the 
wrongness of sexual violence consists in the way in which the assailant violates the 
victim’s self-ownership claims.  
However, there are two problems with this account, and I believe that they 
generalise to other attempts to explain the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks 
solely by appeal to the way in which they violate the victim’s self-ownership claims. 
First, appeals to self-ownership cannot distinguish between sexual attacks and 
relevantly similar non-sexual attacks that also involve the appropriation of the victim. 
Calhoun, Berkich, and Rubenfeld argue that rape is like the very serious violations of 
enslavement and torture; if successful, they show that rape is very seriously 
wrongful. However, there are less serious wrongs that also meet their condition of 
appropriation of the victim’s body or a violation of their self-possession. For 
                                                          
25 Rubenfeld (2013, 1432) argues that deceiving someone into engaging in sexual contact does not 
undermine their self-possession, so he does not believe that his argument applies to cases in which 
deception undermines a person’s consent to sexual contact. 
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example, suppose that an assailant physically moves a victim using threats or 
physical force. Also consider an assailant who sedates the victim without their 
consent and draws a blood sample from them for research. Each of these cases 
plausibly involves the appropriation of the victim. The kidnapper compels the victim 
to move their whole person and the researcher renders the victim unconscious; both 
affect the victim’s whole body. Both assailants attack the victims in ways that seize 
or appropriate the entirety of their bodies. There is also an important sense in which 
they treat the victim as a “personal possession” (Calhoun 1997, 109) in each case, 
because both assailants use the victim to further their own interests or projects, with 
no regard for the victims’ interests or claims. 
Appealing to the claim that sexual attacks involve an appropriation of the victim 
cannot therefore justify the claims that, for example, kidnapping someone by force is 
morally worse if, while forcing the victim to move to another location, the kidnapper 
gropes or squeezes the victim’s genitals rather than forcefully pushing their arms 
and back. It cannot substantiate the suggestion that an assailant who rapes an 
unconscious victim, but causes no physical injury, acts in a more condemnable 
manner than the person who sedates a person and draws a blood sample. Each of 
these cases involves the appropriation of the victim, so the claim that sexual attacks 
are morally distinct from relevantly similar non-sexual attacks because they alone 
involve such an appropriation cannot succeed. 
The theorists in question might respond that the cases that I have discussed do not 
properly involve the appropriation of the victim’s body as they understand this 
phenomenon. They could clarify or develop their conceptions of appropriation and 
self-possession to distinguish between rape and the cases that I have raised. 
However, they would still encounter a second problem for their accounts. This 
problem is that it is not clear why rape and sexual assault necessarily appropriates 
the victim’s body when non-sexual assault does not. They do not fully explain what it 
is about sexual attacks that makes it the case that these attacks appropriate the 
victim’s body. Furthermore, if one explains this by appealing to some feature of 
sexual attacks, it is likely to be the case that this feature of sexual attacks grounds 
their distinct wrongness, and we need not appeal to self-ownership to explain this.  
For instance, it is not clear why, on Rubenfeld’s account, sexual assault violates the 
victim’s self-possession in a way that non-sexual assault generally does not. He 
offers a range of ways in which rape in particular violates the victim’s self-
possession, claiming that the assailant takes over the victim’s body, compels them to 
serve the assailant’s ends, and makes the victim’s body literally the assailant’s 
possession (Rubenfeld 2013, 1426–27). Rubenfeld does not explain why this is true 
of rape and not of common assault. For his account to succeed, there must be 
something about sexual attacks such that they violate the victim’s self-possession 
while non-sexual attacks do not. Whatever explanation one provides for this, one 
might plausibly appeal to this explanation for the distinct wrongness of sexual 
attacks and bypass the appeal to self-ownership entirely. 
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Berkich’s development of Calhoun’s account raises this problem more explicitly. 
Berkich (2009, 391–92) notes, as I have, that certain non-sexual attacks appropriate 
the victim, and that an account that determines the wrongness of sexual violence by 
appeal to the assailant’s appropriation of the victim must explain why this 
appropriation is more like the atrocity of enslavement than it is like these more trivial 
violations. To distinguish sexual from non-sexual attacks and recognise the moral 
severity of sexual violations, the appropriation model relies on the claim that sexual 
attacks appropriate the victim’s body in a way that most non-sexual attacks do not. 
Berkich examines Archard’s (2007, 389–90) claim that “our interests in our sexual 
bodily integrity and in our sexual self-determination are at the heart of our being. 
Sex and sexuality are central to who we are.” Berkich (2009, 393) suggests that 
Archard’s view offers a means to justify the claim that sexual violence appropriates 
the victim in a distinct manner to other violence because “sexual 
assault…constitutes, on Archard’s view, a far greater appropriation of [the victim]” 
than non-sexual assault “insofar as sexuality is central to personhood itself.” Archard 
claims that sexuality and sexual integrity are central to personhood and Berkich 
argues that this view helps to make sense of the claim that sexual violence 
constitutes a more extreme appropriation of the victim themselves than non-sexual 
violence because it seizes something that is central to who they are. 
However, insofar as self-ownership accounts rely on some further, independent 
argument or feature to distinguish between sexual and non-sexual violence, then 
this argument or feature, rather than self-ownership, explains the wrongness of 
sexual violence. If sexual violence is distinctly wrongful because it attacks something 
more central to personhood, then it is the attack on something central to 
personhood that grounds the wrongness of sexual violence, as I considered in 
Chapter 3. This provides the requisite resources to explain the distinct wrongness of 
sexual attacks, and one does not need to appeal to the further claim that sexual 
attacks are more seriously wrongful because they violate the victim’s self-ownership 
claims in a distinct way or appropriate the victim’s body. One might consistently 
argue that sexual violence is wrong because it attacks something central to 
personhood with no discussion of self-ownership. It is not clear what the notion of 
self-ownership adds to such an account. 
I have rejected (1), the claim that sexual attacks involve a distinct wrong because 
the victim’s self-ownership claims are violated in a way that does not occur in non-
sexual attacks.  I reject this view of the role of self-ownership because it relies on 
some prior explanation of the moral distinctiveness of sexual attacks to explain why 
these attacks violate the victim’s self-ownership claims in a way that non-sexual 
attacks do not. Plausibly, this explanation can ground the distinct wrongness of 
sexual violence without appeal to self-ownership at all. 
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Section 4.7 –  
Self-Ownership as Necessary to the Wrong of Sexual Attacks 
 
I have suggested that self-ownership is not central to an explanation of the distinct 
wrongness of sexual attacks. However, the claim (2) that part of the wrongness of 
sexual attacks is explained by the violation of the victim’s self-ownership claims, 
even though this is not what distinguishes them from non-sexual attacks, is 
nevertheless appealing. If this is correct, then the proper response to my argument 
that self-ownership accounts cannot explain the distinct wrongness of sexual 
violence is to supplement these accounts with such an explanation rather than 
abandoning them. 
To motivate this strategy, I offer an analogy with property ownership. Suppose that 
a spouse owns a wedding ring to which they ascribe significant sentimental value 
(Radin 1982, 959; Wald 1997, 476). If another person stole the wedding ring, this 
would plausibly be more seriously wrongful than if they had instead stolen the 
wedding ring from a jeweller who had it in their possession solely to sell for a profit 
(Gardner and Shute 2007, 11; Radin 1982, 959–60). However, sentimental value 
alone does not ground claims over an object in the absence of independently 
grounded property rights. If an object has sentimental value for a person who does 
not own the object, they will in most cases not have claims over the object. Suppose 
that the spouse invests significant sentimental value in the wedding ring from her 
now-deceased husband, and it transpires that her husband stole the ring from the 
jeweller. The sentimental value of the ring to the woman does not entail property 
ownership. If the spouse could acquire claims over the ring in virtue of its 
sentimental value, this requires that the jeweller must have lost his property rights 
over the ring because it is held in possession by someone who values it. If the 
jeweller properly owned the ring in the first instance, there is a tension with the view 
that he could have lost the rights that he has over it in the course of these events. 
This is not to say that the sentimental value that the woman invests in the wedding 
ring has no normative consequences. It certainly gives the jeweller a good reason to 
allow the woman to keep the ring and perhaps even places certain constraints on his 
use of it; one might say that the woman has an enforceable claim that the jeweller 
does not frivolously dispose of the ring, for example. However, this is entirely 
consistent with the jeweller owning the ring and the woman having no property 
rights over it. The jeweller has a good reason to dispose of his property in a certain 
way, namely by transferring it to the woman, and none of this reduces his claims to 
exclusive control of the ring. 
We can therefore consistently endorse two claims here. It is more seriously wrongful 
to violate a person’s property rights when the property in question is of sentimental 
value to the owner. At the same time, it does not violate a person’s claims to use an 
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object in which they have invested sentimental value if they do not have 
independent claims (property rights) over the object. The sentimental value of 
property exacerbates the wrong done in violations of property rights over the object, 
but no wrong is done to a person who lacks property rights over the object, even if 
it is of significant sentimental value to them. In this case, the spouse’s ownership 
claims over the ring are necessary to explain the wrong perpetrated if the ring is 
stolen, but an appeal to these claims cannot explain the moral difference between 
stealing the wedding ring and stealing something about which she does not care.  
Consider another case, which also concerns property theft. Two strangers are 
stranded in a blizzard. Person A owns a coat that she brought with her, and is on the 
ground between herself and Person B. There is only one coat, and the person who 
does not wear it will die. It would be very charitable of A to give B her coat and thus 
sacrifice her life, but she is probably not obliged to do so. In contrast, we might 
think that if B was to seize the coat without A’s consent, this would be tantamount 
to murder. They steal from A something that A requires to survive. The wrong 
perpetrated against A in this case can only be explained by appeal to A’s ownership 
of the coat. B’s taking possession of the coat only constitutes murder or killing A 
because they cause A to die by removing from her something that is necessary for 
her survival. Although B’s violation of A’s ownership claims over the coat are 
necessary to explain the wrong B commits, it would be misleading to describe the 
act as theft or as a denial of A’s ownership. We must appeal to A’s ownership claims 
to explain the wrong that B perpetrates but describing this case only as a violation of 
self-ownership obscures the fact that B kills A, and does not merely steal from her. 
In both of these cases, the violation of the victim’s ownership claims is necessary to 
explain the wrong perpetrated. At the same time, the wrong perpetrated is not best 
described as theft or any other violation of the victim’s ownership rights. In the first 
case, the thief deprives the victim of something deeply meaningful to them. In the 
second case, the thief kills the victim. 
Developing this as an analogy to self-ownership and sexual assault offers a strategy 
for a proponent of the self-ownership account to accommodate, but not explain, the 
distinct wrongness of sexual violence.26 Sexual violence is seriously wrongful 
                                                          
26 Interestingly, theorists discussing sentimental value sometimes use similar language to theorists 
discussing sexual violence. Archard (2007, 389–90) argues that “Sex and sexuality are central to who 
we are” and McGregor (1994, 235) argues that “Much of our personal identity is tied to our gender 
and sexual expression and hence to our sexual self-determination” to explain the distinct wrongness 
of rape. In her discussion of sentimental value, Radin (1982, 959, emphasis mine) proposes that “an 
object is closely related to one’s personhood if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the 
object’s replacement”. Gardner and Shute (2007, 11) claim that theft of property with sentimental 
value is a violation of the person themselves insofar as it removes something that (“metaphorically”) 
is “a part of their extended selves”. 
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because there is something morally significant about the sexual nature of sexual 
attacks. At the same time, we can only make sense of the wrong perpetrated 
against the victim in sexual violence by first acknowledging that they have claims 
over their body (Wald 1997, 468–69). 
The problem remains that self-ownership itself cannot explain the distinct and severe 
wrongness of sexual violence, just as an appeal to property rights cannot explain the 
severity of stealing the wedding ring or the wrongful killing when a person steals 
something necessary for another person’s survival. By way of summary, I find 
Archard’s claims on the subject illuminating. Archard (2008, 27, 30) considers 
Thomson’s (1990, 205) view that sexual violence is a “Bodily trespass”, where 
‘trespass’ refers to “‘a claim infringing intrusion or invasion’”. 
Where this approach goes badly wrong is in failing to capture the significance for the victim 
of further and essential features of rape. These have to do with where the other steps, how 
the step is made, and what the other is doing in taking this particular step too far. Bodily 
trespass as such, even a concept of which allows for aggravated trespass, cannot, I suspect, 
represent all that is wrong with rape (Archard 2008, 30). 
Archard claims that viewing sexual violence as a bodily trespass, the violation of a 
self-ownership claim over one’s body, cannot adequately explain its wrongness. 
While he does not deny that sexual assault is indeed a violation of such claims, he 
argues that we must recognise some further feature of sexual violence to explain 
this. I believe that this is correct. Without an account of the wrongness of sexual 
violence that goes beyond appeals to self-ownership, we cannot distinguish morally 
between relevantly similar sexual and non-sexual attacks or explain the moral 
severity of sexual attacks. Tellingly, while Archard recognises sexual violence as a 
violation of self-ownership here, his earlier account of the wrongness of rape makes 
no reference to self-ownership (Archard 2007). In Archard’s view, it seems, one can 
consistently recognise that sexual violence does involve the violation of a self-
ownership claim, while also recognising that this does very little to explain the 
wrongness of such attacks. Self-ownership offers a necessary but woefully 
insufficient account of the wrongness of sexual violence. 
 
Section 4.8 –  
The Role of Self-Ownership in the Wrongness of Sexual Attacks 
 
I have examined self-ownership accounts of the wrongness of sexual violence and 
objections against them in the hope of clarifying how we should understand self-
ownership in this context and the role that self-ownership takes in the wrongness of 
sexual attacks. 
Given the objections against more substantive conceptions, I will understand self-
ownership as claims or rights that a person has over their own body. Specifically, 
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these are claims to do with one’s body what one chooses, as long as this does not 
infringe another person’s claims, and claims to exclusive access over one’s body and 
against non-consensual contact with other people. This is quite a minimal or 
deflationary conception of self-ownership. It entails that a wide range of impositions 
constitute violations of self-ownership and includes all unjustified non-consensual 
physical touching. If an act violates a person’s self-ownership claims, then this is a 
component of the wrong perpetrated against them. However, in most cases this will 
be strikingly deficient; most acts that violate a person’s self-ownership claims are 
also wrong for other reasons, such as the pain, injury, fear, and trauma that they 
inflict. 
Therefore, the violation of the victim’s self-ownership claims does not explain the 
wrongness of sexual attacks, nor does it give any reason to believe that sexual 
attacks involve a wrong that is not present in non-sexual attacks. I have also argued 
that we should not endorse the view that sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful 
because they violate the victim’s self-ownership claims in a way that non-sexual 
attacks do not. Instead, I adopt the following view of self-ownership claims. Sexual 
attacks violate the victim’s self-ownership claim to determine who has contact with 
their body. This is a necessary component of the wrongness of sexual attacks. All 
the same, this does not ground the serious wrongness of sexual attacks or the moral 
distinction between sexual and non-sexual attacks. In Chapter 6, I draw on self-
ownership claims in this way to explain the wrongness of sexual attacks. 
In the previous few chapters, I have considered a range of accounts of the 
wrongness of sexual violence. I have argued that each of these fails to explain and 
justify the serious and distinct wrongness of such impositions. In the remaining two 
chapters, I will propose my own account. 
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Chapter 5 
What Makes an Attack Sexual? 
 
Section 5.1 – Introduction to Chapter 5 
 
In previous chapters, I have examined some accounts of the wrongness of sexual 
attacks and considered the role that different conceptual resources, such as 
objectification and self-ownership, might take in a successful account. I have argued 
that the accounts and conceptual resources that I have considered are not sufficient 
to explain the wrongness of sexual attacks. In the next two chapters, I develop my 
own account. I will begin by adopting a novel approach to the issue. I begin in this 
chapter by trying to ascertain what it means for an attack to be sexual. Where 
philosophers and others discuss rape as ‘non-consensual sex’ or ‘non-consensual 
sexual intercourse’, it is not clear what it is for non-consensual contact to be ‘sex’ or 
what it is for non-consensual intercourse to be ‘sexual’. More broadly, there have 
been few attempts to explain what constitutes a sexual assault or sexual violence. 
My concern in this thesis is to determine the distinct wrong of sexual attacks. That 
is, I aim to explain how the sexual nature of non-consensual contact exacerbates the 
wrongness of these attacks or entails that these attacks involve a wrong that is not 
present in non-sexual attacks. A promising strategy, then, is to first determine what 
it is for non-consensual contact to be sexual. The distinct wrongness of sexual 
attacks must be explained by appeal to whatever it is that distinguishes sexual from 
non-sexual attacks conceptually. In this chapter, I investigate exactly what it is that 
makes an attack sexual, and what distinguishes sexual from non-sexual attacks. 
The terms ‘rape’ and ‘sexual assault’ suggest that some attacks are sexual in 
nature27 and that their sexual nature is an important aspect of their wrongness. 
However, I will argue that there is currently no viable account of what it is for an 
attack to be sexual. In trying to capture the sexual nature of these acts, 
philosophers have considered the physical contact imposed, the involvement of 
sexual body parts, and the presence of sexual desire. I argue that there are counter-
                                                          
27 Many feminists argue that rape is not sexual and should be understood just as an act of violence 
(Cahill 2001, 19–22; Muehlenhard, Danoff-Burg, and Powch 1998). The claim that rape is not sexual 
can be interpreted in different ways and my project is consistent with many interpretations of this 
claim. When I suggest that certain attacks are sexual, I mean only that cases of rape and sexual 
assault share a feature that distinguishes them from other acts of violence, and that we can speak 
meaningfully of ‘non-consensual sex’ and ‘non-consensual sexual contact’. I do not take a position 
against many of the claims made by advocates of the view that rape is not sex (Gardner and Shute 
2007: 23–4; Stellings 1993: 193).  
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examples to each of these. I then propose an alternative account according to which 
non-consensual physical contact is sexual insofar as it involves the sexualisation of 
the victim, where this consists in the treatment of the victim as a sexual object. An 
attack sexualises the victim in the relevant sense insofar as the contact imposed has 
a particular expressive significance, and this does not rely on the assailant having a 
particular motive. 
The argument proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, I argue that it is not clear what it 
is for an attack to be sexual and that an account of this is important. In Section 4.3, 
I reject the view that an attack is sexual whenever individuals intuitively recognise it 
as such. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, I reject accounts according to which an attack is 
sexual if it involves sexual body parts or a sexual motive. In Sections 4.6 and 4.7, I 
set out my own account, informed in part by comments from survivors of sexual 
violence. In Section 4.8, I respond to objections. In Section 4.9, I offer concluding 
remarks and foreshadow my account of the wrongness of sexual attacks. 
 
Section 5.2 – The Challenge and its Implications 
 
Philosophers generally define ‘rape’ as non-consensual or coercive sex (S. A. 
Anderson 2016; Archard 2007, 374; Bogart 1991, 117–18, 1995, 162–64; Burgess-
Jackson 1999, 93; Cahill 2001, 11; MacKinnon 1989a, 322, 2017, 290; Wertheimer 
2003, 28–36; West 1996, 243–44).28 There is extensive discussion of consent and of 
how we should define ‘sex’ generally, but few attempts to explain what ‘sex’ means 
in the context of non-consensual contact. Without an account of what ‘sex’ and 
‘sexual’ mean, however, we cannot determine the kind of act that must be imposed 
without consent to constitute rape or sexual assault. 
Consider an example from UK law. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 1(3) defines 
‘sexual assault’ as follows: 
1. A person (A) commits an offence if – 
a. he intentionally touches another person (B), 
b. the touching is sexual, 
c. B does not consent to the touching, and 
d. A does not reasonably believe that B consents. 
                                                          
28 A similar trend is evident in empirical research (Muehlenhard et al. 1992). 
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Sexual assault is defined here as non-consensual sexual touching.29 To ascertain 
which attacks constitute sexual assault, we must first know what it is for non-
consensual touching to be sexual. The statute claims that touching is sexual if “a 
reasonable person” would consider it to be sexual “because of its nature” or, where 
this is unclear, due to “the purpose of any person” involved (Temkin and Ashworth 
2004, 331-332; Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 78). However, this does not explain 
what the nature of the contact or the assailant’s purposes would have to be like to 
make the touching sexual, and therefore provides little assistance in answering these 
questions (Ashworth and Horder 2013, 344–45; Simester et al. 2013, 470; R. v 
Anthony 2005). 
Furthermore, judgements about when non-consensual touching constitutes sexual 
assault30 are inconsistent, as evidenced by judgements in UK legal cases. In R. v 
Court 1988, the appellant struck a girl on the buttocks, and said that this was 
because he had a “buttock fetish”. Lords Keith, Fraser, Griffiths, and Ackner argued 
that the assault was indecent in part because it was motivated by his desire for 
sexual gratification. They suggested that it would have been less clear that the 
assault was indecent if the appellant had not disclosed his “buttock fetish” as a 
motive. Dissenting, Lord Goff argued that only the physical form of the contact 
determines whether the assault is indecent, and that the assailant’s motive is 
irrelevant. In tension with the majority judgement in Court, judges in R. v Taaffe 
2016 found the appellant guilty of sexual assault for grabbing or pinching the 
buttocks of several women in the absence of any sexual motive. 
In R. v Criston 2016, the Attorney General appealed against a prior conviction, 
claiming that it was too lenient. The offender was originally convicted for grabbing 
the victim’s penis and testicles and putting his finger in the victim’s anus while 
accompanied by five onlookers. The judge in the original case “regarded the incident 
as akin to playground bullying and did not apply the sentencing guidelines for sexual 
offences” (Criston 2016, emphasis mine). The appeal was upheld; while the judge in 
the original case believed that the assault was not sexual, the judges presiding over 
the appeal disagreed. 
Judges have also disagreed over whether removing a person’s shoes can constitute 
a sexual imposition if it is sexually motivated. Judges in R. v George 1956, Court 
(1988, 154), and R. v Price (2003, 145, 147) held that this is never sexual. In 
contrast, Lord Wolff has claimed that removing a person’s shoes without their 
consent could constitute a wrongful sexual imposition, and whether this act is sexual 
in any particular instance would have to be determined by a jury (Anthony). 
                                                          
29 See also the Equalities Act 2010 s 26(2), according to which “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature” 
constitutes workplace harassment. 
30 The term “indecent assault” was previously employed in UK law, and the two are sufficiently similar 
for my discussion to apply to both (G. Williams 1983, 231). 
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Furthermore, judges have disagreed over whether a kiss can constitute indecent 
(sexual) assault (G. Williams 1983, 232). 
These cases demonstrate significant disagreement over whether certain acts should 
be recognised as sexual assault. This disagreement stems at least in part from the 
lack of a clear understanding of what it is for an attack to be sexual. 
 
Section 5.3 – A Common-Sense Solution? 
 
There is a temptingly simple but ultimately unsuccessful way to overcome this 
problem. Lord Goff has argued that “jurors and magistrates are perfectly capable of 
recognising indecency when they are faced by it” (Court 1988, 162). He may have in 
mind something like the following view. Certain acts, such as penile-vaginal and 
penile-anal intercourse, are intuitively sexual, and we do not need an account of 
what it is that makes them sexual. When these are imposed without consent, the 
attack that occurs is sexual (or ‘indecent’). Dempsey and Herring (2007, 470–71) 
interpret the law in this way, arguing that it defines sexual offences as the non-
consensual imposition of certain “physiological action types.” Call this the ‘common-
sense view’. 
However, this view is inadequate. As I have already illustrated, it is simply not clear 
that people can intuitively recognise whether non-consensual touching is sexual or 
not. The cases I have discussed demonstrate disagreement over whether certain 
acts constitute sexual attacks. The common-sense view cannot effectively assist us 
in determining whether a certain instance of non-consensual touching is a sexual 
attack because there is sometimes no settled agreement about whether the contact 
imposed is intuitively sexual or not. 
This view is also ad hoc; it is not clear why these acts should be recognised as 
sexual attacks. For example, any common-sense account would recognise non-
consensual penile-vaginal intercourse, but not punching a person’s stomach, as a 
sexual attack. There must be a reason that one constitutes a sexual attack and the 
other does not, even if it is obvious that this is the case. However, the common-
sense view offers no explanation as to what it means to call these attacks sexual; it 
assumes that individuals will be able to discern whether an attack is sexual by 
appeal to intuition. 
This arbitrariness entails a third problem. Without an explanatory basis of what 
makes an attack sexual, the common-sense view offers no means to adjudicate 
disagreement about which instances of non-consensual touching are indeed sexual. 
Consider the case of a person who strokes another person’s lower leg without their 
consent. Person A believes that intentionally stroking a person’s lower leg without 
their consent constitutes a sexual attack. Person B disagrees, arguing that this is not 
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the sort of contact that can count as a sexual. A and B both subscribe to the 
common-sense view by asserting that this act is either obviously sexual or obviously 
non-sexual. The common-sense view provides no resources that could assist us in 
determining whether A or B has the correct notion of a sexual attack. It takes the 
sexual nature of an attack to be immediately apparent, holding that contact is sexual 
or not sexual as a matter of brute fact. Any attempt to explain why a certain mode 
of non-consensual contact is sexual or not sexual and offer a reason to side with A 
or B on this issue would be a move away from the common-sense view and towards 
a more substantive account. 
The common-sense view fails because it lacks an explanation of what it is for these 
acts to be sexual. It appeals only to intuitions about cases without explaining what it 
means to call an attack ‘sexual’. Of course, any attempt to provide such an 
explanation should be responsive to intuitions about certain cases; part of what we 
seek from such an account is that it is not committed to (too many) counter-intuitive 
claims about whether certain attacks are sexual. The problem with the common-
sense view is that it does not go beyond these intuitions to explain why a certain 
case involves or does not involve a sexual attack, and so cannot offer guidance in 
cases of disagreement. 
In the next two sections, I consider two accounts that seek to offer such an 
explanation, one treating attacks as sexual in virtue of involving a sexual body part 
and one treating attacks as sexual in virtue of the assailant’s mental states. 
 
Section 5.4 – The Body Parts Account 
 
One strategy is to label certain body parts ‘sexual’ and understand sexual attacks as 
non-consensual contact involving a sexual body part. Take Wertheimer’s suggestion: 
[R]ape is violence that is sexual in the straightforward sense that it targets the victim’s sexual 
organs or, as in some cases, the perpetrator uses the victim’s body in ways that involve his31 
sexual organs, as in oral or anal rape (Wertheimer 2003, 91, emphasis in original). 
On Wertheimer’s view, an attack is sexual if and only if it involves a sexual body part 
of at least one party. This account captures aspects of the view advanced by Lord 
Goff (Court) and the judges in Taaffe insofar as the sexual nature of non-consensual 
touching is determined entirely by the physical form of the contact involved and the 
assailant’s motive is irrelevant. It also avoids the arbitrariness of the common-sense 
view. Rather than just asserting that certain forms of physical contact are sexual, it 
                                                          
31 This wording (wrongly) implies that only men can commit rape. I take the spirit of Wertheimer’s 
account to be that an attack is sexual if and only if it involves contact with a sexual body part of the 
assailant and/or victim. 
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seeks to explain what it is that makes such an attack sexual. Moreover, it 
accommodates intuitions about paradigm cases, recognising non-consensual penile-
vaginal intercourse, penile-anal intercourse, and oral-genital contact as rape. 
Nevertheless, this account is flawed. Firstly, non-consensual contact involving a 
sexual body part is not sufficient for rape or sexual assault. J.H. Bogart (1991, 121) 
notes that “the harm of rape does not lie in a physical attack directed at sexual 
organs. A beating which included blows to sex organs would not constitute a form of 
rape.” To kick someone in the genitals is generally recognised as a non-sexual 
assault. According to Wertheimer’s (2003, 91) view, however, such an attack would 
count as rape or sexual assault, because it is “violence…that targets the victim’s 
sexual organs”. This is a problem for the account in question. 
Secondly, sexual assault need not involve any sexual body part of the perpetrator or 
victim. Suppose that one person holds another person’s head and inserts their 
tongue into this person’s mouth, imposing a non-consensual kiss. The body parts 
account would struggle to recognise this as a case of sexual assault because we do 
not generally consider the tongue and mouth to be sexual parts of the body. Unless 
we can identify a sexual body part that is involved here, the account fails to 
recognise this as a sexual attack. 
Relatedly, accommodating attacks that we intuitively recognise as sexual requires 
that we say something about what it means for a body part to be sexual. Consider a 
case in which one person inserts a non-bodily object into the victim’s anus without 
their consent. It is widely accepted that this constitutes a sexual assault (Cahill 2001, 
11; Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 2). According to the body parts account, non-
consensual anal penetration by an object constitutes rape (a sexual attack) because 
it would involve one of the victim’s sexual body parts (their anus). 
However, the body parts account raises as many problems as it solves. Recognising 
the anus as sexual and so identifying a similarity between the anus and other sexual 
body parts (vagina, vulva, clitoris, penis, testes) indicates that Wertheimer then 
requires a definition of ‘sexual body part’, which he does not provide. One plausible 
definition of ‘sexual body part’ would be any body part that contributes to 
reproduction. Wertheimer (2003, 46–60, 80–85, 102–3) would probably prefer this 
definition, given his appeals to evolutionary psychology. However, the anus cannot 
be a sexual body part on this view because it does not contribute to reproduction. 
The same goes for Primoratz’s (1999, 46) definition of ‘sexual body parts’ as those 
“that differentiate the sexes.” Again, the anus cannot be a sexual body part on this 
view because persons have an anus regardless of their sex. It is worth noting that 
Wertheimer himself does not appear to treat the anus as a sexual body part. He 
argues that “anal rape” constitutes rape because it involves the assailant’s “sexual 
organs” (their penis) and does not appeal to the contact involving the victim’s anus 
to categorise this attack as sexual. Without a principled basis on which to recognise 
the anus as a sexual body part, Wertheimer’s account will struggle to accommodate 
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the non-consensual insertion of a non-bodily object into a person’s anus as sexual 
attack. That is, it will not properly justify recognising as sexual some of those attacks 
that are very widely assumed to be sexual. 
This reflects an underlying problem for the account. According to the body parts 
account, determining whether an attack is sexual itself relies on an account of what 
it is for a body part to be sexual. If the body parts account is to succeed, it must 
explain what it is that makes a body part sexual. The account answers the question 
of what it means for an attack to be sexual by replacing it with the equally 
intractable problem of what it is for a body part to be sexual. Rather than solving the 
problem, it merely pushes it back a step. 
Furthermore, providing a viable account of sexual body parts is likely to be 
impossible. Ultimately, the body parts account fails because it assumes that it is 
possible to specify certain body parts as sexual independently of the acts in which 
they are involved. Halwani (2010, 125) argues that “With the exception perhaps of 
penises and vaginas,32 there are no sexual body parts as such; whether a body part 
is sexual depends on what it is doing or what is being done to it.” Soble (1996, 118–
19) claims that “if the hands are being used nonsexually, the hands at that time are 
not functioning as sexual parts, but if they are being used sexually, they have 
become, at that time, sexual parts of the body.” Hands are sexual when they caress 
a person’s genitals, but not when a parent platonically embraces their child; lips and 
tongues are often sexual when persons kiss, but usually not when one is eating; an 
anus is not sexual when a person undergoes a consensual medical rectal 
examination, but it is sexual when one person inserts an object into another person’s 
anus without their consent. The sexual status of a body part depends on its 
involvement in a sexual act or a sexual attack. This explains the tension that arises 
in the cases I raised. It is difficult to offer a definition of ‘sexual body part’ that 
includes the mouth and the anus, because it is not clear what these have in common 
with (other) body parts that we think of as most obviously sexual. At the same time, 
these are sexual in the context of the consensual acts and assaults that I have 
discussed (the non-consensual kiss and the insertion of a non-bodily object into a 
person’s anus). These body parts are sexual in these cases because they are 
involved in a sexual act or targeted in a sexual attack. However, this move is not 
open to a proponent of the body parts account, which holds that we must first 
determine whether a body part is sexual to then determine whether an attack is 
sexual given the involvement of some sexual body part. 
 
 
                                                          
32 Halwani’s inclusion of the vagina rather than the clitoris is peculiar here, but this does not 
undermine the point that he makes.  
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Section 5.5 – The Mental States Account 
 
I will now address a proposal, which I call the mental states account, according to 
which non-consensual touching is sexual if and only if the assailant’s motive is 
sexual. 
As I discussed in Section 1.4, some philosophers define ‘sexual act’, focusing on 
cases of consensual contact, in relation to the mental state of those involved. To 
recap, Goldman (1977, 268) and Primoratz (1999, 46) both define ‘sexual act’ as an 
“activity that tends to fulfil sexual desire”, where ‘sexual desire’ refers to the “desire 
for contact with another person’s body” or “the desire for certain bodily pleasures” 
respectively. Webber (2009, 247) stipulates a distinctive phenomenal quality that our 
experiences of something might have and suggests that any act or desire is sexual if 
it is experienced in this way. 
Suppose that we apply these definitions of ‘sexual act’ to cases of non-consensual 
contact. The mental states account holds that such contact is sexual if and only if 
the assailant experiences it with a sexual mental state, where this could be sexual 
desire, sexual pleasure, or some closely related experience.33 
However, this account is unsuccessful. Firstly, the mental states account is too 
inclusive. Suppose that a sexual sadist punches another person in the stomach 
because they find this act sexually pleasurable (M. Davis 1984, 92). They do not 
perform any verbal utterances, physical movements, or facial expressions to indicate 
that they are motivated by or experience sexual desire. The punch is outwardly 
indistinguishable from a paradigm case of common assault and differs only because 
the assailant has a motive of sexual desire. According to the mental states account, 
this would be a sexual attack because the sadist experiences sexual gratification. I 
expect that many people will find this implication to be at odds with the way in 
which we usually discuss sexual attacks.  As such, an alternative account that 
categorises this as a non-sexual assault would be preferable. 
More worryingly, the account is too narrow. Suppose that one person inserts their 
finger into another person’s vagina without their consent. As in many cases of sexual 
assault, they do this to humiliate or express dominance over the victim, and do not 
have a motive or experience of anything like sexual desire (Seifert 1994, 56). It 
would be troubling to deny that this is a sexual assault (Ormerod 2011, 737; 
Simester et al. 2013, 470; Sullivan 1989, 333–34). However, the mental states 
                                                          
33 Some commentators argue that sexual assault is not sexually motivated (Cahill 2001, 16–27; 
Muehlenhard, Danoff-Burg, and Powch 1998, 628–29; Seifert 1994, 55–56). If sexual assault is never 
sexually motivated, then the mental states account is straightforwardly inadequate, because it would 
not count any attack as sexual. I assume, for the purposes of evaluating it, that assailants sometimes 
experience such attacks as sexual. 
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account would deny that this constitutes sexual assault because the assailant has no 
sexual experience or motive, where this is understood in terms of the accounts I 
have raised.34 
This is especially pressing when we consider sexual violence in the context of war or 
genocide. These attacks are overwhelmingly not motivated by sexual desire 
(Folnegovic-Smalc 1994, 174–75). Instead, perpetrators aim to harm the victims and 
their communities (Allegra 2017; Blatt 1991, 845, 860–62; Folnegovic-Smalc 1994, 
174–75; Herzog 2012, 39; Stiglmayer 1994, 84), weaken community bonds amongst 
those that they attack (Card 1996, 7–10; Seifert 1994, 63), build trust amongst 
those perpetrating the genocide (D. K. Cohen 2013; Herzog 2012, 38–39), and 
demonstrate their own masculinity or power (Herzog 2012, 38; Stiglmayer 1994, 
84). Testimony from captured Serbian soldiers who perpetrated sexual violence 
during the genocide within Bosnia-Herzegovnia indicates that they raped Bosnian 
Muslim women and girls because they were ordered to do so (Card 1996, 10, 16; 
MacKinnon 2007, 223; Stiglmayer 1994, 148–51, 160–61). Their testimony reveals 
that perpetrators lack anything we would recognise as a sexual motive or 
experience. The mental states account recognises attacks as sexual only when the 
assailant experiences sexual gratification and therefore cannot accommodate 
intuitive classifications of violence in conflict. 
This is also reflected in cases of sexual violence in peacetime. Some perpetrators of 
rape claim that they perpetrated the attack as a means of seeking revenge against 
the individual victim, a man close to the victim, or women in general (Black 1983, 
35; Scully and Marolla 1985, 251, 254–57). In at least some cases, the assailant is 
motivated entirely by hostility towards the victim or some other individual or group, 
and experiences no sexual pleasure (Scully and Marolla 1985, 255). The mental 
states account is unable to accommodate these as sexual attacks or non-consensual 
sex because the requisite mental state is not present in these cases. However, these 
attacks are instances of rape, understood as non-consensual sex, and so this reveals 
a flaw in the mental states account. 
The mental states account has these problematic implications because it determines 
whether an attack is sexual by reference to some feature of the assailant’s 
experience. The assailant’s perspective is privileged on this account insofar as an 
attack constitutes a sexual violation only if the assailant experiences the attack in a 
particular way, a dismissal of the victim’s perspective that might be problematic 
independently of its implications for the scope of sexual attacks.35 As Simester et. al 
                                                          
34 Lord Goff raises similar worries about relying on the motive of the assailant in Court (1988, 161). 
35 This suggestion is partly inspired by Catherine MacKinnon’s (1989b, 120) comments on the law of 
rape, specifically her claim that “the standard for its criminality lies in the meaning of the act to the 
assailant”. My criticism of the mental states account here is that the sexual nature of an attack 
depends on what the attack means to the assailant, which overlooks other important considerations. 
123 
 
(2013, 470) note, “The humiliation and distress arises from [rape], regardless of 
whether [the assailant] seeks sexual gratification from his conduct.” That is, whether 
the assailant acts from a motive of sexual gratification or some other motive, we 
would not expect this to significantly change the experience of or harm to the victim. 
It is simply not clear that the assailant’s possession of a sexual or non-sexual motive 
is significant in a way that would justify classifying attacks as sexual or non-sexual 
on that basis. The mental state account goes wrong, I propose, because it grounds 
the sexual nature of an attack solely in the assailant’s perspective of thereof, 
overlooking important considerations such as the victim’s experience and the form of 
the physical contact itself. 
Finally, consider the case of R. v King (2016). The assailant attempted to insert his 
fingers into the victim’s anus. He was reportedly motivated not by a desire for sexual 
gratification, but by misogynist hostility towards women. He was convicted of 
attempted assault by penetration, a sexual attack in law (Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 
2(1)(b)), and this was upheld on appeal. King captures the flaws in both the body 
parts and mental states accounts. If we are to recognise this as a sexual attack, as 
the courts did, then this cannot depend on the mental state of the assailant, which 
was not sexual, or the body parts involved, at least without an account of what it 
means for a body part to be sexual. The sexual nature of an attack must depend on 
something external to the assailant’s perspective, where this cannot consist 
straightforwardly in the involvement of certain body parts. 
 
Section 5.6 – Towards an Account of Sexual Attacks 
 
In this section, I will explain the approach that is required to overcome the problems 
I have identified in competing accounts. I propose that an attack is sexual only if it 
sexualises the victim. An assailant sexualises a victim in the relevant sense when the 
contact that they impose treats the victim as a sexual object. The occurrence of this 
treatment does not depend on the assailant’s motive, but instead on the expressive 
significance of the contact. 
I am guided by testimony of survivors of sexual violence. Some survivors of sexual 
attacks report that their assailant treated them as an object, or as if they are 
valuable only because they are subjected to sexual contact. In a publicised case of 
rape and kidnapping, survivor Elizabeth Smart described her ordeal as one of being 
treated as a “sex object” (Associated Press 2013). In a study by Leslie Lebowitz and 
Susan Roth (1994, 370), Helen, a survivor of sexual violence, reports that rape “is 
somebody using you like a piece of furniture”. Lebowitz and Roth (1994, 370) add 
that “for Helen, being raped was like being used like an object”. Two further 
participants in the study say that being raped led them to identify their value with 
their sexuality, and to view their sexuality as something that could be owned by 
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someone else (Lebowitz and Roth 1994, 372). Generally, Lebowitz and Roth (1994, 
372) note that “Survivors report feelings and interactions with others which suggest 
that female sexuality is frequently conceptualized as a commodity or object.” 
To explain sexualisation in a way that accommodates this testimony, I seek to 
articulate an insight expressed by Bogart: 
What it means to say that rape involves sex is that rape is an attack on a person as a sexual 
being, it is an attack on a person through their sexuality. For that reason, in order for a rape 
to occur, it is necessary for there to be contact with the victim and for that contact to 
implicate the victim’s body as sexualized, even if the contact need not take a definite and 
predetermined form (Bogart 1991, 121). 
My proposal, following Bogart, is that an attack is sexual if and only if it sexualises 
the victim. Bogart does not explain what this means. Cahill (2001, 120, emphasis 
mine) provides some explanation when she claims that “Rape is sexual because it 
uses the sexualized body parts, and the very sexualities, of the victim and the 
assailant as a means to commit physical, psychic, and emotional violence.” I believe 
that Cahill is correct to note that sexual violence is sexual because it sexualises the 
victim and that this involves treating the victim as a means to some end. I propose 
that to sexualise someone is to treat them as a means to sexual gratification. I take 
‘sexual gratification’ to mean the fulfilment of some sexual desire. I will adopt 
Webber’s view of sexual desire, although I believe that competing views, including 
those proposed by Goldman and Primoratz, are consistent with my account. When 
sexualisation occurs as non-consensual bodily contact, the assailant has imposed a 
sexual attack. I will develop the notion of sexualisation in such a way that my 
account remains distinct from the mental states account. 
One strength of this approach is that it maintains a strong conceptual link between 
sexual attacks and sexual objectification, reflecting the testimony from survivors I 
have noted. It also accommodates the claim advanced in many of the accounts that 
I have discussed in previous chapters, that sexual assault treats the victim as an 
object (Gardner and Shute 2007, 16–22; Hampton 1999, 135; McGregor 1994, 235; 
Shafer and Frye 1977, 345). An attack is sexual only if it sexualises the victim, 
treating them as a means to sexual gratification. Numerous theorists view this kind 
of treatment as central to sexual objectification. Martha Nussbaum (1995, 257) 
discusses “Instrumentality”, one person treating another “as a tool of his or her own 
purposes”, as a mode of objectification. Linda LeMoncheck (1985, 35) proposes that 
a necessary condition of sexual objectification is that “A [the objectifier] values B 
[the objectified person]…solely or primarily in terms of B’s instrumental ability to 
sexually attract, stimulate, or satisfy A.” She highlights the phenomenon of one 
person acting as if another person’s most salient feature is their capacity to provide 
sexual gratification. Similarly, MacKinnon (1989a, 329, emphasis mine) argues that 
being “sexually objectified means having a social meaning imposed on your being 
that defines you as to be sexually used, according to your desired uses, and then 
using you that way”, while Sandra Bartky (2008, 54, emphasis mine) claims that “A 
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person is sexually objectified when her sexual parts or sexual functions are 
separated out from the rest of her personality and reduced to the status of mere 
instruments or else regarded as if they were capable of representing her.” These 
theorists each link objectification to treating a person as a means to fulfil sexual 
desire. Sexualisation is similar; one person sexualises another if they treat them as a 
means (or ‘instrument’) to the fulfilment of some sexual desire.36 According to 
numerous conceptions of objectification, sexualisation, particularly without a 
person’s consent, treats the sexualised person as a sex object. 
Sexualisation is a form of objectification that consists in treating a person in a sexual 
manner, and specifically the treatment of a person as a means to sexual 
gratification. This does not mean that one person acts on another with a sexual 
motive. An account that defines ‘sexualisation’ in this way would collapse into the 
mental states account because the presence or absence of sexual desire would 
determine whether the attack is sexual. We have seen that this account fails to 
accommodate cases of sexual violence in which the assailant has no such experience 
or motive, notably those of King, Taaffe, and rape in conflict. While some sexual 
attacks might involve a motive of sexual gratification, they must be sexual in virtue 
of something other than this motive. 
Therefore, a successful account must define ‘sexualisation’ in a way that does not 
rely on the assailant having a sexual motive or experience. In this context, 
sexualisation occurs when one person treats another in a sexual way without 
necessarily acting from a sexual motive. Following Bogart, the assailant sexualises 
the victim in virtue of the form of the contact that they impose. This is how we 
should understand sexualisation when determining whether an attack is sexual. 
Sexualisation can occur in non-consensual and consensual acts, and there is nothing 
necessarily wrong with this when it occurs consensually. My claim is only that when 
it occurs in non-consensual contact, the attack perpetrated is a sexual one. 
In the next section, I explain how sexualisation can occur without a motive of sexual 
gratification by arguing that an act can convey a sexual message. At this juncture, I 
present the following examples of consensual sexualisation by way of motivating the 
view that it is possible to treat someone else in a sexual manner even when one has 
no sexual motive and does not experience sexual desire or pleasure. First, suppose 
that one person briefly squeezes another person’s buttocks while they walk down a 
street together. Neither party sexually desires the act or receives any sexual 
pleasure; perhaps they are a couple expressing intimacy or two heterosexual male 
friends doing this jokingly.37 It nevertheless seems as though there is something 
                                                          
36 I use the term ‘sexualisation’ because ‘sexual objectification’ is often taken to encompass treatment 
beyond treating someone as a means to fulfil some sexual desire (Nussbaum 1995, 257). 
37 This joke would be in poor taste, relying on their shared belief that there is something to be 
mocked in intimate contact between two men. 
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sexual about the way that they treat each other. Indeed, if the contact was in no 
way sexual, the actions of those involved would be unintelligible. The couple who 
squeeze each other’s buttocks only express intimacy by this action insofar as it is 
recognisable as a sexual act, something that it is appropriate to do only in the 
context of a sexual relationship (or explicitly acknowledged mutual sexual 
attraction). Similarly, the heterosexual men who perform this contact jokingly only 
engage in it because they believe that there is something amusing in two men 
engaging in contact that appears in some way sexual. 
Second, suppose that one person inserts a dildo into another person’s anus for the 
purposes of filming pornography for money. Neither experiences any sexual desire 
or gratification. Nevertheless, there is something distinctly sexual about the act. The 
actors have no motive of sexual gratification, but it would be peculiar to claim that 
there is nothing sexual about the contact in which they are involved, or that it is only 
sexual because it might later be viewed by an audience seeking sexual pleasure. It is 
not implausible to suggest that the actors treat each other in a sexual way even 
though they do not interact to experience sexual gratification. 
To summarise my account so far, an attack is sexual if and only if it sexualises the 
victim in the relevant sense. I take ‘sexualisation’ to involve treating a person as a 
sexual object. In this context, sexualisation involves treating a person in a sexual 
way (as a means to sexual gratification) where this does not mean that the agent 
acts from a motive of sexual desire or an intention to fulfil a desire for sexual 
pleasure. In the next section, I show how this is possible. 
My account recognises sexualisation where this does not rely on the assailant having 
a sexual motive, and this is necessary to accommodate the cases that I have 
discussed thus far. An account with these features can accommodate the attacks in 
King and rape in conflict because it holds that the assailant’s motive does not 
determine whether an attack is sexual. Given that the assailant has no sexual motive 
or experience, one can only recognise these attacks as sexual by allowing that an 
assailant can treat the victim in a sexual manner even when they are not motivated 
by a desire for sexual gratification. 
 
Section 5.7 – Sexualisation and Expressive Significance 
 
I have proposed that an attack is sexual if and only if the assailant treats the victim 
as a sexual object, which I call ‘sexualisation’. The relevant form of sexualisation 
cannot depend on the assailant having a sexual motive. Therefore, my account holds 
that it is possible for an assailant to treat someone in a sexual way without seeking 
sexual gratification. MacKinnon (2007, 210) argues that when an assailant 
perpetrates sexual violence, “a specific tool of domination is selected, a distinctive 
127 
 
message and meaning conveyed.” Similarly, Shafer and Frye (1977, 341) claim that 
rape “conveys to [the victim] that she is seen as an object with a sexual function.” 
The claim that sexual violence “conveys” a “distinctive message” offers an insight 
into how an assailant might sexualise a victim even in the absence of a motive of 
sexual gratification. 
In making sense of this, I draw on Barnhill’s notion of default expressive 
significance. Barnhill (2013, 5) argues that interpersonal physical contact often 
conveys certain attitudes, regardless of whether anyone involved actually has the 
relevant attitude, because the contact has a “default expressive significance”. The 
default expressive significance of bodily contact is the attitude that it conveys 
independently of any attitudes held by those who engage in it. A person can engage 
in contact that is expressive of an attitude in virtue of its default expressive 
significance and thereby treat someone in a certain way without having this attitude. 
For example, the default expressive significance of spitting on someone is that the 
agent feels contempt towards the other person (Barnhill 2013, 5). We can recognise 
that spitting on someone conveys or communicates contempt even if we know 
nothing about the feelings of the agent. To spit on someone is to treat them 
contemptuously even if one does not feel contempt towards them. 
Anderson and Pildes (2000, 1567) note that a person might also act with the 
intention of expressing a particular attitude towards another but fail to express this if 
their action does not have the relevant expressive significance. Someone who 
attempts to communicate contempt towards another person by patting them on the 
back or embracing them will fail to express their contempt. Similarly, one person 
who spits on another in an attempt to communicate respect for them will struggle to 
express this attitude (Barnhill 2013, 5). Acting with the motive of expressing a 
certain attitude does not mean that one will succeed in expressing this attitude. The 
attitude conveyed by bodily contact is not straightforwardly determined by the 
agent’s attitudes or intention. 
I propose that bodily contact can have a sexual default expressive significance; 
certain forms of contact are expressive of the agent viewing the other person as a 
means to sexual gratification, and therefore as a sexual object. They convey the 
message that the other person is used or can be used in this way. I use the phrase 
‘sexual default expressive significance’ to capture those instances in which the 
message conveyed is that the other person is a means to sexual gratification or a 
sexual object. 
This is reminiscent of the phenomena of social meaning and expressive content I 
have discussed in earlier chapters. Anderson and Pildes (2000, 1506–8, 1512–13) 
claim that some acts have social meaning or public meaning, and can express or 
convey mental states, including attitudes, desires and beliefs, even where the agent 
does not experience the relevant mental state or even intend to convey it. For 
example, burning a country’s flag conveys anger at the government or one of its 
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policies and playing sad music conveys sorrow (E. S. Anderson and Pildes 2000, 
1506, 1508). Dempsey and Herring (2007, 482) propose that an act has social 
meaning insofar as “it expresses something normatively meaningful” independently 
of the agent’s intentions. When I attribute sexual default expressive significance to 
an act, I claim that the act, in virtue of its physical form, conveys that the agent 
holds a certain attitude, namely that they seek sexual gratification from the person 
on whom or with whom they act, or that they view the other person as appropriately 
used for the purposes of sexual gratification. Hampton (1999, 125, 129, emphasis in 
original) claims that “human behaviour is expressive, and what behaviour expresses 
is partly a matter of cultural convention”, such that this can be “read off of” the 
behaviour itself without appeal to the agent’s intentions or the experience of anyone 
else involved. My discussion of sexual expressive significance is partly a development 
of the accounts of social meaning and expressive content that I discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. My claim here is that there are certain forms of contact that 
convey a sexual attitude towards another person, partly as a result of social 
conventions, independently of any person’s intention or experience. 
One person can sexualise another even if they do not initiate contact for the 
purposes of sexual gratification insofar as the contact carries a sexual default 
expressive significance. For example, when one person squeezes another person’s 
buttocks, this conveys a sexual attitude even if neither party has the relevant 
attitude. This parallels the case of the person who spits on another without intending 
to communicate contempt; in both cases the act conveys an attitude that the agent 
does not harbour or intend to express. In the sexual case, they treat the other 
person as a sexual object by conveying the message that they seek to use them in 
this manner or view them as the kind of entity that may be appropriately acted upon 
for the purposes of sexual gratification, even if they do not in fact engage in the act 
for in pursuit of some sexual desire. 
Equally, certain sexually-motivated acts can fail to convey a sexual attitude when the 
contact does not have sexual default expressive significance. These cases parallel 
that of the person who attempts to express contempt by an embrace; the agent 
attempts to express a certain attitude but fails to do so because the contact they 
initiate lacks the relevant expressive significance. For example, the sadist punching a 
person’s stomach (consensually or otherwise) does not convey a sexual attitude 
because this form of contact is not recognised within the relevant community of 
interpreters as conveying that the other person is a means to sexual gratification. 
This clarifies sexualisation as it pertains to sexual attacks. When an assailant non-
consensually imposes onto the victim a form of contact with sexual default 
expressive significance, they treat them as a sexual object insofar as this contact 
conveys the message that the victim is a means to sexual gratification and can be 
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used in this way.38 Following MacKinnon’s terminology and Smart’s testimony, the 
distinctive message conveyed by sexual attacks is that the victim is a sexual object. 
The notion of default expressive significance explains how sexual attacks can convey 
this message without appeal to the assailant’s motive. The motive of the agent does 
not determine whether the contact carries a sexual default expressive significance. 
An attack is sexual if and only if the contact carries a default expressive significance 
that the victim is a sexual object. 
This raises the question of how forms of contact acquire sexual default expressive 
significance. A plausible suggestion is that they acquire this expressive significance 
when people typically engage in this form of contact with the motive of fulfilling a 
sexual desire. When such contact predominantly occurs for the purposes of sexual 
gratification, people within that culture come to perceive a link between the form of 
the contact and sexual desire or gratification. Certain forms of contact then convey 
the message that the assailant views the victim as a sexual object, someone who 
may be used for sexual gratification. 
The following example may help to illustrate this process. Choking a person’s neck is 
not generally recognised as sexual contact in the absence of contextual cues to this 
effect. According to the view I propose, this is because people do not choke each 
other primarily for sexual purposes, and so choking has not acquired a sexual default 
expressive significance. However, if consensual choking for sexual pleasure 
continues to become more prominent, there may come a time when one person 
choking another is recognised by default as sexual contact even if we know nothing 
about why they engage in the act, at least when certain contextual cues pertain. In 
certain contexts, choking would come to communicate that the agent seeks sexual 
gratification through contact with the other person. To foreshadow the final step in 
my account, non-consensual choking would then constitute sexual assault. Insofar 
as choking in the relevant context would convey that the assailant views the victim 
as a means to sexual gratification, the assailant would treat the victim as a sexual 
object in the course of this attack. 
This framework can explain the sexual element in the cases of consensual contact I 
have discussed. The two people who squeeze each other’s buttocks engage in a 
form of contact with a sexual default expressive significance. In many societies, this 
is recognised as conveying sexual desire for the other person or for acts that might 
proceed and conveying that one person views that other as an appropriate means to 
sexual gratification. People often squeeze each other’s buttocks when they sexually 
desire this contact, so it is unsurprising that this form of contact has come to convey 
                                                          
38 There are a range of further attitudes that non-consensual sexual contact can also communicate, 
such as misogyny, racism, contempt, a desire to dominate, and so on. I focus on the assailant’s 
treatment of the victim as a means to sexual gratification because I believe that this distinguishes 
sexual attacks from non-sexual attacks. 
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that they desire sexual gratification through contact with the other person even 
when they do not. Equally, the pornographic actors treat each other in a sexual 
manner without seeking sexual gratification because the insertion of an object into 
another person’s anus outside of medical contexts conveys sexual desire for the 
contact itself or for the other person and that one views the other person as an 
appropriate means through which to secure sexual gratification. Again, this is 
unsurprising. This kind of contact predominantly occurs for sexual gratification, and 
so it has acquired this expressive significance even when it does not occur for this 
purpose. The people in these cases sexualise each other because the form of 
contact conveys by default the message that they seek to fulfil some sexual desire. 
The notion of sexual default expressive significance grounds the possibility of 
treating a person as a sexual object without acting towards them with a sexual 
motive, accommodating sexual attacks that do not involve any sexual motive. It 
provides an insight into MacKinnon’s (2007, 210) claim that the assailant conveys a 
“distinctive message”, and holds that the message conveyed by the assailant is that 
the victim is a sexual object. Plausibly, forms of contact acquire a sexual default 
expressive significance when people generally engage in them for sexual 
gratification. An attack is sexual when it sexualises the victim in this way. 
Paradigm cases of rape and sexual assault, such as non-consensual penile-vaginal 
intercourse, penile-anal intercourse, oral-genital contact, and the groping of a 
person’s buttocks or breasts all constitute sexual attacks on my account because 
each of these involves a form of contact with a sexual default expressive 
significance. Consider a case of penile-vaginal rape perpetrated by a man against a 
woman. He treats her as a means to sexual gratification, regardless of whether 
sexual gratification plays any role in his decision to attack, because the assault 
conveys the message that he views her as a sexual object. Penile-vaginal 
penetration has acquired a sexual default expressive significance, and therefore 
communicates that one person seeks sexual gratification through contact with the 
other regardless of the actual intentions or attitudes they hold. The non-consensual 
imposition of this form of contact therefore constitutes an attack in which the 
assailant sexualises the victim. 
My account also accommodates cases that Wertheimer’s account and the mental 
states account cannot, such as the attack attempted in King. The insertion of a 
finger into a person’s anus carries a sexual default expressive significance. When it 
occurs outside of medical contexts and with the consent of both parties, it conveys 
that each person views the other as a sexual object. Plausibly, this is because anal 
penetration predominantly occurs in pursuit of sexual pleasure. When this form of 
contact is imposed without consent, it conveys that the assailant views the victim as 
an object for the purposes of sexual gratification, even when they do not in fact act 
with this purpose. As such, the assailant sexualises the victim in virtue of the non-
consensual contact itself even in the absence of any sexual motive or the 
involvement of straightforwardly sexual body parts. 
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Section 5.8 – Potential Objections 
 
In this section, I consider potential objections to my account. First, I have 
concentrated on non-consensual bodily contact, and one might therefore be 
concerned that my account does not apply to non-consensual impositions without 
bodily contact, such as exhibitionism, voyeurism, and sexually explicit comments. 
This is not a problem for my account, which applies quite straightforwardly to 
attacks that do not involve bodily contact. An attack is sexual when the contact has 
a sexual default expressive significance and thereby sexualises the victim. There is 
no reason that this cannot apply to sexual impositions or attacks that do not involve 
bodily contact. For example, non-consensual voyeurism constitutes a sexual attack 
because watching someone while they are in a state of undress or engaged in a 
sexual act is widely recognised as aimed at sexual gratification. It therefore acquires 
a sexual default expressive significance in much the same way as do certain forms of 
bodily contact. Watching someone in this manner without their consent conveys the 
message that they are an object for sexual gratification, and non-consensual 
voyeurism therefore meets my definition of a sexual attack. Exhibitionism (‘flashing’) 
is also a sexual attack. Overwhelmingly, persons who expose themselves to another 
person in this way do so for sexual gratification or as a precursor to acts that are 
themselves sexually gratifying. Exposing oneself in this way to another person 
thereby acquires a sexual default expressive significance. The non-consensual 
commission of this act constitutes a sexual attack because it is the imposition of an 
act that carries a sexual default expressive significance and therefore conveys the 
message that the victim is a sexual object. 
Second, it might be objected that my account raises difficulties for assigning moral 
responsibility and legal culpability to the assailant for some sexual attacks. An attack 
can convey a sexual default expressive significance even when the assailant does 
not intend to convey the relevant message. An assailant could commit a sexual 
attack without realising that the mode of contact that they impose carries this sexual 
significance, and therefore perpetrate a sexual assault without intending to.39 They 
would be straightforwardly responsible for committing a common assault, but it is 
more difficult to determine their responsibility for committing a sexual attack. 
However, this concern is not specific to my account. There are real-world cases in 
which the assignment of responsibility raises difficult philosophical issues. Consider 
again the practice, which I discussed in Section 2.2, whereby medical students were 
directed by medical staff to perform pelvic (vaginal) examinations on anaesthetized 
                                                          
39 This problem arises in any case in which an act depends on some contingent social norm. The 
perpetrator may simply be unaware that their act conveys the relevant message (E. S. Anderson and 
Pildes 2000, 1512–13, 1524; Blackburn 2001, 468–69; Dempsey and Herring 2007, 483). 
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patients solely for educational purposes and without specific consent (Bibby et al. 
1988; Coldicott, Pope, and Roberts 2003; Schniederjan and Donovan 2005; Rees 
and Monrouxe 2011). Patients object strongly to this practice, and many recognise it 
as sexual assault (Bibby et al. 1988; D. S. Davis 2003; Schniederjan and Donovan 
2005). However, in many cases the medical personnel have not recognised any 
wrongdoing in this practice, and would certainly not have characterised it as a sexual 
violation (Barnes 2012; D. S. Davis 2003; Rees and Monrouxe 2011, 269; 
Schniederjan and Donovan 2005; Ubel, Jepson, and Silver-Isenstadt 2003, 578). 
Assuming that non-consensual examinations are sexual attacks, the medical staff 
and students involved have perpetrated a sexual attack without knowing this, raising 
difficult questions about the moral responsibility and legal liability of the medical 
personnel involved. These problems arise because there are impositions that are 
properly recognised as sexual attacks in which the assailants do not view their 
conduct as a sexual attack. 
A similar problem arises in discussions of consent. Tom Dougherty (2013, 717–22) 
and Herring (2005, 2007) argue that deception undermines consent to sexual 
contact when the consenting party would not have consented to the contact if they 
had not been so deceived. Dougherty (2013, 221) acknowledges that this position is 
contrary to popular intuitions, a claim reflected in legal precedent (The Queen v 
Barrow 1865-1872; R. v Linekar 1995) and academic writing (Gross 2007). If 
Dougherty and Herring are correct, this allows for cases in which a person commits 
a sexual attack without intending to or even knowing that they have done so. 
Suppose an individual believes that some forms of deception do not undermine 
consent to sexual contact, and they deceive another person into agreeing to sexual 
contact (by falsely promising to pay them, lying about their job, and so on). The 
assailant does not know that they have perpetrated a sexual attack because they do 
not know that their deception has undermined the other person’s consent. On 
Dougherty and Herring’s views, they have committed a sexual attack without 
realising, which raises a range of issues for how we should assign moral 
responsibility for the attack. 
While there is any disagreement over the nature of sexual offences or consent, it is 
possible that an assailant could impose a sexual attack without knowing that the 
attack is sexual. That my account allows for this possibility is not a problem for this 
account specifically. 
Third, a critic might charge that my account makes the sexual status of an attack 
relative to the cultural context. The sexual default expressive significance of a form 
of contact depends on recognition within society that the form of the contact occurs 
predominantly for sexual gratification. The same form of contact might therefore 
carry a sexual default expressive significance in one culture but not another. On my 
account, it would follow that the same attack could constitute sexual assault in one 
cultural context and a non-sexual assault in another. 
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This is not an insurmountable problem. The sexual status of an attack relies on the 
cultural context, but it does not follow that its sexual status is relative to a culture or 
differs between cultural contexts. It is likely that all cultures will recognise most of 
the same kinds of contact as conveying the relevant message and therefore 
recognise the same set of attacks as sexual. Given general cross-cultural facts about 
the biological composition of human persons and the sensitivity of certain body parts 
to certain forms of contact, these forms of contact come to be recognised as 
conveying a sexual message in any cultural context. Therefore, it is unlikely that a 
cultural context could develop that does not assign a sexual default expressive 
significance to certain forms of contact (such as penile-vaginal intercourse and oral-
genital contact) when these occur. Most attacks that are sexual in one culture will be 
sexual in all others. Equally, the sexual status of an attack is relative only to those 
forms of contact that society recognises as sexual gratifying in consensual contexts 
and cannot be changed by the choice of any individual or group of individuals. 
Nevertheless, the development of sexual default expressive significance cannot 
always be traced to the biological sensitivity of certain body parts to certain kinds of 
contact. For example, kissing a person on the mouth has been perceived as both 
sexual and non-sexual in different cultures (E. Anderson, Adams, and Rivers 2012; 
Burton 2014). 
My account therefore retains some cultural relativism regarding sexual attacks, but 
some relativism is beneficial. Consider that in Regency and Victorian England, a 
woman’s ankle might have been considered a sexually explicit part of her body.40 
This impacts the expressive significance of contact involving a woman’s ankle. On 
my account, some impositions, such as lifting a woman’s clothing to reveal her ankle 
or compelling someone to touch one’s own ankle, would constitute sexual attacks in 
Regency or Victorian England but not in present-day England.41 This is as it should 
be. The attitudes towards women’s ankles in Regency and Victorian England 
substantially change the nature, ethical implications, and victim’s experience of non-
consensual contact involving a woman’s ankle, so it is not a problem if my account 
entails that these impositions are sexual attacks in some cultural contexts and not 
others. Where my account entails some cultural relativism regarding which attacks 
are sexual, we should view this as enabling sensitivity to meaningful cultural 
differences and not as a problem. 
 
                                                          
40 It is not clear whether women’s ankles were in fact viewed this way, although the following 
comment by Richard Steele (1714, 196, emphasis mine) provides some evidence: “We who follow 
Plato…can see a Lady’s Ankle with as much Indifference as her Wrist: We are so inwardly taken up 
that the Same ideas do not spring in our Imaginations, as do with the common World.” I found this 
quote through the work of Behind the Times (2011). 
41 I am indebted to Alison Toop for this example. 
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Section 5.9 – Concluding Remarks to Chapter 5 
 
Although it underpins our discussion of sexual violence, it is difficult to ascertain 
what it is that makes an attack sexual. While we recognise rape and sexual assault 
as morally abhorrent attacks that are importantly distinct from other kinds of assault, 
there has been little investigation into exactly what it is that makes an attack sexual, 
and what differentiates such violations from a host of other ways in which an 
individual might touch someone without their consent. 
Existing accounts are unsuccessful. The common-sense view, that some kinds of 
contact are obviously sexual and the non-consensual imposition of these constitutes 
a sexual attack, does not adequately explain what it is for an attack to be sexual. 
While the body parts and mental states accounts offer more theoretically robust 
explanations of what it means to say that an attack is sexual, a range of counter-
examples demonstrate that they do not capture what we mean when we say that an 
attack is sexual. 
I have proposed that we can nevertheless make sense of this. Certain attacks 
sexualise the victim, treating them as a sexual object. In these cases, the assailant 
treats the victim in a sexual manner by conveying the message that the victim is a 
means, or appropriately used as a means, to sexual gratification. This does not 
require that the assailant seeks sexual gratification. Instead, an attack sexualises the 
victim in virtue of the contact itself. I have proposed that it does so when the 
contact conveys a “distinctive message”, following MacKinnon (2007, 210). Physical 
contact can convey a message or attitude independently of the assailant’s motive 
when it has default expressive significance, a notion developed by Barnhill. Contact 
carries sexual default expressive significance when it conveys that the agent views 
the other person as someone who may be used as a means to sexual gratification. 
Therefore, an assailant sexualises the victim when they impose without consent a 
form of contact that carries sexual default expressive significance. The presence of 
this form of sexualisation determines whether an attack is sexual. Plausibly, forms of 
contact acquire sexual expressive significance in virtue of being commonly engaged 
in for the purposes of sexual gratification and thereby being recognised as 
expressive of this motive. 
In Chapter 6, I will offer my account of the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks. In 
the present chapter, I hope to have identified what it means for non-consensual 
contact to be sexual. Plausibly, if sexual attacks involve a distinct wrong, this must 
consist in the features of such attacks that distinguish them conceptually from non-
sexual attacks, as these are the only relevant candidates for morally salient features 
that are necessarily present in all sexual attacks and absent in non-sexual attacks. 
My strategy to explain the distinct wrong of sexual attacks is therefore to begin with 
my account of what a sexual attack is and to argue that this is morally significant. In 
this chapter, I have proposed my account of what it is for an attack to be sexual. In 
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Chapter 6, I propose an account of why this is morally significant by way of arguing 
that sexual attacks involve a distinct wrong against the victim. 
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Chapter 6 
The Distinct Wrong of Sexual Attacks: A Proposal 
 
Section 6.1 – Introduction to Chapter 6 
 
In this chapter, I offer my own account of the distinct wrong of sexual attacks. I 
propose that sexual attacks can be morally distinguished on the basis of their default 
expressive significance. I argue that consensual sex conveys by default a desire or 
willingness to provide the other person with sexual gratification. The assailant 
exploits this in sexual attacks, conveying by the attack the extremely cruel message 
that the victim is somehow complicit in the violation of their self-ownership claims. 
In Section 6.2, I set out the resources that we might usefully employ in an account 
of the wrongness of sexual offences. In Sections 6.3 and 6.4, I set out the 
framework for my account, examining how the expressive significance of sexual 
contact might explain how sexual attacks objectify the victim. In Section 6.5, I offer 
a proposal for the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks, applying my framework to 
an expressive significance that I think is widely attributed to sexual contact. In 
Section 6.6, I show how my account avoids the flaws that I have identified in other 
accounts and discuss some remaining problems. 
 
Section 6.2 – Existing Accounts and Useful Resources 
 
In this section, I summarise and develop those concepts from the literature that 
offer an instructive insight into the wrongness of sexual attacks. In Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4, I examined accounts of the wrongness of sexual violence that I take to be 
unsuccessful, or else in need of elaboration and further defence. Gardner and Shute 
claim that, in rape, the assailant’s objectification of the victim is extreme because 
they subvert the social meaning of consensual sex as a union of two selves; I argued 
that their formulation of the social meaning of consensual sex is unstable and 
inaccurate and suggested that they do not fully explain how the social meaning of 
consensual sex can be subverted to affect the wrongness of non-consensual sex. 
McGregor, Shafer and Frye, Murphy, Hampton, and Archard each propose that rape 
is seriously wrong because sex is central or important to every person’s identity; I 
responded that there is no available interpretation of what it is for something to be 
central to a person’s identity that positions sex as central in this way for all persons 
and explains why rape is therefore distinctly wrongful. Numerous theorists, including 
Dripps, Posner, Wald, and Wall argue that rape is seriously wrong given the manner 
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in which it violates the victim’s self-ownership claims; I objected that this is not 
sufficient to explain the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks, even if the violation of 
the victim’s self-ownership claims takes a necessary explanatory role here. 
One way to understand the flaw in each of these accounts is that they do not offer a 
viable and sustainable explanation of what it is that makes sex special. Their 
strategy is to explain the special wrongness of non-consensual sexual contact by 
appeal to some feature of sex that distinguishes it from most other human activities 
and experiences. For each of these accounts, I suggest that what is lacking is a 
viable, sustainable, and sufficiently wide-ranging explanation of what makes sex 
special in the (morally) relevant sense. To meet the traditionalist’s challenge, 
Gardner and Shute require an account of the social meaning of consensual sex that 
is very positive, applies to all forms of sexual contact, and is unique to sexual 
contact. In the absence of this social meaning, they cannot explain how the 
profoundly positive social meaning of consensual sex is subverted in every act of 
rape, such that the victim is objectified more severely than in non-sexual assault. 
Those theorists who discuss rape as an attack on something central to a person’s 
identity must explain what it means for something to be central to a person’s 
identity such that a person’s sexual desires or history is central to each person’s 
identity and attacking something central to a person’s identity exacerbates the 
wrong committed against them. Similarly, self-ownership accounts rely on an 
explanation of why sexual violations of self-ownership claims are prima facie more 
serious than non-sexual violations of these claims. Each of these accounts, to 
varying degrees, explains the distinct wrong of sexual violence by establishing that 
there is something special about consensual sex or sexual contact. While I have 
raised some problems for these evaluations of wrongdoing more generally, each 
account ultimately fails because it does not establish that there is something distinct 
about sexual contact that could explain the serious wrongness of a sexual attack. 
The notion of expressive significance likely plays an important role in understanding 
the wrongness of sexual violence. In this context, this is the idea that non-
consensual physical contact can convey messages or attitudes about the victim’s 
worth, about the proper role of the victim, and about how the victim might 
appropriately be treated. This is prominent in Hampton’s (1999, 135) account of the 
wrongness of rape; she argues that rape conveys the messages that the victim is an 
object of the rapist and that women are properly treated as property by men. Shafer 
and Frye raise a similar idea. They argue that rape “conveys to her [the victim] that 
she is seen as an object with a sexual function” (Shafer and Frye 1977, 340). 
Gardner and Shute (2007, 22) claim that non-consensual sexual penetration can 
“come to represent a paradigm of subject-object relations.” Accordingly, they argue 
that rape has a particularly stark “social meaning” that the victim is an object, and 
rape is therefore best understood as “the sheer use of the person raped” (Gardner 
and Shute 2007, 22–25). That is, Gardner and Shute claim that non-consensual 
sexual penetration carries a social meaning; it conveys that the victim is an object. 
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I have accommodated the motivation behind some of these claims in developing the 
concept of sexualisation. In Sections 5.6 and 5.7, I proposed a form of sexualisation 
in which one person treats the other as a sexual object, that is, as a means to sexual 
gratification. I proposed that bodily contact can carry a default expressive 
significance such that it conveys the message that the victim is a sexual object and 
appropriately used for sexual gratification. On my account, non-consensual contact is 
sexual when the form of the contact carries this sexual expressive significance. Such 
offences treat the victim as an object because they convey by this expressive 
significance that the victim is a sexual object and that they are appropriately used 
for sexual gratification. 
Moreover, I have argued that sexual default expressive significance is not only a 
feature that might explain the serious wrongness of such offences, but that an 
attack or offence is sexual in virtue of instantiating this feature. The presence of this 
expressive significance determines what it is for an attack to be sexual. If my 
account of (the definition of) sexual attacks succeeds, then this feature is present in 
all and only those attacks that are sexual. If I can explain how sexual default 
expressive significance exacerbates the wrongness of a non-consensual imposition, 
then this will provide an explanation of exactly why sexual attacks are distinctively 
wrongful. I will therefore develop and examine the moral implications of the notion 
of sexual default expressive significance that I have proposed. 
Hampton’s notion of a moral injury is also instructive. To recap, Hampton (1999, 
131–32) claims that a moral injury is the denial of a person’s value that occurs when 
their entitlements are disrespected and violated. Hampton’s account of moral injury 
illustrates how the expressive significance of sexual attacks grounds or exacerbates 
their wrongness. Insofar as these attacks convey such attitudes or claims about the 
victim and the victim relative to the assailant, they deny the victim’s value and 
violate claims generated by this value. These attacks convey that the victim is 
inferior, an object or tool, rather than a person of equal worth. Given the expressive 
significance of sexual attacks, they attack the dignity of the victim. 
I have argued that Hampton’s account does not establish the wrongness of sexual 
violence as distinct from non-sexual violence. She argues that the moral injury 
inherent in rape is particularly severe because a person’s humanity is deeply 
connected to and engaged in sexual activity (Hampton 1999, 147, 149, 151). On her 
view, the claim that rape is distinctly wrongful relies on a conception of sex as 
central to the self. I have argued that it is therefore incomplete for the same reason 
as other accounts according to which sex is central to the self, such as those 
advanced by McGregor (1994) and Shafer and Frye (1977). Nevertheless, none of 
this is a problem for her conception of moral injury. I will draw on her claim that the 
expressive significance of contact can wrong a person in virtue of what the contact 
conveys about the person’s status. My response to the traditionalist’s challenge will 
appeal to a conception of the expressive significance and moral injury of sexual 
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attacks, which does not itself rely on claims about the centrality of sex to a person’s 
identity. 
Theorists also consider sexual attacks as violations of claims that persons have over 
their own body. McGregor (1994, 233) and Shafer and Frye (1977, 338–40) discuss 
this in the terminology of a person’s “domain”. According to these accounts, sexual 
violence wrongs the victim in part because the assailant intrudes into the victim’s 
domain, denying their claims over this. Similar ideas arise in self-ownership accounts 
of sexual violence. Dripps (1992, 1993), Posner (1993), Wald (1997), and Wall 
(2015) each argue that sexual violence wrongs the victim because it violates their 
self-ownership claims, where these are the claims that a person has over their body, 
specifically of exclusive access and control. Sexual violence, like other non-
consensual bodily contact, violates these claims by imposing contact onto a person 
to which they have not consented. 
The proposal that a person has claims to exclusive access and control over their own 
body (and perhaps certain aspects of their surroundings) offers a useful explanatory 
resource for this project, for reasons that I advanced in Chapter 4. First, it captures 
a morally salient aspect of sexual offences, one that is likely to affect the 
experiences and suffering of the victim. Sexual offences involve an attack or 
imposition onto the victim’s body. Like many of the most serious wrongs, sexual 
offences attack the person themselves, rather than a possession of theirs or some 
other entity. Second, an appeal to the stringent claims that a person has over their 
own body grounds and justifies the privileging of negative sexual autonomy over 
positive sexual autonomy in cases where these might be said to conflict. 
 
Section 6.3 – The Approach of my Account 
 
Building on these ideas, I propose a framework for an account, which I develop in 
the next section. In Chapter 5, I offered an account of what it is for an attack to be 
sexual. In the next three sections, I offer an account of the wrongness of sexual 
attacks. 
Like other attacks, non-consensual sexual contact wrongs the victim in part because 
it violates their self-ownership claims over their own body. It wrongs the victim by 
violating an important entitlement. As attacks targeting the victim’s body, they can 
be understood as direct attacks on the victim themselves. This is an aspect of the 
account that I advance, as I explain later. 
I have argued that an attack is sexual insofar as it involves a particular default 
expressive significance; these attacks convey that the assailant views the victim as 
an object, or a tool to be utilised for the assailant’s purposes. All sexual attacks 
objectify the victim insofar as they convey these claims or attitudes about them. A 
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promising way to understand the wrong of sexual attacks, then, is that they objectify 
the victim and treat the victim as a tool for the assailant’s sexual gratification, 
regardless of whether the assailant in fact aims for or experiences this. The distinct 
wrongness of sexual attacks is explained by the assailant’s objectification of the 
victim, which is itself explained by the expressive significance of the non-consensual 
contact that constitutes the attack. 
This aspect of my account bears similarities to Gardner and Shute and Hampton’s 
views on rape. It also accommodates a claim, which is frequently raised in the 
literature but rarely developed in significant depth, that sexual attacks wrong the 
victim in part because the assailant compels the victim to serve the assailant’s ends; 
the victim not only has their bodily integrity violated and their person attacked, they 
are hijacked unwillingly for the assailant’s purposes. On my account, the 
objectification (and more specifically, the sexualisation) of the victim in sexual 
attacks consists in the assailant conveying the message that the victim is a tool for 
the assailant’s purposes. It is embedded in my account of the nature of sexual 
attacks that the assailant goes beyond attacking the victim’s body and uses the 
victim for the assailant’s own purposes. 
These observations get us some of the way towards an explanation. In particular, it 
is a morally significant feature of sexual attacks that they convey not only that the 
victim lacks claims against non-consensual contact over their person, but that the 
victim is appropriately used as a tool for the assailant in the assailant’s pursuit of 
their own ends. Many acts of violence are such that the assailant views the victim as 
an obstacle to their goal, and attacks them to achieve this goal, when they could 
have achieved their goal just as effectively if they had never acted on the victim. 
Sexual attacks are different insofar as they at least convey the message that the 
assailant experiences sexual gratification in the violence perpetrated. That is, the 
assailant conveys that the violation of and use of the victim is an essential 
component of the assailant’s goal and motivation. 
The expressive significance of sexual attacks exacerbates the wrongness of these 
violations. To adopt the terminology employed by Anderson and Pildes (2000, 1527–
30), sexual attacks impose an “expressive harm” onto the victim.  They claim that a 
person suffers an expressive harm when an individual or group acts in a manner that 
conveys a “negative or inappropriate attitudes towards her” (E. S. Anderson and 
Pildes 2000, 1527). Importantly, they argue that a person is harmed when another 
individual acts towards them in a way that conveys an unfavourable attitude about 
them. The message conveyed by the assailant’s conduct in a sexual attack is that 
the victim is a sexual object and appropriately used as a tool by the assailant; as 
such, they convey that the victim is inferior in value to the assailant. Sexual attacks 
meet Anderson and Pildes’s condition for expressive harm; the assailant conveys a 
negative message about the victim’s status and the victim’s claims to be treated and 
not treated in certain ways. 
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This approach is similar to that which Hampton (1999, 126–35) advances with her 
conception of moral injury. While I endorse her claim that sexual violence wrongs 
the victim by conveying the message that the victim is inferior to the assailant and 
constitutes an attack on the victim’s equal status, I believe that my approach goes 
further. First, I do not rely on the claim that sex is central to a person’s identity to 
explain why the expressive harm inherent in a sexual attack is especially 
condemnable. Second, I have elaborated on the expressive significance of sexual 
attacks itself. Sexual attacks convey not only a message of the superiority of the 
assailant or that the victim lacks important normative claims over their person, as 
almost any attack might convey; their expressive significance is also such that the 
assailant conveys that the victim is an object for explicitly sexual purposes. The 
views found in Hampton’s work, and to a lesser extent in Shafer and Frye’s 
discussion, that sexual attacks convey that the victim is superior and that the victim 
lacks claims against abuse, follow from my own conception of the expressive 
significance of sexual attacks. However, my account goes further in specifying the 
expressive significance of these attacks and identifying what it is that makes the 
message conveyed sexual and how this is distinct from the messages that are 
generally conveyed by non-sexual attacks. 
The notion of expressive harm is drawn from different accounts, and I will say 
something here about how I utilise it in my own proposal for understanding the 
wrongness of sexual attacks. Blackburn offers a compelling account of the wrong 
perpetrated in unjustified expressive harm. He claims that these harms constitute 
“something like a diminution of status” (Blackburn 2001, 470). The victim of an 
unjustified expressive harm is wronged because they are treated as if they are not 
an equal person with the moral claims that this entails, and instead as a being who 
is inferior and lacks the claims to which they are properly entitled. Blackburn’s view 
echoes Hampton’s (1999, 135) account here. Unjustified expressive harm wrongs 
the victim because the assailant thereby conveys a denial that the victim is an equal 
person with corresponding rights and claims. Plausibly, expressive harms wrong the 
victim because they set back the victim’s interest against acts that convey disrespect 
towards them. Alternatively, it might be that acts with expressive significance that 
convey a negative message about a person without justification wrong the victim 
because they disparage and disregard the victim’s status, regardless of whether we 
posit an interest in avoiding such disparagement. The wrong perpetrated by acts 
with a degrading expressive significance towards the victim might consist in a 
violation of the victim’s status rather than a wrongful setback to their interest. I will 
remain neutral on this question. 
When I claim that sexual attacks are seriously wrongful because they carry a sexual 
expressive significance, I do not mean to suggest that the content of the expressive 
significance or the severity of the injury to a person’s status is equal across all sexual 
attacks nor that we can treat the expressive significance as entirely separate from 
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the other features of the attack that exacerbate it’s wrongness, such as the 
invasiveness of the bodily intrusion or the physical pain caused. 
Sexual attacks convey that the victim is a sexual object, that they are used and 
appropriately acted upon for the purposes of sexual gratification. They also convey 
that the victim lacks claims over their person or that these claims may legitimately 
be violated. This allows for significant diversity in the ways in which a person can be 
treated as a sexual object and in the self-ownership claims that are violated in 
sexual attacks. 
Consider the following two examples of wrongful non-sexual acts with radically 
different expressive significance. First, 
Suppose some neighbours cavalierly toss their beer bottles onto your lawn. The ugliness of 
the litter and the inconvenience of picking it up are burdens, but they are not expressive 
harms. The expressive harm is in the neighbours’ rudeness, the casual disregard for your 
interests expressed in their actions (E. S. Anderson and Pildes 2000, 1527, emphasis in 
original). 
Second, Hampton (1999, 129) relays an event relayed by Bill T. Jones, about a white 
farmer and a black farmhand. In response to a perceived slight, the farmer hung the 
farmhand and his sons in burlap bags from a tree and set them on fire. In defiance, 
one of the men asked him for a cigarette. The white farmer used a knife to cut off 
the man’s penis and shoved it in his mouth. 
The second case is far more harmful than the first to the extent that substantive 
comparisons between the two may verge on poor taste. It is extremely invasive, 
painful, and injurious, whereas the harm of the former consists in mild 
inconvenience. The expressive significance of each act is also profoundly different. 
While the littering conveys disrespect and a lack of consideration towards the 
litterer’s neighbour, the attack in Jones’s story conveys a total disregard for the 
humanity and worth of the victims. It also conveys that the victims are comparable 
to “a burning pile of trash”, that they are inferior on the basis of their race (by 
invoking imagery of lynching in hanging them on a tree), and that at least one of 
them is not really a man (by castrating him) (Hampton 1999, 129). The littering case 
conveys only that the neighbour’s comfort and convenience is unimportant and that 
the litterer is superior to their neighbour only to the extent that they might infringe 
some minor claims of their neighbour when this is convenient for them. The attacks 
in Jones’s story convey that the victims are so worthless that they may appropriately 
be destroyed in a manner that causes them extreme pain, and that their bodies may 
be violently cut apart. Where the littering case involves a disregard for some of the 
victim’s claims, the racist attack conveys a total disregard for or denial of all of the 
victims’ claims and a complete denial of their value. 
I raise these cases to demonstrate the complexity of expressive significance. While 
Jones’s story depicts an attack with a much more complex multiplicity of social 
meanings, the acts in both cases convey a disregard for the interests of the victims 
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and a denial of their status as equal persons. As I have documented, the way in 
which this expressive significance manifests and operates is profoundly different 
between the cases. Insofar as it is even possible to identify an expressive 
significance that is common to both cases, the nature and severity of this differs 
greatly. Identifying that two acts involve an expressive significance that can be 
minimally described in the same way allows for profound differences in how this 
significance operates between the two acts. There is a sense in which it is true that 
the littering case and the murder case both convey a disrespect of the victims and 
disregard of their claims, but the nature and extent of the expressive significance is 
radically different. 
Analogously, my suggestion that the distinct wrongness of all sexual attacks is 
grounded by the sexual default expressive significance of the contact imposed allows 
for very significant differences between sexual attacks. For instance, I claim that 
non-consensual penile-vaginal intercourse and the non-consensual groping of a 
person’s buttocks are both sexual attacks. This entails only a very minimal similarity 
between these attacks and allows for important differences in their expressive 
significance. Some sexual attacks convey that the victim is a sexual object to the 
extent that they do not have any claims against violence from others, while others 
might not convey this. More invasive assaults convey that the victim might 
permissibly have the entirety of their body co-opted for the gratification of the 
assailant, while less invasive sexual assaults may not. I do not attempt to offer a 
taxonomy of more or less wrongful forms of sexual assault. I wish to show only that 
recognising sexual attacks as seriously wrongful on the basis of a particular 
expressive significance does not entail that they are all similarly wrongful or that 
there are not profound differences between them. The law sets far greater penalties 
for some forms of sexual offence than for others, and my comments here indicate 
that this is as it should be. Recognising the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks as 
grounded by their expressive significance accommodates radical differences in the 
severity of such attacks. 
My proposed approach is that sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful in virtue of the 
expressive significance of the non-consensual contact imposed, which conveys that 
the assailant violates the victim’s self-ownership claims in a manner that does not 
occur in non-sexual attacks. 
 
Section 6.4 – A Proposed Framework 
 
This leaves a significant aspect of my account to be developed. I have not yet 
explained why an attack is more seriously wrongful in virtue of conveying a sexual 
expressive significance and treating the victim specifically as a sexual object. Thus 
far, I have argued that such attacks are seriously wrong because they convey that 
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the victim may permissibly be treated as a tool in service of the assailant’s interests 
and that they do not have the claims against the assailant’s conduct that they in fact 
possess as equal and valuable persons. However, this does not establish that there 
is something wrong in sexual attacks as distinct from otherwise similar non-sexual 
attacks. 
Many non-sexual assaults carry an expressive significance that denigrates the status 
of the victim, and it is not yet clear what sets sexual attacks apart from these, 
morally speaking. Suppose that an assailant repeatedly punches and kicks their 
victim to satisfy and alleviate their anger or for revenge against them. The default 
expressive significance of this contact is that the assailant hates the victim, takes 
them to be deserving of pain, and that the victim lacks claims over their own body 
against forceful non-consensual contact. With more contextual information, the 
attack might convey that the victim is appropriately treated as an object for the 
purposes of the assailant’s goal, to relieve their anger or provide them with 
vengeance. This is a paradigmatic non-sexual attack that violates the self-ownership 
claims of the victim and conveys that they are appropriately used as an object for 
the purposes of the assailant, whatever these purposes are. Those features of sexual 
attacks that I identified as the basis for condemning all instances of these attacks 
specifically are also present in non-sexual attacks. I must still explain how the 
features that are unique to sexual attacks exacerbate their wrongness. 
To recap, sexual attacks are conceptually distinct because the contact carries a 
default expressive significance to the effect that the assailant treats the victim as a 
sexual object, a means to sexual gratification. The claim that sexual attacks are 
distinctly wrong therefore relies on the view that a wrong occurs when the default 
expressive significance of the non-consensual contact is that the assailant treats the 
victim as a means to sexual gratification, where the very same wrong would not be 
perpetrated if it conveyed that the assailant treats the victim as a means to non-
sexual gratification. In the remainder of this chapter, I propose an explanation of the 
distinct wrongness of attacks that convey by default that the victim is a sexual 
object. 
My approach in what follows is not far removed from that which is adopted by 
Gardner and Shute. My strategy is to identify some feature that is unique to 
consensual sexual acts. I then argue that this feature of consensual sexual contact 
influences the default expressive significance of the contact when it is imposed 
without consent, and that this exacerbates the wrongness of the attack. My 
approach differs from Gardner and Shute’s account both in the expressive 
significance that I attribute to consensual sexual contact and in my view of the link 
between the expressive significance of consensual sexual contact and the wrongness 
of sexual attacks. 
In Section 6.5, I will illustrate how the default expressive significance of consensual 
sexual contact factors into the wrongness of sexual violence. In the present section, 
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I will illustrate the structure of my account by showing how it would operate given 
different (flawed) conceptions of the expressive significance of consensual sexual 
contact. The first example instantiates the conservative moral framework that 
underpins the traditionalist’s challenge. I find this argument deeply objectionable but 
present it to illustrate the broader structure of my argument, that the default 
expressive significance of consensual sexual contact explains why the non-
consensual imposition of contact that conveys that a person is a sexual object 
exacerbates the wrongness of the attack. 
Suppose that most individuals within a society subscribe to a traditional misogynist 
conception of sexual contact, to the extent that we can talk meaningfully about this 
being the society’s or culture’s view of sexual contact. According to this view, sexual 
contact is a regrettable necessity for reproduction within marriage and is otherwise a 
dirty and degrading relief of bestial urges, especially for women who participate. 
Sexual contact thereby develops a related default expressive significance and 
conveys that those involved are degraded, lack dignity, or are properly disrespected 
for the purposes of fulfilling desires that have little value. Under these conditions, 
persons engaging in non-procreative consensual sexual contact would convey that 
they do not respect their sexual partner, and that their partner has sufficiently little 
dignity that they may be degraded for purposes as trivial as the relief of these 
bestial urges. Even partners who do not subscribe to this view of sex are likely to 
face the default expressive significance of sexual contact in this society as an 
obstacle to healthy and enjoyable sexual relations. 
We can say something about how the expressive significance of sexual contact in 
this social context would exacerbate the wrongness of sexual attacks. In this 
context, the default expressive significance of sexual contact is such that it is 
degrading qua sexual contact. When an assailant imposes a sexual attack, they 
violate the victim’s self-ownership claims with contact that conveys that they are a 
means to sexual gratification. Given a traditional conception of sexual contact, the 
assault is particularly wrongful qua sexual attack. The assailant imposes contact onto 
the victim that is degrading and conveys that the victim may be used in a manner 
that is particularly disrespectful and harmful for the physical release of the assailant. 
The expressive significance of sexual contact in this society is such that non-
consensual sexual contact is especially degrading and conveys that the victim’s 
claims and wellbeing matter so little that the victim may permissibly be used in a 
demeaning act for the assailant’s base satisfaction. In short, one might explain the 
special wrongness of sexual attacks in this context by arguing that sexual attacks are 
a particularly cruel and extreme way to treat the victim as if they do not matter. 
I sketch this account to draw out a feature of my own argumentative strategy. This 
account explains the wrongness of sexual attacks by appeal to something that is 
distinct about the default expressive significance of consensual sexual contact. It 
holds that sexual attacks wrong the victim in a way that non-sexual attacks do not 
by recognising that the non-consensual imposition of contact with the relevant 
146 
 
expressive significance, which is unique to sexual contact, is on this basis distinctly 
wrong. 
There are some observations that it is important to reiterate here. It is possible that 
something like this expressive significance continues to be attributed to sexual 
contact. Indeed, it is not entirely dissimilar to the view that I discussed in Section 
2.4 of sex as something that one person does to another and that harms one of the 
parties, usually a woman or any person who is penetrated. Regardless, this account 
is inadequate because it instantiates one horn of the traditionalist’s challenge. If it 
succeeds, it does so on the basis of a conservative conception of sex. I hope to 
develop an account that can explain the wrongness of sexual attacks even when 
these conservative, pessimistic, and misogynistic conceptions of sex no longer 
attract any support nor influence widespread cultural beliefs about sex, a state of 
affairs that we have good reason to aim for. The account that I have sketched here 
clearly will not fulfil this condition nor meet the traditionalist’s challenge. 
Nevertheless, it reveals the structure of the account that I have in mind.  
The overarching structure of my account can also helpfully be illustrated by 
something like an account that I have already considered. To reiterate, some 
accounts hold that sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful because they attack 
something central to a person’s self or identity (Archard 2007; Hampton 1999; 
McGregor 1994; Shafer and Frye 1977). In places, these accounts draw heavily on 
the expressive significance of sex and sexual attacks. This is particularly overt when 
Archard (2007, 390), following Hampton, claims that a rapist “can be taken to say to 
his victim ‘You do not count, or count for very little, even in respect of that which 
matters very much to you’.” Sex is central to a person’s identity. When an assailant 
imposes non-consensual sexual contact, they convey that the victim lacks the value 
present in equal persons because the assailant disregards or violates the victim’s will 
for their own purposes. It is distinctly wrongful as a sexual attack because it conveys 
that the victim lacks value to the extent that they can be treated in this way even 
with regard to something that is very important to them. 
On this reading, Archard explains the distinctive wrongness of sexual attacks by 
appealing to a distinct feature of consensual sexual contact. Consensual sexual 
contact is relevantly distinct from most consensual non-sexual contact because it 
involves something that is central to a person’s identity. An implication of this is that 
when an assailant imposes sexual contact without consent, they convey (amongst 
other things) that the victim is of so little worth that they might be attacked in a way 
that targets something central to whom they are. This expressive significance is not 
present in most forms of non-sexual attack, and so establishes a normatively 
significant distinction between sexual and non-sexual attacks. We can identify a 
familiar structure in this reconstruction of Archard’s account. There is some feature 
of consensual sexual contact that distinguishes it from all or most forms of non-
sexual contact. Given this feature, non-consensual sexual contact carries an 
expressive significance that is not present in non-sexual attacks. This expressive 
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significance conveys something demeaning or degrading about the victim, and 
thereby has a normative significance. 
Of course, I disagree with Archard’s account, along with those advanced by Shafer 
and Frye, McGregor, and Hampton, because they rely on the claim that sex is central 
to each person’s identity. All the same, the structure of these accounts as I have 
presented it here is promising; sexual attacks are distinctly wrong because 
consensual sex carries a distinct expressive significance, such that the imposition of 
this contact without consent violates the victim’s self-ownership claims in a way that 
conveys something distinctly degrading about the victim and their status. However, 
if an account with this structure is to succeed, I must identify a feature that is 
peculiar to (consensual) sexual contact and show how this grounds a normatively 
distinct expressive significance of sexual attacks and, in turn, the distinct wrongness 
of sexual attacks. The framework of my account, then, is that sexual contact carries 
a particular expressive significance, such that the non-consensual imposition of 
sexual contact conveys something distinct about the victim. Sexual attacks are 
distinctly wrong for this reason. 
 
Section 6.5 –  
The Normative Content of Sexual Expressive Significance 
 
The remaining question is how we should understand the expressive significance of 
sexual contact and how this explains the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks. To 
begin, I return to the account developed by Gardner and Shute. The problem with 
Gardner and Shute’s conception of the social meaning of consensual sex is that it is 
idealised and excessively positive. However, we can make claims about consensual 
sexual contact that are more realistic reflections of commonly held views and are 
more likely to persist between cultural settings and over time. In a later paper, 
Gardner (2018, 54) makes claims about consensual sexual contact that are more 
modest and for that reason more compelling. He claims that there is at least an 
expectation of sexual contact generally that both parties cooperate to ensure each 
other’s “pleasure and satisfaction” (Gardner 2018, 54). Similarly, Natasha McKeever 
(2016, 208–9) argues that persons usually expect sexual contact to be pleasurable 
and for those involved to aim at each other’s gratification as well as their own. 
Thomas Nagel’s (1969) conception of complete sex likewise offers some insight into 
dominant expectations of and assumptions about sexual contact. He argues that sex 
is complete and therefore non-perverted only when it involves the following 
experiences for those involved. Each person must perceive and be aroused by 
(“sense”) the other (Nagel 1969, 10–11). They must recognise the other as being 
aroused and be aroused further by their arousal. Then, they realise that the other is 
aroused by their arousal and become aroused further upon this realisation. For 
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Nagel, complete sex follows a complex psychological process in which each person 
recognises that their potential partner is aroused by them, aroused by their arousal, 
and is themselves aroused further by this. This involves sexual excitement 
engendered by the recognition of the effect that one’s own sexual response has on 
one’s partner. 
I do not endorse Nagel’s conception in its entirety here. Certainly, I do not believe 
that his discussion reflects the way in which persons tend to think about sex and 
sexual attraction. However, I do believe that he reveals something about the way in 
which persons often perceive and think about sexual contact given his focus on 
mutuality and responsiveness to another person’s arousal plays. My suspicion is that 
most persons approach consensual sexual contact with an expectation that one’s 
partner not only aims for one’s own pleasure, but also that they themselves take 
pleasure in this response. More generally, there is a broad expectation that 
individuals engaged in consensual sexual contact aim for each other’s pleasure and 
themselves take pleasure in the enjoyment of their partner. 
Each of these views is indicative of a default expressive significance of consensual 
sexual contact that applies quite broadly and in numerous cultures. We generally 
think of consensual sexual contact as a joint enterprise in which those involved seek 
to provide each other with sexual satisfaction. Consensual sexual contact therefore 
has a distinct default expressive significance. It conveys that both persons seek to 
provide each other with gratification. This phenomenon is sufficiently prevalent in 
sexual contact, and in popular expectations of sexual contact and conceptions of 
good sex, that sexual contact has arguably acquired this default expressive 
significance. When one perceives or hears a description of sexual contact, one is 
therefore likely to infer that both partners seek to provide each other with sexual 
gratification and that they take pleasure in doing so, unless this presupposition is 
defeated. The default expressive significance of consensual sexual contact is one of 
pleasure and reciprocity. Consensual sexual contact thereby conveys by default that 
one aims for one’s own gratification and the gratification of one’s co-participant(s). 
In some cases, the focus might be on one partner experiencing pleasure. This is to 
be expected amongst partners with a mutually satisfying sexual relationship in which 
they sometimes take turns to focus on providing the other person with sexual 
pleasure, for example, by performing oral sex on them. More worryingly, we might 
expect that heterosexual persons who subscribe to the sexist view that women 
cannot or should not experience sexual fulfilment will likely engage in sexual contact 
in which the focus is on providing sexual gratification to only one partner (the man). 
These cases may be sufficiently widespread to impact the default expressive 
significance of sexual contact more widely. Therefore, I propose a very broad 
expressive significance of sexual contact, which accommodates diffuse views of sex 
and is likely to persist over time and (often) between cultures. The expressive 
significance of sexual contact is that those involved both aim for the gratification of 
at least one partner. 
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When physical forms of contact with a sexual default expressive significance occur in 
consensual contexts, there is usually at least the expectation that those involved aim 
for each other’s gratification (or the gratification of at least one partner). This is an 
empirical claim, a full defence of which would require empirical evidence about the 
societies in which we live, and I cannot provide this here. 
Instead, I note that this view of the expressive significance of sexual contact is 
minimal in its commitments, especially in comparison to that which Gardner and 
Shute attribute to sex detailed in Section 2.3. My claim here is only that there is a 
widespread cultural view that associates sexual contact with partners aiming for the 
pleasure of at least one person involved in the act. This avoids the grandiose and 
romanticised claims advanced by Gardner and Shute. The claim that sexual contact 
generally carries this expressive significance is also consistent with other conceptions 
of the expressive significance of sex I have discussed. It is consistent with the claim 
that sex is viewed as something that is degrading outside of marriage and an 
unfortunate necessity for procreation; it is possible for this view of sex to be 
prominent in a society in which persons also believe that sex generally occurs to 
provide at least one participant with pleasure. That is, it is possible that sex could be 
viewed as degrading in most circumstances and as being performed primarily for the 
pleasure of at least one party. Indeed, the natural law tradition that I discussed in 
Section 1.6 holds that non-marital sex is wrong exactly because it is a pleasurable 
act that takes place under certain conditions. That sex has the expressive 
significance I propose is also consistent with Hampton’s suggestion, which I 
discussed in Section 2.4, that the expressive significance of sex could be such that 
sex is viewed as a non-serious recreational activity engaged in for fun and 
relaxation. My proposal that sexual contact carries an expressive significance 
according to which those involved aim for the pleasure and gratification of at least 
one party is both minimal in its commitments and consistent with it being the case 
that sexual contact is subject to a host of other expressive significances. 
Furthermore, this expressive significance of sexual contact is also stable because the 
predominant motivation for consensual sexual contact is to provide gratification to at 
least one of the persons involved. As long as this is the case, sexual contact will be 
associated with physical gratification. If persons ceased to expect or experience 
physical gratification in sexual contact, it is plausible that there would simply be 
much less sexual contact, as few reasons remain to engage regularly in these 
activities if the pleasure is no longer present. We can reasonably expect that, at 
least while sexual contact remains a popular human interaction, it will continue to be 
associated with physical gratification and pleasure. 
Sexual attacks are distinctively wrong because they attack the victim and the victim’s 
agency in a way that non-sexual attacks do not, in virtue of their expressive 
significance. In a sexual attack, the victim is subjected to contact that, in consensual 
contexts, would convey that each person aims to provide the other with gratification. 
Sexual attacks are particularly cruel because the assailant imposes contact that 
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conveys by default that those involved seek each other’s gratification. The assailant 
selects a form of imposition that conveys that the victim seeks the gratification of at 
least one party. A particularly despicable form of victim-blaming levelled against 
survivors of sexual assault is the claim that they were a willing participant in the 
attack or even that they themselves enjoyed it. My claim is that the assailant in a 
sexual attack conveys this message to the victim by the default expressive 
significance of the contact that they impose. By imposing contact that, in consensual 
contexts, signals that both persons aim for the gratification of those involved, the 
assailant conveys the message that the victim seeks the gratification of the assailant. 
The non-consensual imposition of contact with a sexual default expressive 
significance violates the bodily integrity (or some closely related claim) of the victim 
while at the same time the assailant conveys the message that the victim is in some 
sense a co-conspirator in the attack on themselves. 
Of course, anyone who is at least minimally reasonable and minimally 
compassionate will recognise that the victim experiences sexual attacks as deeply 
unwelcome and uncomfortable, and often traumatic and sites of great suffering. The 
suggestion that victims might take pleasure in such an attack or seek the 
gratification of the assailant is both absurd and deeply immoral. Indeed, it is for this 
reason that the feature of sexual attacks that I seek to explicate shows them to be 
so seriously wrong. The assailant conveys the message that the victim is somehow 
complicit in the attack by utilising contact with a sexual default expressive 
significance, given the expectations and meanings that surround this contact when it 
occurs in consensual contexts. This is how the expressive significance of consensual 
sexual contact is utilised against the victim. Given the role they play in consensual 
interaction, forms of physical contact with a sexual default expressive significance 
convey that those involved seek the gratification of at least one party. This is 
subverted when such contact is imposed without consent; the assailant selects a 
form of contact that would, in consensual contexts, carry such an expressive 
significance. 
In this regard, sexual attacks are quite unique. However, there are some attacks or 
other kinds of imposition that are analogous. I have proposed that sexual attacks are 
seriously wrongful because the assailant attacks the victim with a form of contact 
that conveys a message about the victim that is not only false and deeply offensive 
(that the victim is appropriately used as an object by the assailant), but also that 
sexual attacks convey a relationship between the assailant and victim (that they are 
complicit in the violation of their own claims to full and equal personhood), which 
denigrates the victim’s status further. 
There are cases of other attacks that take this form, which exacerbates the severity 
of the wrong perpetrated and/or the harm inflicted on the victim. Consider the 
following analogy. A colonial power violently invades and occupies another country. 
Some native citizens of the country resist and are violently suppressed by the 
military forces of the colonial power, and many are murdered or captured. The 
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colonial military physically force those who are captured into the colonial military 
dress and use threats of violence to compel the partisans to perform salutes and 
utter chants in the style of occupying force’s personnel. Suppose that they also 
compel indigenous children to attend educational institutions in which they are 
forced to renounce the cultural traditions of their homeland and adopt those of the 
occupying colonial power. 
There are a multitude of very serious wrongs perpetrated by the colonial power and 
its military personnel in this case, and it is difficult to disentangle them. I propose 
that a serious wrong is perpetrated in forcing the captured indigenous partisans to 
wear the military dress of their oppressors and in forcing the indigenous children to 
adhere to the oppressors’ cultural traditions. There is something strikingly cruel in 
these practices. There is also something more complex at play here than if the 
military personnel had beaten their victims into submission, as condemnable as this 
would also be. The colonial military draws on the expressive significance of certain 
practices to inflict an especially targeted means of humiliating and degrading their 
victims. In ordinary cases, wearing the uniform of an institution and performing 
utterances that are typical of membership of this institution convey allegiance to or 
support of this institution. To a lesser extent, adhering to the cultural institutions of 
a particular society may convey an affinity to that society. As such, the practices of 
the colonial power’s military themselves acquire a powerful expressive significance 
that exacerbates the wrongness of their already unjust conduct. They violate a 
multitude of moral claims of the indigenous people to force these people into a role 
that, by default, conveys affinity or allegiance to those who wrong them.  
This aspect of the colonial power’s practices conveys something about the 
indigenous individuals that they oppress, namely that these individuals invite or 
approve of the violence committed against them and support the aims of the 
oppressors. While many very serious wrongs are present here, the injustice 
perpetrated by the colonial power is exacerbated by the expressive significance of 
this practice, in particular because this conveys that the victims hold a positive 
attitude towards the violence perpetrated against them and towards their 
oppressors. The colonial military utilise practices with a particular default expressive 
significance, conveying the (clearly false) message that the partisans and children of 
the colonised group are in some way complicit in the violence perpetrated against 
them. 
This example may strike the reader as unnecessarily brutal or gratuitous, and I am 
wary of the gravity of this kind of case. Nevertheless, I believe this example is 
important to illustrate the kind of harm I have in mind. In the colonisation case, the 
assailants violate the victims’ rights over their own bodies to impose treatment that 
conveys that the victims support the colonial power. When they compel the victims 
to wear clothing and participate in practices that are synonymous with the colonial 
regime, they convey that the colonised persons support the colonial power and 
welcome their own subjugation, and this is part of what makes their actions so 
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horrifying. This is comparable to the wrong that is perpetrated in sexual attacks, 
according to my account. In a sexual attack, the assailant violates the victim’s self-
ownership claims, the rights they have over their own body, by imposing contact 
that carries a sexual default expressive significance. The expressive significance of 
sexual contact is that both parties aim for the pleasure or gratification of at least one 
person involved. When an assailant imposes sexual contact, this carries the 
expressive significance that the victim is in some way complicit in or supportive of 
the assailant’s violation of their self-ownership claims, in much the same way as the 
colonial military’s impositions convey that their victims welcome or are in some 
sense supportive of the systemic wrongs perpetrated against them. In both cases, 
the assailants impose something during an attack (practises associated with the 
colonial power and sexual contact respectively) whose expressive significance is such 
that the attack conveys the complicity or support of the victims. There is something 
especially cruel, even perverse, in the mechanism by which the colonial power 
chooses to degrade, dehumanise, and dominate the victims of its atrocities, and I 
propose that something similar occurs in sexual attacks. This analogy also shows 
that default expressive significance, although quite an abstract phenomenon, can 
explain or ground serious and horrifying wrongs against a person. 
I hope that this analogy helps to illustrate my account of the distinct wrongness of 
sexual attacks. While sexual attacks are unique, the wrong perpetrated is 
comparable to that which occurs in this case. Given typical features of consensual 
sexual contact, forms of contact with a sexual default expressive significance convey 
by default that both parties seek at least one party’s gratification. In a sexual attack, 
the assailant conveys not only that the victim is an object who may appropriately be 
treated as a means to their own goals and lacks moral claims against such 
treatment, but also imposes a form of physical contact that would ordinarily (in 
consensual contexts) signal that both parties aim for sexual gratification. This 
remains the case even though no reasonable observer could entertain the 
suggestion that any victim ever welcomes the imposition of non-consensual sexual 
contact. It is instead a claim about the default expressive significance of the contact 
imposed. The assailant chooses to impose contact that, by default, conveys 
particular messages given the role that such contact plays in consensual contexts. 
I believe that discussing the expressive significance of sexual attacks in this way 
helps to explain the claim advanced by some theorists in the philosophical literature 
that sexual violence is distinct insofar as the assailant uses the victim as a tool to 
pursue ends that are directly “contrary” to the victim’s (Hampton 1999, 135; 
McGregor 1994, 235; Shafer and Frye 1977, 345). Initially, these claims appear 
unhelpful in distinguishing sexual from non-sexual violence, as both can meet this 
condition. For example, an assailant who punches and kicks their victim for revenge 
or to satisfy their anger seems to use the victim for ends contrary to their own in 
much the same way as the assailant in a sexual attack. My account offers a 
mechanism to understand these claims in a way that grounds a meaningful 
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distinction between sexual and non-sexual attacks. According to my account, it is 
only in sexual attacks that the assailant imposes contact for which the default 
expressive significance is one of cooperation between parties. The expressive 
significance of sexual attacks is such that the assailant hijacks or co-opts the victim’s 
body and agency in a way that does not generally occur in non-sexual attacks. 
Sexual attacks are distinctly wrong because they violate the victim’s self-ownership 
claims in a way that constitutes a unique denigration of the victim’s status. The 
assailant in a sexual attack chooses to impose contact onto the victim, the default 
expressive significance of which is that those involved seek the pleasure or 
gratification of at least on party. In a sexual attack, the assailant thereby conveys 
that the victim is complicit in or supports this violation of their rights over their own 
body by imposing this contact. The victim’s interests, rights over their own body, 
and autonomy are not only ignored, but their existence denied in the contact 
imposed by the assailant. The assailant conveys by their assault that the victim is 
merely a tool to be used for their own purposes, and that the victim’s own 
preferences are moulded to this end. 
If my comments here are plausible, then we have a strategy to meet the 
traditionalist’s challenge. I have proposed an account that offers a meaningful and 
morally significant distinction between sexual and non-sexual attacks. That is, there 
is at least one feature that exacerbates the wrongness of an act that is present only 
in sexual attacks. This entails that sexual attacks are seriously wrongful in a way 
that non-sexual attacks are not, and that a sexual attack is more seriously wrong 
than an otherwise similar non-sexual attack because it involves this feature. 
Importantly, my proposal does not entail a conservative or restrictive sexual ethic for 
consensual sexual contact. It relies only on the claim that individuals engaging in 
consensual sexual contact generally do so with a view to providing those involved 
with physical gratification, and that this occurs with sufficient frequency that persons 
generally recognise the relevant forms of contact as indicative of an intention to 
provide such gratification. 
Lastly, I will comment on the scope of my proposal. The feature of sexual attacks 
that I have identified might appear somewhat obscure, especially if it is to ground 
the wrongness of sexual attacks, many of which are intuitively uniquely abhorrent. 
However, it is important to avoid overstating the importance of this feature, which I 
advance to answer the traditionalist’s challenge, in explaining the wrongness of any 
actual sexual attack. If one is prompted to explain the very serious wrongness of an 
act of rape, this is far better explained by the suffering imposed on the victim and 
the intrusion into very private areas of their body than it is by anything I have 
proposed here. It would be more fruitful to explain the wrongness of voyeurism and 
exhibitionism by appeal to the fear and intense discomfort that they often cause, as 
well as the implied threat of even more invasive contact. In many cases, the 
wrongness of groping and verbal street harassment is best explained by reference to 
the sheer frequency with which (predominantly) women are targeted by these 
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impositions and by the resultant message that certain public spaces are not safe or 
accessible for individuals marginalised on the basis of their gender. However, my 
proposal is necessary because there are cases of these kinds of sexual attacks that 
do not exhibit these features but are nevertheless seriously wrong, and because it 
explains the general intuition that any sexual attack is more seriously wrongful than 
an otherwise similar non-sexual attack. 
A similar point obtains for the distinctions we might draw between sexual attacks. 
There is a range of features that explains the severity of the moral wrongness of 
sexual attacks other than the expressive significance that I have identified. Attention 
to these is necessary if we are to distinguish between different kinds of sexual 
attack. For instance, the statutory regulation of sexual offences across jurisdictions 
overwhelmingly identifies multiple kinds of attack as criminal and assigns differing 
penalties for conviction of these offences. To justify punishing some of these 
offences more than others, one probably must rely on the claim that a normatively 
significant feature is present in one but not the other. My account is entirely 
consistent with this. I have aimed only to justify the claim that, for any act of sexual 
intrusion, the act is distinctively wrong in virtue of being sexual. That is, I have 
aimed only to identify a feature that all sexual attacks have in common that 
distinguishes them from non-sexual attacks. This allows for a great deal of 
complexity and nuance in distinguishing different sexual attacks. On my account, all 
sexual attacks share a default expressive significance that exacerbates the 
wrongness of these attacks, and this allows for extensive normative differences 
between sexual attacks. 
 
Section 6.6 – Comparisons to Competing Accounts 
 
In this section, I argue that my account overcomes the objections that I levelled 
against other accounts of the wrongness of sexual attacks and raise some remaining 
problems for my account. 
I rejected Wertheimer’s account because it explains the wrongness of sexual attacks 
by appealing to the victim’s experienced suffering. This is problematic for two 
reasons; there are sexual attacks of which the victim has no experience and we have 
good reason to view the victim’s trauma in response to these attacks as a reaction to 
being subjected to a serious wrong that itself must therefore be explained by 
something other than this suffering. My account avoids this worry because I do not 
explain the serious wrongness of sexual attacks by appealing to the victims’ 
experienced suffering. My account is consistent with the claim that a sexual attack 
constitutes a more serious wrong insofar as the victim’s suffering is more severe, all 
other things being equal, but its explanation of why sexual attacks qua sexual 
attacks involve a distinct wrong does not depend on the suffering of the victim. 
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While I have drawn on survivors’ testimony to investigate the wrongness of sexual 
attacks, especially in my attempt to ascertain what it is for an attack to be sexual, I 
have not suggested that the wrong of sexual attacks consists in the victim’s 
suffering. These argumentative strategies are consistent with the claim that the 
suffering of victims of sexual attacks is a response to the wrong perpetrated against 
them, where the feature that explains the distinct wrong of sexual attacks is 
something other than victims’ conscious suffering. In response to the kind of view 
that Wertheimer advances, Gardner and Shute argue that we should prefer an 
account that explain why victims’ psychological suffering and traumatic responses 
are reasonable and proportionate given the serious wrong perpetrated against them. 
My own account is consistent with this model; it holds that sexual violence is 
seriously wrong because the assailant violates the victim’s self-ownership claims in a 
manner than conveys that the victim is an object for the assailant’s gratification and 
that they are complicit in this violation of their rights. The psychological suffering of 
victims can be understood as a reaction to this wrong perpetrated against them. 
Although aspects of Gardner and Shute’s (2007) view are promising, I rejected their 
account because it relies on a conception of the social meaning of consensual sex 
that is excessively positive. I suggested that this is not a stable or sufficiently 
widespread expressive significance of consensual penile-vaginal intercourse and that 
it may not pertain effectively in the case of many other sexual acts. Like Gardner 
and Shute’s account, I also rely on the claim that there is a set of meanings or 
features widely attributed to consensual sexual contact, where I discuss these as 
‘default expressive significance’ rather than ‘social meaning’. However, the default 
expressive significance that I attribute to consensual sexual contact is different from 
and more minimal than that advanced by Gardner and Shute. In my view, there is a 
widespread recognition that individuals who engage in sexual contact generally aim 
to provide each other (or at least one party) with sexual gratification, and so the 
default expressive significance of this contact is that participants aim for this. This is 
far less ambitious, and I think more realistic, than the claims that Gardner and Shute 
advance about the social meaning of consensual sexual contact. As such, my 
account is not vulnerable to the objections I raised against Gardner and Shute. 
I also objected to a diverse group of accounts according to which sexual attacks are 
seriously wrongful because they target something central to a person’s identity 
(Archard 2007; Hampton 1999; McGregor 1994; Murphy 1994; Shafer and Frye 
1977). I argued that these accounts are flawed because there is no interpretation of 
their central claim on which we can make sense of the views that sex is central to 
each person’s identity and that attacking something central to a person’s identity 
exacerbates the wrongness of the attack. My account is not vulnerable to this 
objection because I make no reference to sex as something central to a person’s 
identity. On my account, sexual attacks involve a distinct wrong because the contact 
conveys by its default expressive significance that the victim is a sex object and is in 
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some way complicit in the violation of their self-ownership claims. None of this 
depends on any view of the victim’s identity or the role that sex plays here. 
Finally, I raised concerns about existing self-ownership accounts of the wrongness of 
sexual violence, focusing on the objection that they cannot meet the traditionalist’s 
challenge because they do not ground a normatively significant distinction between 
sexual and non-sexual attacks. I argued that the most promising self-ownership 
account of the wrongness of sexual attacks would therefore be one in which the 
violation of the victim’s self-ownership claims is a necessary feature of the 
wrongness of sexual attacks, but part of a more complex explanation. This reflects 
the structure of the account that I have advanced here. The violation of the victim’s 
claims over their own body is an important aspect of the wrong of sexual attacks, 
but the normative distinction between sexual and non-sexual attacks is itself 
explained by the default expressive significance of the sexual contact by which the 
assailant violates these claims. 
There are some challenges to my account that warrant further research. I outline 
these here without attempting a full response. First, my account of expressive 
significance leaves open the possibility that the wrongness of sexual attacks depends 
on conceptions of sex that might vary between cultures. I have argued that the 
distinct wrongness of sexual attacks relies on the expressive significance of 
consensual sex, which depends on beliefs and attitudes widely held within a 
particular culture. Specifically, I suggest that the expressive significance of sex is, 
amongst other things, that both parties aim for the pleasure or gratification of at 
least one participant. It is not clear what my account would say of societies in which 
sexual contact does not carry this expressive significance, and perhaps it would 
simply fail to ground or justify the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks that occur in 
these circumstances. That is, the scope of my account might be limited to societies 
in which sexual contact has this expressive significance, and there may be societies 
in which it does not. 
There are two ways to mitigate this problem with my account, although I am not 
sure that either of them succeeds entirely. In Section 5.8, I argued that some forms 
of contact are likely to convey that those involved seek sexual gratification in almost 
any society. Given cross-cultural, biological facts about human persons, we might 
think that certain forms of contact will only occur frequently in pursuit of sexual 
pleasure. As such, it is very unlikely that a culture would develop that does not 
recognise these forms of contact as sexual. The same argument applies here. For 
similar reasons, we might think that sexual contact overwhelmingly comes to be 
associated with pleasure and gratification across societies, so that the expressive 
significance of contact that is imposed in sexual attacks is that those involved seek 
the sexual gratification of at least one party. While we can imagine a society in 
which this expressive significance is not attributed to sexual contact, this is unlikely 
given the sensitivity of certain parts of the body to certain kinds of contact. As I 
proposed in Section 6.5, the expressive significance that I attribute to sexual contact 
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is also minimal in its commitments and consistent with many other claims and 
attitudes being so attributed. Therefore, diverse societies with a wide range of 
cultural attitudes towards sex may nevertheless attribute this expressive significance 
to sexual contact, and my account of the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks would 
therefore apply very broadly. 
Alternatively, it may be instructive to separate the framework that I proposed in 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 from my application of this framework in Section 6.5. In Section 
6.5, I identified what I take to be an expressive significance attributed to sexual 
contact in many societies. In Sections 6.3 and 6.4, however, I raised the more 
general strategy of identifying an expressive significance that is unique to sexual 
contact and arguing that the assailant in a sexual attack takes advantage of this to 
violate the victim’s self-ownership claims in a manner that is particularly cruel, 
degrading, and opposed to the victim’s status as an equal human person. 
Considering the framework of my account more broadly enables its application to 
societies that do not attribute to sexual contact the expressive significance according 
to which those involved aim for the pleasure or gratification of at least one party. In 
Section 6.4, I showed how this framework might apply in societies that attribute a 
different expressive significance to sexual contact. 
These arguments show that my account applies very broadly. However, they do not 
entirely allay the concern that there might nevertheless be a society in which there is 
no distinctive expressive significance attributed to sexual contact that could explain 
the distinct wrongness of sexual attacks, however unlikely it is that such a society 
exists. A fully satisfying defence of my account against this charge therefore requires 
further research. 
A second problem with my account is that there are outstanding questions about 
exactly how the expressive significance of sex grounds the distinct wrong of sexual 
attacks. Many theorists argue that rape conveys that the victim is inferior to the 
assailant and lacks the status of a full and equal person, and suggest that this 
explains the distinct wrongness of these attacks (Archard 2007, 388–90; Gardner 
and Shute 2007, 22–24; Hampton 1999, 128–32, 135, 143; Shafer and Frye 1977, 
338, 340). Anderson and Pildes argue that when the expressive significance of acts, 
or something like it, conveys certain negative attitudes about a person or group of 
people as inferior or undeserving of equal status, this is sufficient to render that 
action legally illegitimate, at least in the sphere of US constitutional law (E. S. 
Anderson and Pildes 2000; Pildes 1998). Following these arguments, it might be that 
the fact that an act conveys an unjustified negative attitude towards another person 
and/or that their status is diminished is a wrong-making feature of the act, and that 
this requires no further explanation. If I have succeeded in showing that sexual 
attacks convey a distinctly negative claim about the victim of the attack, then 
perhaps this is sufficient to show that sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful. 
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However, an opponent of my account might respond that I have not yet shown how 
this grounds the distinct wrong of sexual attacks. That is, they might object that an 
act cannot be more seriously wrongful just in virtue of the expressive significance of 
the act, and that I require a further argument to show why the expressive 
significance of sexual violence makes sexual violence more seriously wrongful. I will 
not address this objection here, except to say that, following some of the theorists 
that I have discussed throughout, it is a plausible assumption that one person 
wrongs another by acting in a manner that conveys that this individual is not an 
equal person or that their status is in some other sense diminished. A full 
investigation and defence of this is an apt subject for further research. 
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Conclusion 
 
I conclude by summarising my arguments and findings. I have endeavoured to 
resolve a problem that I call the traditionalist’s challenge. The traditionalist’s 
challenge notes that many persons view sexual attacks as being seriously wrongful 
in virtue of being sexual attacks. A sexual assault is more seriously wrongful than a 
non-sexual assault that causes comparable psychological suffering and physical 
injury just because the former is sexual. To justify this, we require an account of 
how the sexual status of an attack exacerbates its wrongness. The traditionalist’s 
challenge holds that one cannot explain the special wrongness of sexual violence 
without appealing to a traditional or conservative conception of the moral status of 
sex more generally, which would entail that casual sex and non-monogamous sexual 
arrangements are morally problematic. We therefore seek an account of what it is 
that makes sexual attacks especially wrongful qua non-consensual sexual contact 
that does not commit its proponent to a restrictive sexual ethic for consensual 
contact. 
I have discussed a range of accounts as responses to the traditionalist’s challenge. I 
argue that they do not succeed in explaining the distinct wrong of sexual attacks, 
but that they provide a compelling insight and useful resources for this project. 
Wertheimer (2003, 103, 112, 156) argues that rape is seriously wrongful because it 
causes very significant experienced suffering and often elicits a traumatic response 
in the victim. That is, rape is seriously wrong because it causes a great deal of 
suffering. Gardner and Shute (2007, 4–6) argue that this approach is inadequate 
because there can be cases of rape (and sexual offences more broadly) that cause 
no experienced suffering for the victim but are nevertheless seriously wrongful. They 
also propose that we should prefer an account that explains the wrongness of rape 
independently of the victim’s experiences suffering (Gardner and Shute 2007, 6–7). 
In doing so, we can establish the traumatic experiences of victims to these attacks 
as rational and proportionate reactions to something awful that has been committed 
against them (Gardner and Shute 2007, 6–8). 
Gardner and Shute’s account is more promising, although I argued that it is 
ultimately flawed. They claim that the social meaning of sex “in our culture” is that 
this act is a “complete and literal intertwining of two selves” (Gardner and Shute 
2007, 22). Rape is seriously wrong because it exploits and subverts the positive 
social meaning of consensual sexual penetration (Gardner and Shute 2007, 22). The 
idealised and very positive social meaning of consensual sex entails that non-
consensual sex (rape) treats the victim as an object in a particularly egregious 
manner. As a result, rape objectifies the victim in a way that non-sexual assault does 
not. The most pressing problems with Gardner and Shute’s account concern the 
social meaning that they attribute to consensual sex. If a society moved away from 
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the view of consensual penile-vaginal intercourse as distinctly unifying towards the 
view that it is merely a fun recreational activity, then their argument about the 
wrongness of rape would no longer apply. It is also questionable how far this social 
meaning currently applies to non-consensual sexual contact other than penile-
vaginal penetration. Gardner and Shute’s account could only succeed with a more 
accurate and stable description of the social meaning of consensual sex. 
An alternative strategy holds that sexual violence is seriously wrong because sex 
constitutes a central part of a person’s identity or self, and so non-consensual sexual 
contact attacks something central to a person in a way that most non-sexual 
violence does not. Versions of this account are offered by Archard (2007), Hampton 
(1999), McGregor (1994), and Shafer and Frye (1977). I considered a range of 
interpretations of their claims that sex is central to the self and argued that they 
either fail to offer an account according to which sex is central to the identity of each 
person or fail to offer an account according to which an attack that targets 
something central to a person’s identity is thereby more seriously wrong. That is, 
there is no interpretation of the arguments advanced here according to which sex is 
central to the identity of each person and sexual attacks are, for that reason, 
seriously and distinctively wrong. 
I then examined self-ownership accounts, according to which sexual attacks wrong 
the victim insofar as they violate claims or rights that the victim has over their own 
body. I argued that the most promising versions of this account understand self-
ownership as the claims to do as one wishes with one’s own body and to prevent 
others from contact with one’s body, without stipulating any further similarities 
between the wrong of sexual attacks and the wrong perpetrated when other 
ownership claims are violated. There are two ways in which self-ownership might 
ground the distinct wrong perpetrated in sexual attacks. Either sexual attacks are 
distinctly wrong because they violate the victim’s self-ownership claims in a way that 
non-sexual attacks do not, or sexual attacks are distinctly wrong for some reason 
other than the violation of the victim’s self-ownership claims. I argued that the first 
approach is unsuccessful. Therefore, the distinct wrong of sexual attacks consists in 
something independent of the violation of the victim’s self-ownership claims, even if 
this plays a necessary role. 
Having taken issue with these existing accounts of the wrongness of sexual attacks, 
I developed my own account by first considering what makes an attack sexual. The 
question of what distinguishes sexual from non-sexual attacks is discussed very 
briefly by philosophers, if at all. I argued that we should not categorise sexual 
attacks in virtue of the body parts involved or the assailant’s motivation, but by 
appeal to the expressive significance of the contact imposed. Following Barnhill 
(2013) and Anderson and Pildes (2000), I proposed that forms of contact can 
communicate attitudes or claims independently of the intentions or experiences of 
those involved. This is the expressive significance of the contact. Some forms of 
contact convey that one person seeks sexual gratification with or from the other. 
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When these forms of contact are imposed without consent, the assailant conveys 
that the victim is a sexual object and appropriately (ab)used for sexual gratification. 
When non-consensual contact has this sexual default expressive significance, the 
assailant sexualises the victim and the attack is sexual. 
I built on this to develop my account of the distinct wrong of sexual attacks. Sexual 
attacks impose an “expressive harm” (E. S. Anderson and Pildes 2000, 1527–30) or 
“moral injury” (Hampton 1999, 126–35) onto the victim; they convey that the victim 
is appropriately used by the assailant for the purposes of sexual gratification and 
therefore convey that the victim lacks the entitlements owed to persons and is 
inferior to the assailant. To explain the distinct wrong of sexual attacks, we must 
appeal to the claim that only sexual attacks convey that the assailant treats the 
victim as a means for sexual gratification. Sexual attacks are distinctly wrongful 
because they involve contact with this expressive significance. 
There are various ways in which the expressive significance of sexual contact might 
exacerbate the wrongness of sexual attacks, depending on the expressive 
significance that one thinks is in fact attributed to such contact. In a traditional 
society where the expressive significance attributed to sex is that it is a harmful 
manifestation of bestial urges, the assailant in a sexual attack will convey by their 
contact that the victim may be violated in a manner that is particularly obscene and 
degrading. It would therefore convey that the victim lacks entitlements or value in a 
way that non-sexual attacks do not. If the expressive significance of sexual contact 
was that it is central to a person’s self or domain, as proposed by McGregor (1994) 
and Shafer and Frye (1977), then sexual attacks would perpetrate a distinct wrong 
because they would convey that the victim matters so little that they may 
permissibly be attacked in a way that targets something central to who they are. 
Sexual attacks convey that the assailant treats the victim as a sex object, as existing 
for sexual gratification. Explaining the distinct wrong of sexual attacks requires that 
we consider the expressive significance attributed to sexual contact to discern why it 
should be worse to be treated as a sexual object during non-consensual contact, 
rather than a non-sexual object. 
I am more tentative in setting out the remaining steps of my account, but I seek to 
identify an expressive significance that is widely attributed to sexual contact in my 
own society (the modern-day UK) and that is sufficiently minimal that it is likely to 
apply quite broadly across cultures. I propose that the expressive significance of 
sexual contact is that those involved aim to provide pleasure or gratification to at 
least one of the participants. When an assailant imposes non-consensual sexual 
contact, they choose a form of contact that conveys that both parties aim for the 
gratification of at least one of them, and thereby convey that the victim is complicit 
in the violation of their self-ownership claims. There is a kind of victim-blaming 
conveyed in the non-consensual contact itself. This reflects the claim by some 
theorists that the assailant takes control of or co-opts the victim’s body against their 
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will (Hampton 1999, 135; McGregor 1994, 235; Shafer and Frye 1977, 345). It is this 
feature of sexual attacks that explains their distinct wrongness. Of course, many 
such attacks are horrific for further reasons; they cause very severe suffering and 
trauma, they are physically invasive, they are injurious. However, sexual attacks are 
morally distinct from non-sexual attacks because each of them carries this default 
expressive significance. In all cases, the assailant conveys that the victim is complicit 
in the violation of their self-ownership claims and the attack on their body. 
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